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ABSTRACT 
BRINGING THE HOUSEHOLD BACK IN: FAMILY WAGE GAPS AND THE 
INTERSECTION OF GENDER, RACE, AND CLASS IN THE HOUSEHOLD 
CONTEXT 
 
MAY 2015 
 
MELISSA J. HODGES, B.A., MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Michelle Budig 
 
Using the 1980- 2008 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), this 
dissertation examines how parenthood exacerbates gender wage inequality within 
married, heterosexual households and across families stratified by race and social class. 
The majority of research on motherhood penalties and fatherhood premiums investigates 
how individual men and women’s earnings change after the arrival of children, yet it is 
unclear how parental bonuses and penalties accrue within coupled households. Although 
studies investigating child effects on individuals’ wages draw on theoretical explanations 
that rely on the joint decision-making of couples, empirical analysis rarely situates the 
effects of children on earnings within couples. This dissertation reveals that wage 
inequality associated with parenthood not only amplifies the gender wage gap, but also 
contributes to wage inequality among couples, net of couples’ work effort, educational 
attainment, income level, and racial/ethnic group membership. Importantly, the degree to 
which parenthood exacerbates gender wage inequality within the household varies by 
educational attainment, work hours, and racial/ethnic group of coupled partners. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION: BRINGING THE HOUSEHOLD BACK IN 
 
Much academic and popular media attention has focused on the growth in income 
inequality over the latter half of the 20th century to the present, citing increasing 
polarization of the US wage structure (Levy and Murnane 1992; Autor, Katz, and 
Kearney 2008; David and Dorn 2013) and a slowing of the rate of decline in both race 
and gender wage gaps since the early 1980s (McCall 2001; Blau, Brinton, and Grusky 
2006).1  Recent work documents a decline in the average gender wage gap among young, 
childfree workers (Gap 2013; McGregor 2013), yet a substantial gender wage gap 
persists in the United States.  Thus, the persistence of the gender wage gap may be related 
to processes of family formation and composition. In this dissertation, I argue that the 
growth in earnings inequality overtime is shaped by and reflected through patterns of 
family formation and examine how this inequality is situated within coupled households. 
Very few researchers have considered how the alignment of child wage effects 
within couples shapes wage inequality both within and across households. Prior research 
on the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium provide an important starting 
point for understanding and assessing how family composition contributes to earnings 
stratification by gender. It is well documented that many women suffer significant pay 
penalties for motherhood while fatherhood is associated with substantial wage premiums 
                                                          
1Although some studies report that gender gaps have all but disappeared for young, childless workers (Gap 
2013; McGregor 2013), using US census data, the National Women’s Law Center found that American 
women continue to receive only 77 cents for every dollar paid to their male counterparts and these wage 
gaps are even larger for men and women of color. While African-American men make 73 percent of what 
white men’s pay, on average, African-American women make 64 percent. Meanwhile, Latinas make just 54 
percent of white men’s earnings while Latino men make 61 percent (National Women’s Law Center 2013). 
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(Waldfogel 1997, 1998; Budig and England 2001; Hodges and Budig 2010; Lundberg 
and Rose 2000; Glauber 2007). However, the majority of this scholarship investigates 
how individual men and women’s earnings change after the arrival of children,2 but does 
not consider how child penalties and bonuses accrue specifically within households and 
shape within-couple gender earnings inequality. The literature demonstrates the 
importance of family structure in shaping individual outcomes, but a focus solely on 
individual outcomes conceals how families absorb and experience gender wage 
inequality associated with parenthood differentially, particularly across households 
stratified by social class and race/ethnicity.  
Because the family remains a key site for the creation and continuation of gender 
differentials (Hartmann 1981), family composition is likely an important mechanism 
contributing to current labor market inequality. The goal of this dissertation is to 
investigate the impact of parenthood on wage inequality among families through 
examination of the gender wage gap, the motherhood penalty, and fatherhood premium 
within and among different-sex married couples. In my second chapter, I assess how 
gender wage gaps within couples are modified by the number of children net of spousal 
differences in human capital and work hours and how these wage gaps vary across 
couples with different degrees of household specialization.  My third chapter traces the 
distribution of child wage effects among families across income and educational degree 
attainment to uncover how social class position affects children’s impact wage on 
inequality among dual-earning couples with differential access to economic resources and 
human capital. My fourth chapter delves further into differences in patterns of family 
                                                          
2 But see Killewald and Garcia-Manglano (2013). 
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composition by comparing within-couple wage gaps among black and white families. 
Each empirical chapter assesses how the number of children shape gender wage gaps 
within couples and how the composition of families contributes to larger wage inequality 
among American households. 
The key contribution of this dissertation to the work-family literature is “bringing 
the household back in” to the investigation of wage stratification research by using 
couples as the unit of analysis. Early status attainment and stratification work 
investigating wage inequality (Blau and Duncan 1967) initially used the married couple 
household as the unit of analysis. However, feminist scholarship critical of this approach 
argued that as more women entered the workforce in the post-war period, focusing on the 
household failed to account for women’s employment participation and differential 
opportunities in the labor market, and assumed that women’s labor market position 
mirrored that of her husband’s. This produced a shift in the stratification research to using 
individuals as the unit of analysis to better assess women’s labor market opportunities 
outside of the family. Studies began to control for family and household factors to isolate 
average wage gaps experienced by men and women rather than examining how the 
structure and relations within families produced gender wage inequalities. Yet, lost in this 
shift to an individual analysis was the investigation of how labor market processes 
produced within-couple inequalities, particularly in terms of earnings. This dissertation 
moves the literature forward by directly examining how children shape both women and 
men’s wages within different-sex, married couple households to better understand the 
relationship between gender wage inequality within families and larger processes of 
social stratification. 
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In my second chapter, I establish how the motherhood penalties, fatherhood 
bonuses, and within-couple gender wage inequality that accrue to families vary by 
couples’ division of paid work hours. Here I consider whether the distribution of the 
effects of children on earnings vary based on couple differences in work-time tradeoffs. 
Using couples as the unit of analysis enables a relational evaluation of primary theoretical 
explanations for the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium. I draw on a body of 
research that primarily relies on Becker’s (1981) economic theory of household 
specialization to understand how within-household tradeoffs in paid and unpaid labor 
shape wage outcomes of individuals associated with parenthood. Previous work modeling 
child effects on wages at the level of the individual created a mismatch between 
household-based theoretical explanations and the unit of analysis for testing these 
effects.3 I find that overall, children affect women’s labor supply negatively but have 
little effect on fathers’ employment participation. This supports previous work on 
individuals that finds reducing work hours has some explanatory effect for the 
motherhood penalty (Budig and England 2001; Budig and Hodges 2010; Glauber 2007), 
while increasing work hours has not been found to be a primary explanatory factor 
behind the fatherhood premium (Glauber 2008a&b; Hodges and Budig 2010). 
Investigating how work time arrangements within couples shape child wage effects of 
parents aligns examination of the theory of household specialization with the appropriate 
unit of analysis. 
                                                          
3 Theories of parental behavior, such as household specialization, make predictions regarding the non-
independence (or the joint decision-making) between parents as potentially driving the differential effects 
of children on earnings, thus individual-level analyses mask the non-independence between partners at the 
crux of what researchers are attempting to understand.  
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In my third chapter, I investigate how the effects of children on the relative 
earnings of spouses vary by socioeconomic status, as measured by family income and 
spousal educational attainment. To date, no study considers how these processes vary by 
social class in the couple context. The variation in the effects of children on wages among 
different groups of fathers and mothers in terms of education (Avellar and Smock 2003; 
Anderson, Binder, and Krause 2002; Hodges and Budig 2010) and position in the wage 
distribution (Budig and Hodges 2010; Cooke 2013) suggest that socioeconomic class 
may matter for how these child wage effects are experienced within coupled households. 
Several qualitative studies have found that social class is an important predictor of how 
dual-earning families “do gender” based on the ideologies of female caretaker and male 
breadwinner (Blossfield and Drobnic 2001). Prior work also suggests that middle and 
upper-class couples are most likely to change their division of labor after the arrival of 
children (Blossfield and Drobnic 2001). Meanwhile, working class wives are more likely 
to maintain employment based on financial necessity and working class families tend to 
divide paid work more equitably than middle class families (Blossfied and Drobnic 
2001). Unlike their working class counterparts, upper income families also have access to 
more resources to better facilitate the combination of work and family for both parents 
(Williams and Boushey 2010).  Yet, the story is complicated based on how class is 
measured, by educational attainment or wage level. Using wage level, some scholars find 
that motherhood penalties tend to be largest for women at the low end of the earnings 
distribution after controlling for an array of human capital characteristics (Budig and 
Hodges 2010; England, Bearak, Budig, and Hodges 2012). Using education, other work 
finds that high school graduates tend to incur larger wage losses than high school drop-
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outs or college graduates, since high school graduates are more likely to hold jobs with 
high inflexibility that often require their presence during regular office hours (Anderson, 
Binder, and Krause 2003). Meanwhile, more highly educated men garner higher 
fatherhood bonuses, (Hodges and Budig 2010), and higher-earning men get a larger 
bonus for fatherhood relative to lower-earning men (Cooke 2014). To sort out these 
somewhat conflicting findings in the literature and to investigate how social class 
structures within-couple earnings inequality by gender and parenthood, my third chapter 
compares within-couple gender wage inequality associated with children by education 
and family income level 
The fourth chapter of this dissertation contributes to the literature by illustrating 
how the effects of children within couples vary among white and black families. In doing 
so, I contribute to feminist scholarship that has long maintained that processes of family 
formation are deeply intertwined with workers’ experiences in the labor market and are 
also central to systems of race, class, and gender (Collins 1998). Family organization is 
shaped by interlocking systems of oppression and are also locations where such systems 
are reproduced (Collins 1998). These processes are evidenced by wage differentials and 
family formation patterns among white and black families.  Differences in selection into 
marriage and parenthood between white and black couples may therefore shape gender 
wage inequality within households. Moreover, given the considerable labor market 
disadvantage experienced by workers of color (Pager 2003; Kennelly 1999; Pager and 
Quillian 2005), the effects of children on wages also shape inequality across race/ethnic 
groups. Smaller motherhood penalties have been found for black women compared to 
whites (Budig and England 2001; Glauber 2007; England, Bearak, Budig, and Hodges 
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2013), while white men receive larger fatherhood earnings bonuses compared to black 
men (Glauber 2008a&b; Hodges and Budig 2010). Additionally, recent work on the 
fatherhood wage premium found that men are only rewarded when they have biological, 
co-residential children, while fathers who do not co-reside with their biological children 
and step-fathers do not garner premiums for fatherhood (Killewald 2013), regardless of 
racial/ethnic group membership.  Differences in patterns of family formation and labor 
market experiences for workers of color suggest it is important to consider how wage 
inequality associated with children is distributed across families by race/ethnicity.   
Findings from each chapter also speak to current public debates over women 
needing to “lean in” instead of “opting out” of paid employment to address gender wage 
and labor market inequality and work-family conflict. Recently, popular media has 
encouraged women to “lean in” (Sandberg 2013) to the world of paid work to reduce 
gender wages gaps. This relatively new campaign encourages women to devote more 
effort to paid work in part as a response to debates over whether highly educated women 
were choosing to “opt out” or forego paid work to care for children at home (Belkin 
2003; Stone 2007).  Findings from each chapter of this dissertation illustrate that the 
tensions between the structure of work and the structure of families that may be driving 
the remaining gender wage gap and that these tensions affect families differently at 
different social locations. Each chapter’s results reveal that there is substantial wage 
inequality within households that remains unexplained. Prior research points to 
differences in employer evaluations of workers with children as a contributing factor to 
the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium. Experimental audit studies have found 
that due to the gendered ideology of the “ideal worker” (Williams 2000), employers often 
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evaluate workers based on assumptions of employee care responsibilities (Ridgeway and 
Correll 2004; Kennelly 1999). While mothers are viewed as being less committed or 
productive workers, fathers are more likely to be viewed favorably (Correll, Benard, and 
Paik 2007). Previous work has been unable to directly investigate employer 
discrimination due to data limitations, but researchers have argued that after controlling 
for human capital, labor supply, and job characteristics the residual penalties and 
premiums result from employers evaluations of workers based on parental status (Budig 
and England 2001; Glauber 2008a&b). If wage gaps within households occur based on 
employers’ evaluations of mothers and fathers based on stereotypical notions of the 
“ideal worker” (Williams 2000), calls for women to “lean in” do not appear to make 
much sense for closing gender wage gaps occurring within families.  
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this dissertation use the 1980-2008 wave of the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, a nationally representative sample of workers collected by 
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Using the NLSY aligns my results with the majority 
of studies of the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium that examine individual 
wage outcomes associated with parenthood. The initial year of the survey, 1979, took 
place when respondents were aged 14-21; in 2008, the ages of respondents range from 41 
to 58. Respondents were interviewed annually until the 1994 survey and bi-annually 
thereafter. The NLSY is a rich source of data on employment and households and follows 
respondents through their careers, marital histories, and transitions to parenthood. 
However, while the NLSY79 collects information about all members living in 
respondents’ household, the data available for spouses obtained from the household roster 
is less complete. Important factors affecting wage trajectories, such as work experience 
9 
 
and job seniority, are not available for respondents’ spouses. However, the data includes 
measures of spouses’ education and work effort, which are the key factors necessary for 
this analysis. 
In each empirical chapter, I use dyadic random slopes models, a subset of multi-
level models (Raudenbusch and Bryk 2002; Kenny 2006) to estimate both the gender 
wage gaps and the effects of children on the natural log of couples’ wages. The model is 
estimated at two levels with time in years nested within individuals. Individuals are then 
nested within couples.  At level-1, the units are the repeated responses over time (for 
example, the log of wages) within each couple. At level-2, the unit of analysis is the 
couple.4 The level 1 (within-dyad) model estimates the average differences in hourly 
wages within couples at each time point, while level 2 estimates average gaps in wages 
between couples. Thus, these models enable simultaneous estimation of the effects of 
husband wage advantage and children within and among couples. 
Chapter 2 investigates how the gender wage gap within couples varies by parental 
status and how motherhood penalties and fatherhood premiums vary within the 
household context, accounting for processes of assortative partnering by education and 
spousal work effort. The analyses then turns to examining how much of the inequality in 
wages among households is attributable to the effects of children across families based on 
different degrees of couples’ specialization.  I examine four types of dual-earning 
                                                          
4 Conceptually, the model contains 3-levels with two levels of nesting. Responses at each time point are 
nested within individuals and individuals are nested within couples. However, at the level of analysis it is a 
two-level model with a single level of nesting (responses nested within couples). This results from how 
gender is handled in the dyadic model. Gender is a characteristic of the repeated responses (a fixed effect) 
rather than a level in the model. 
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couples. First, I compare within-couple wage gaps where both spouses work full-time and 
where wives work part-time while husbands work full-time. Next, I evaluate Winslow’s 
(2009) finding that wage discrepancies are largest when one spouse works excessive 
hours by comparing the within-couple wage gaps for couples where husbands work more 
than 50 hours per week and wives work either full or part-time.  
Chapter 3 examines how wage inequality associated with children within families 
is stratified by socioeconomic class in terms of spouses’ income and educational 
attainment. I investigate how the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium may 
amplify or reduce gender wage discrepancies within couples based on wage level and 
parental degree attainment across households. When both spouses are highly skilled (or 
highly paid) workers, it is likely that men who garner the largest premiums are married to 
women who incur the smallest penalties. Among couples with less education or income, 
it is also possible that men who incur small fatherhood premiums may also be married to 
women who receive small motherhood penalties.  This would result in smaller gender pay 
differences within households, but based on the differences in the tails of the income and 
educational distributions, produce greater inequality across households. First, I compare 
the distribution of the gender and child wage gaps within couples across seven different 
quantiles of the family income distribution. Next, I assess how these gaps vary based on 
the degree attainment of spouses. By using both wages and the educational attainment of 
spouses, I am able to assess within-couple wage gaps among families across 
socioeconomic class.   
In my fourth chapter, I investigate the association between the gender wage gap 
and the effects of children on married couples’ wages within white and black families to 
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assess how the effects of children on couples’ wages differ by racial group membership. 
In the first set of analyses, I compare the effects of the number of children within couples 
where both partners are identified in the NLSY as being non-Hispanic white or non-
Hispanic black, controlling for spousal age, education, and work effort.  Given 
differences in family formation patterns among white and black families, in the next set 
of analyses, I consider whether the effects of children on wages vary based on parent-
child relationships across different racial/ethnic groups.  This chapter illustrates 
differences in the distribution of gender wage inequality within households by 
race/ethnicity. 
The goal of this dissertation is to “bring the household back in” by situating 
current US wage inequality within households based on family composition. Using the 
1980-2008 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, each empirical chapter of 
this dissertation investigates how gender wage inequality associated with children 
contributes to the overall wage stratification across American families. There are several 
potential pay-offs to approaching the examination of gender and family gaps in the 
couple context. First, using couples as the unit of analysis enables better evaluation of 
primary theoretical explanations for the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium. 
While previous research investigating child wage effects among individual men and 
women has used the theory of household specialization as a key theoretical explanation 
for wage differences between parents and the childfree, these studies fail to appropriately 
evaluate the theory by using individuals as the unit of analysis.  
Second, using dyadic multi-level models reveals how processes of family 
formation and composition contribute to the persistence of a gender wage gap in the US. 
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Although the gender wage gap appears to have all but closed among young, unmarried, 
and childfree workers, I argue that much of the remaining gender wage gap is situated 
within families. Assessing the alignment of motherhood penalties and fatherhood premia 
within couples based on work-time tradeoffs may shed light on how the persistence of the 
gender wage gap is generated by couples’ responses to work and family obligations. 
Furthermore, findings may also be useful in speaking to current public debates regarding 
the validity of encouraging working women to “lean in” in the face of inflexible spouses 
and work structures.  
Finally, the analyses in chapters three and four illustrate how processes of family 
formation are central to systems of race, class, and gender (Collins 1998). Within-couple 
wage inequality varies in significant ways among couples with different levels of 
education and economic resources. Parental wage gaps also align differently based on a 
family’s racial/ethnic status. The analyses uncover important differences in the 
distribution of child wage effects within couples across education, income levels, and 
racial/ethnic group membership that may provide insight into addressing current US 
wage inequality. In order to address the growth in US wage inequality, this dissertation 
demonstrates that it is necessary to consider how wage gaps associated with children vary 
based on the diversity among US families. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ALL IN THE FAMILY: A COUPLES’ APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING 
GENDER AND CHILD WAGE GAPS 
 
 
Much media attention has been given to a recent study documenting a decline of 
the gender wage gap among young, childfree workers (Gap 2013; McGregor 2013).  
Although this decline is indeed promising, a substantial gender pay gap persists in the 
United States (Blau, Brinton, and Grusky 2006). While the pay gap has declined among 
young men and women in the early stages of their careers, the question of which workers 
continue to shoulder the remaining wage gap has yet to be fully answered. It is likely that 
remaining gender wage inequality is situated within and borne largely by families. 
Therefore, despite popularized solutions that encourage women to “Lean In” (Sandberg 
2013) to the world of paid work to combat gender workplace inequality, the remaining 
pay gap cannot be wholly addressed without taking workers’ familial obligations into 
account. To fully understand and address gender wage inequality, it is necessary to 
consider how the wage gap occurs not only among individuals but also within families 
and across households.  
To this end, feminist research that examines the effect of children on wages 
provides insight into understanding the intersection of work and family life in the 
production of gender wage discrepancies. It is well-established empirically that many 
women suffer significant pay penalties for motherhood while fatherhood typically is 
associated with substantial pay increases (Waldfogel 1997, 1998; Budig and England 
2001; Hodges and Budig 2010; Lundberg and Rose 2000; Glauber 2007). On average, 
US mothers incur a wage penalty of roughly 7 percent (Budig and England 2001) while 
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fathers garner an average earnings premium of 5 percent (Glauber 2008 a&b; Hodges and 
Budig 2010). The considerable gender differences in wage effects associated with having 
children suggest that some of the gender gap may be explained by the alignment of wage 
effects associated with children within households. To directly address persistent gender 
wage inequality, it is therefore necessary to consider to what degree the gender wage gap 
is located within and among couples with children. 
However, the majority of research on the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood 
premium investigates how individual men and women’s earnings change after the arrival 
of children,5 but does not consider how these individual child penalties and bonuses 
accrue specifically within households to generate within-couple wage inequality. While 
there are a diverse array of family forms in the US, fathers and mothers often live in 
households together, thus it follows that couples jointly bear the pay penalties and 
bonuses parenthood brings. The effects of children vary substantially among different 
groups of parents based on the couples’ marital status, spouses’ human capital 
characteristics and household work time arrangements (Budig and England 2001; 
Ameudo-Durantes and Kimmel 2005; Anderson, Binder, and Krause 2002; Glauber 
2007; 2008 a&b; Budig and Hodges 2010; Hodges and Budig 2010; Lundberg and Rose 
2000). While the motherhood penalty, on average, is largely driven by women’s lost 
work experience and reduced hours following the birth of a child, particularly among 
married women (Budig and England 2001; Glauber 2007; England, Bearak, Budig and 
Hodges 2013), married men with more human capital and who co-reside with their 
biological children garner the largest fatherhood premiums (Hodges and Budig 2010; 
                                                          
5 But see Killewald and Garcia-Manglano (2013). 
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Killewald 2013). Therefore, children may (or may not) exacerbate wage disparities 
between husbands and wives based on couple differences in work effort and human 
capital characteristics. The focus of examining child effects on individual’s wages in 
previous work masks how families absorb and experience gender wage inequality. 
Parental penalties and premia may also contribute to larger patterns of wage inequality 
based on the distribution of these effects across households with different resources and 
work time arrangements. 
Moreover, much of the theorizing about the effects of children on earnings relies 
on predictions of couples’ characteristics, joint decision-making, and work time tradeoffs 
to explain why children are associated with gender discrepant earnings for mothers and 
fathers. Thus, modeling child effects on wages at the level of the individual creates a 
mismatch between household-based theoretical explanations and the unit of analysis for 
testing these effects. Theories of parental behavior, such as household specialization 
(Becker 1981), make predictions regarding the nonindependence (or the joint decision-
making) between parents as potentially driving the differential effects of children on 
earnings, thus individual-level analyses conceal the nonindependence between partners 
which is what researchers are attempting to evaluate.  
  The goal of this chapter is to investigate the relationship between gender, 
parenthood, and wage inequality through observation of the gender wage gap, the 
motherhood penalty, and fatherhood premium within and among married couples. Using 
the 1980-2008 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, I use dyadic multi-
level models to understand how within-couple wage gaps change with the number of 
children in the household and how potential husband wage advantage conditioned on 
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children varies based on the work hour tradeoffs of dual-earning couples. Three research 
questions drive this analysis: 1) how does the gender wage gap within married couples 
vary by parental status? 2) How do motherhood penalties and fatherhood premia align 
within the household context? And 3) How much of the inequality in wages among 
households is attributable to the effects of children across families based on couples’ 
different work and family arrangements?  I briefly review the literature on factors shaping 
the wage inequality within couples and the gendered effects of children on parental 
wages before moving to my empirical analysis. 
Theorizing Parental Wage Inequality Within and Between Households 
The literature on parental penalties and premiums identifies several possible 
explanations behind variation in child effects on wages6 that involve processes occurring 
both within and among couples. They include: processes of selection into marriage and 
parenthood, assortative partnering and variation in human capital characteristics of 
couples, and household specialization in spousal work effort. The last explanation also 
usually cited for the residual effects of children on wages is differential treatment of 
workers by employers based on an employee’s parental status (Ridgeway and Correll 
2004; Correll, Benard and Paik 2007). Taking couples as the unit of analyses, I assess 
how these factors shape the gender wage gap and the alignment of parental wage effects 
                                                          
6 The literature on parental earnings gaps finds variation in the motherhood penalty and fatherhood 
premium across racial and ethnic groups (Budig and England 2001: Glauber 2007a; Glauber 2007b; 
Hodges and Budig 2010). Budig and England (2001) found that the motherhood penalty was smaller for 
African American and Latina mothers due to racial/ethnic variation in women’s attachment to paid labor.  
England et al (2013) find that Black women’s motherhood penalties also tend to be smaller than white 
women’s. Moreover, a large body of evidence points to minority men’s disadvantaged position in the labor 
market. Glauber (2007) and Hodges and Budig (2010) find that African American and Latino fathers 
typically garner lower premiums for fatherhood than white men. In my fourth chapter, I compare how 
children influence wage inequality within black and white families.   
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within and across households. Based on previous work on the wage effects of children, I 
posit three initial hypotheses:  
H1: Husbands will have a wage advantage within couples regardless of parental status.  
H2: As the number of children increases, within-couple husband wage advantage will 
also increase. 
H3: The alignment of the wage effects associated with children within couples will 
explain wage inequality (variation) across households. 
Selection into Parenthood and Partnership Pathways 
The effects of gender and children on wages have been found to vary by family 
structure with important consequences for within and between-household inequality. 
Therefore, as in all analyses of this dissertation, it is first important to consider processes 
of selection into marriage and childbearing. Marriage gaps between middle and working 
class couples has been linked to growing income inequality across US families (Cherlin 
2014; Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov, and Santos 2014). Most research finds that 
marriage itself produces gender inequality within households (Gupta 1999; 2007; West 
and Zimmerman 1987). Marriage is also linked to greater motherhood penalties (Budig 
and England 2001; Glauber 2007; Misra et al. 2007; Budig and Hodges 2010), possibly 
because married women’s greater family resources allow them to reduce their work effort 
when children are young. If mothers are more likely to reduce time spent in paid work 
following the birth of child, they experience not only a loss in terms of paid work time 
directly following the birth, but also a reduction in experience and seniority on the job, 
which also directly affects earnings (Budig and England 2001; England et al 2013). 
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Meanwhile, only married men receive the premium associated with fatherhood (Glauber 
2008a&b; Hodges and Budig 2010; Killewald 2013), with marriage explaining roughly 
one-half of the fatherhood earnings bonus (Hodges and Budig 2010; Glauber 2008a&b). 
Killewald (2013) also finds that only married, co-residential, biological fathers receive a 
wage premium of 4 percent.7 Given the decline in marriage rates in recent decades 
(Cherlin 2014; Krieder and Ellis 2011b; Bumpass and Lu 2000), by examining couples’ 
transition to parenthood after marriage, I am investigating a select group of families in 
my sample. In results not shown, I initially tested for differences across marriages, 
finding different selection processes at work in first versus subsequent marriages. 
Therefore, I limit my sample to first marriages only.  
In addition, as discussed in the literature on the motherhood penalty and 
fatherhood premium, unmeasured factors, such as individual career ambition, that cannot 
be captured by adding controls to the dyadic multi-level model can also influence within-
couple wage inequality. Factors that influence wages may also shape a couple’s 
likelihood of having children, thus making it difficult to assess causality. To address this 
potential selection bias, researchers of parental penalties and premiums have primarily 
employed fixed-effect models that provide estimates that are robust to unobserved 
differences among respondents that do not change over time (Allison 2009). However, 
the fixed-effects in multi-level dyadic models cannot control for unmeasured differences 
among couples that influence the effect of children on earnings or that statistically 
interact with another variable that influences these effects. Thus, time changing variables 
                                                          
7 I examine the role of biology and co-residency with children in further detail in Chapter 4. 
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that could simultaneously influence both the likelihood of couples having children and 
how much each spouse earns must be explicitly included in the model.  
Labor Market Resources and Human Capital  
 
Individuals may select spouses based on a variety of factors. However, research 
investigating marriage and partnership patterns finds that couples are similar in terms of 
age (Kalmijn 1998), educational attainment (Blackwell and Lichter 2004; Schwartz and 
Mare 2005), and other human capital characteristics at the time of marriage (Rosenfeld 
2007). Human capital characteristics have also been found to have important 
consequences for the effect of children on wages, but findings vary. While some scholars 
have found that high school graduates tend to incur larger motherhood penalties than 
either low- or high-skill mothers due to differences in time constraints and flexibility on 
the job (Anderson, Binder, and Krause 2003), others have found that mothers with the 
lowest wages incur the largest penalties after controlling for education and work 
experience (Budig and Hodges 2010; England et al 2013). Meanwhile, fathers with more 
education and those employed in professional/managerial occupations, which tend to 
have higher human capital requirements, garner the largest premiums (Hodges and Budig 
2010). Although findings are inconclusive, prior scholarship on parental wage effects 
suggest that it is necessary to consider how human capital may shape within-couple wage 
inequality. 
It is possible that wage gaps within couples may simply result from differences in 
human capital characteristics between spouses. However, since individuals are more like 
to marry based on educational similarity (Cherlin 2014), human capital characteristics 
20 
 
may have less explanatory power for gendered wage variation within couples, but explain 
wage inequality across families. Winslow (2009) finds that having a bachelor’s degree or 
higher is associated with higher odds of earning as much as or more than one’s spouse for 
both men and women.  Because spouses often select into marriage based on education, in 
couples where both husband and wife have relatively high education, or similar degree 
attainment, there may be a smaller wage gaps within couples. Highly educated wives, 
who may incur the smallest wage penalties, are more likely to marry highly educated 
husbands, who are more likely to earn the largest bonus, thus producing less within-
couple inequality among highly-educated couples.  Meanwhile, the reverse process may 
occur among couples in which both spouses have less education. In less-educated 
couples, wives are more likely to receive a higher penalty and men a smaller premium, 
thus producing more wage inequality within couples with less education. Accounting for 
age8 and education9 may explain some of the differences in wages within, but also across 
couples. To address this, I include measures for the age and educational attainment of 
spouses in my dyadic multilevel models. 
H4: Including controls for age and education of each spouse in the model will decrease 
husbands’ wage advantage and the effects of children on wages within couples. 
H5: Including controls for age and education of each spouse in the model will decrease 
wage inequality across couples.  
 
                                                          
8 Age also functions as a proxy measure for work experience. Unfortunately, the spousal data contained in 
the household roster of the NLSY does include sufficient measures that allow for a construction of work 
experience for spouses. I tested the effect of potential work experience as used by Killewald (2013). 
Results were robust and available in Appendix Table A4.  
9 I explore variation in the gender wage gap and differences in wage returns for having children within 
couples across levels of education in more detail in the following chapter. 
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Women’s Employment Participation and Household Specialization  
The most widely tested explanation for the motherhood penalty and the 
fatherhood premium is the theory of household specialization (Budig and England 2001; 
Hodges and Budig 2010; Lundberg and Rose 2000; Glauber 2007). According to Becker 
(1981), women’s disadvantage in the labor market makes their specialization in 
reproductive work rather than paid labor a potentially rational choice. Wives may thus be 
more likely to incur a wage penalty for motherhood due to reduced time spent in paid 
work or foregoing paid employment altogether after the arrival of children. Meanwhile, if 
husbands are more likely to increase their work hours, they may in turn garner a bonus 
relative to childfree husbands for their specialization in market work. Taking couples as 
the unit of analysis allows for better interrogation of the theory of household 
specialization by directly modeling the effects of children on couples’ wages to assess 
how children shape gender wage inequality within families. 
Previous work finds that couples are likely to engage in household specialization 
after marriage (South and Spitze 1994; West and Zimmerman 1987; Gupta 1999; 2007) 
and that children intensify this process (Lundberg and Rose 2001). Among dual-earning 
couples, with the arrival of children it is often the case that one partner’s success at work 
usually comes at the expense of the other (Moen 2003; Presser 1994; Becker and Moen 
1999).  Women are more likely to take non-traditional work arrangements, such as 
working part-time to better blend work and family (Moen 2003, Bianchi, Robinson, and 
Milkie 2006). Other studies also find that husbands’ careers are often taken into account 
when making decisions among highly skilled, professional women (Stone 2007) and the 
middle class (Becker and Moen 1999) to remain at work or reduce work time. Although 
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prioritizing men’s careers is no longer universally the case, the husband’s career typically 
takes top priority (Moen 2003; Abraham et al. 2010) and this may be reflected in 
husbands’ wage advantage within households. However, wage gaps may be smaller 
within dual-earning households where both spouses maintain full-time employment 
following the birth of a child.   
As with human capital, research findings on the relationship between work hours 
and the effects of children on wages are also somewhat mixed. Reducing work hours has 
some explanatory effect for the motherhood penalty (Budig and England 2001; Budig and 
Hodges 2010; Glauber 2007). Winslow (2009) finds that the impact of motherhood on 
women’s earnings relative to their husbands can be largely explained by mothers’ lower 
labor supply relative to their childless counterparts. However, increasing work hours has 
not been found to be a primary explanatory factor behind the fatherhood premium 
(Glauber 2008; Hodges and Budig 2010). This suggests that while reducing work time 
may have explanatory potential for mother’s wages, this may not necessarily be the case 
for fathers. Including the work hours of both spouses in the model may therefore reduce 
more of the motherhood penalty than the fatherhood premium.  Although work hours 
only partially explain the differential effects of children on parents’ earnings, to test the 
theory of household specialization I include controls for usual weekly work hours and 
annual weeks worked for husbands and wives in my models.  
H6: Including weekly work hours and annual weeks worked for each spouse will explain 
(reduce) more of the motherhood penalty than the fatherhood premium within couples. 
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Although the effect of children on women’s employment has declined since the 
1990s, regardless of marital status and educational attainment (Boushey 2008), variation 
among couples in women’s labor force attachment patterns may also shape wage 
inequality between households. While there has been considerable debate over whether 
highly educated mothers are “opting out,” (Belkin 2003) of paid work, women overall 
continue to have strong labor market attachment (Boushey 2008; Stone 2007; Carr 2005), 
but are more likely to work part-time with the arrival of children (Bianchi, Robinson, and 
Milkie 2006). However, Cha (2010) finds that in couples where husbands work excessive 
hours, women’s likelihood of reducing hours or dropping out of employment increases. 
This suggests that when husbands work long hours, wage inequality within households is 
intensified. To assess the effect of one spouse reducing or working excessive hours in 
more detail, I compare husbands’ wage advantage and child wage effects within-couples 
by grouping couples based on spouses’ tradeoffs in work hours. I compare four separate 
groups of couples: where both spouses work full-time, couples where husbands work 
full-time (more than 35 hours per week) and wives work part-time (less than 35 hours), 
and couples where husbands work excessively long hours (more than 50 hours) and 
wives work either full-time or part-time (more or less than 35 hours per week)10. It is 
likely that the wage gaps within couples generated by wives reducing work time may 
become more pronounced in households where husbands work excessive hours.  
H7: Husbands’ wage advantage will be largest within couples with children, but will be 
amplified within couples where husbands work excessive hours. 
                                                          
10 I also ran models for couples that followed the breadwinner/homemaker model where one spouse (wife 
or husband) was not employed, and thus reported a “0” on wages, as well as couples where the wife worked 
full-time and the husband worked part-time. Results from models including all couple types are available in 
Appendix Table A3. 
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H8: The per child wage gap within couples will be smallest within full-time, dual-earning 
couples, followed by couples with wives who work part-time, and largest in households 
where husbands work excessive hours.  
Factors outside the Household 
The last explanatory factor behind the fatherhood premium and the motherhood 
penalty cited in the literature is discriminatory employer evaluations that penalize or 
reward men and women differently based on perceptions of job performance and parental 
status. Experimental and audit studies have found employers are more likely to judge and 
reward employees differentially by gender and parental status (Correll, Benard, and Paik 
2007), with fathers being more likely to receive favorable evaluations compared to 
childfree men and women while mothers are more likely to be viewed unfavorably in 
terms of work performance (Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Kennelly 1999).  However, the 
NLSY does not contain information on employers and it is difficult to obtain data on 
discrimination and match it to outcomes in large-scale national surveys. As with previous 
work on the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium (Budig and England 2001; 
Glauber 2007; 2008a&b;  Hodges and Budig 2010; Budig and Hodges 2010), it is likely 
that residual unexplained wage gaps that remain after controlling for other explanatory 
factors could result from employer’s behavior located outside of the household in 
workplaces.  
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Data and Methods 
I use the 1980-2008 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY), a national probability sample of individuals.11 Respondents were interviewed 
annually until the 1994 survey and bi-annually thereafter. The initial year of the survey, 
1979, took place when respondents were aged 14-21; in 2008, the ages of respondents 
range from 41 to 58. All models in this chapter include all racial/ethnic categories in the 
NLSY: non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and Latino. The NLSY is an important 
source of data on employment and households, however, spousal data obtained from the 
household roster is less complete, but includes measures of spouses’ age, education and 
work effort necessary for testing my hypotheses.  
I construct a dyadic data set by identifying married couples12 with spouses over 
the age of 18, not currently enrolled in schooling, and not in the military, with valid (non-
missing or “0”) scores on wages for least two time periods for each partner, as required 
for multi-level analysis of dyads. Over the survey waves, the NLSY captures up to three 
marriages of respondents.13 I follow couples from their first marriage until they divorce 
(thus dropping out the sample), separate (one member leaves the household) or until the 
last year of interview. Once a couple divorces or no longer lives together, they drop out 
                                                          
11 1979 is omitted from the analysis as there were too few couples (12 couple-years) available that met 
sampling criteria.  
 
12 Because data on cohabitation in the household roster is only available in the NLSY79 for years 1994 -
2010, I limit my analysis to married couples only.  
 
13 Should a respondent remarry, I created another couple identification number and assigned the 
corresponding measures to this new couple. I tested for differences in the effect of gender and children on 
couple wages for second and third marriages. Results were only significant for second marriages and given 
selection differences between first and second marriages, I only present the results for first marriages. Full 
results available upon request. 
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of the sample as they cease to be engaged in a co-residential relationship. The sample 
contains a total of 5,769 couples for analysis (13,550 childfree and 47,740 parental 
couple-years) across waves 1980-2008.14  
Measures 
The dependent variable used in this analysis is the natural log of hourly wage, 
reported by each member of the dyad (see Table A1).15 I include both individual and 
couple-level independent variables to investigate the effects of couples’ human capital 
and household specialization on male wage advantage and the effects of children within 
couples. First, I include a dichotomous measure for gender (male =1) to distinguish and 
account for the discrepancy in hourly wages between husbands and wives. Next, I include 
the primary independent variable, a continuous measure for number of children in the 
household and its interaction term with gender. These measures allow me to estimate 1) 
differences in husband wage advantage between fathers and childfree husbands and 2) 
how children differentially impact the wages of mothers compared to fathers. In later 
analyses, I also investigate variation in family size among couples with children by using 
dummy variables for one, two, and three or more children and their corresponding 
interactions with gender.  
To test my fourth and fifth hypotheses, I include continuous measures for the age 
(in years) and years of education of husbands and wives to capture each spouse’s human 
                                                          
14 See Table 2 for sample sizes in couple-years.  
 
15 Multi-level dyadic discrepancy models require reorganization of the NLSY data into dyadic format. 
Table A1 illustrates how the data is organized. The dependent variable includes a wage score for each 
member of the dyad, or the outcome score for the natural logarithm of hourly wages in each dyad j. The 
model uses both spouses’ scores on hourly wage to estimate the gender discrepancy within couples. 
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capital (education and potential work experience). To assess my sixth hypothesis 
regarding household specialization based on spouses’ work effort, I also include 
continuous measures for the usual weekly work hours and annual weeks worked in the 
main job for each spouse. Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis are 
presented in Table 1 in the results section. 
I also compare the distribution of husband wage advantage and the effects of 
children across couples categorized by work hour arrangements to test my seventh and 
eighth hypotheses. For each couple, I created dichotomous measures (equal to 1) to 
classify couples into categories with partners having part-time (less than 35 hours per 
week), full-time (greater than 35 hours per week), or excessive work hours (50 hours per 
week or more). Sample sizes for each couple type are presented in Table 2 in the results 
section.  
 
Dyadic Multilevel Models 
I investigate couples’ wage gaps over time using longitudinal dyadic discrepancy 
models, a subset of multi-level models (Raudenbusch and Bryk 2002; Sayer and Klute 
2005). The level 1 (within-dyad) model estimates the average differences in hourly wages 
within couples at each time point, while level 2 estimates average gaps in wages between 
couples.  The model is estimated at two levels with time in years nested within 
individuals. Individuals are then nested within couples. At level 1, the units are the 
repeated responses over time within each couple. At level 2, the unit of analysis is the 
couple.16 To establish the gross discrepancy in wages within and between couples, I first 
                                                          
16 Conceptually, the model contains 3-levels with two levels of nesting. Responses at each time point are 
nested within individuals and individuals are nested within couples. However, at the level of analysis it is a 
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fit an unconditional model that only includes a control for year of interview and the 
gender discrepancy dummy at level 1. The unconditional level 1 and level 2 models are 
as follows: 
LNWAGEij = β0j + β1j*(YEAR1ij) + β2j*(MALE1ij)   + rij  
B0j = γ00 + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + u1j 
β2j = γ20 + u2j 
 
 
LNWAGEj is the outcome score of the log of hourly wage for each member of the couple i 
in each dyad j (see Table A1). I also include a control variable for year of interview to 
reduce period effects.  For each dyad, the responses of the members (spouses) are 
regressed on an indicator variable, MALEij, or the variable that will capture the gender 
gap, coded 1 for husbands and 0 for wives. The intercept represents the earnings score for 
wives when the year is 1980, or when both MALE and YEAR are equal to zero. 
At level 2, the coefficients from level 1 become the dependent variables and a 
separate equation for each dependent variable (or level 1 coefficient) is estimated. The 
term, B0j represents wages for women at year zero, while, γ00, represents the average 
wives’ wage across all couples, and u0j is the unexplained residual variance in wives’ 
wages. The term, β1j is the gap in wages between husbands and wives, controlling for 
year, and γ10 is the average wage gap across all couples. The term β2j represents the rate 
                                                          
two-level model with a single level of nesting (responses are nested within couples). This results from how 
gender is handled in the dyadic model, since it is a characteristic of the repeated responses (a fixed effect) 
rather than a level in the model. 
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of change in wages, given a spouse’s gender, while the term γ20 is the average wage 
relationship (rate of change) across all couples.  
Each level 2 equation includes an intercept that represents the value of the 
dependent variable for the average couple, plus a term that captures the unexplained or 
residual variance for each dependent variable at level 2.  This variance can be interpreted 
as the heterogeneity across couples, or how each couple differs from the average couple. 
Significant variance in the unconditional model indicates unexplained variability across 
couples, thus allowing me to introduce other predictors of this variability into the model. 
For example, if there is significant variation in husbands’ wage advantage in the 
unconditional model, I can introduce dyad characteristics, such as number of children, to 
explain this variance. Subsequent conditional models will test my hypotheses concerning 
predictors (number of children and spouse’s characteristics) that may reduce or enlarge 
the gender wage gap. The baseline model (model 2, Table 3) that introduces child effects 
is as follows: 
LNWAGEij = β0j + β1j*(YEARij) + β2j*(MALEij) + β3j (NUMKIDS) +β4j*(MALE 
*NUMKIDS) + rij  
 
B0j = γ00 + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + u1j 
β2j = γ10 + u1j 
β3j = γ20 + γ21 + u2j 
β4j = γ30 + γ31 + u2j 
 
  
I take an additive approach to my initial assessment of the variation in wages 
across households. To test my first hypothesis, I run a gross model for the gender gap 
within couples that only includes the variables for gender and year to estimate the initial 
gender wage gap within married couples. Next, to test my second and third hypotheses 
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regarding the effect of children on within-couple wage gaps and wage inequality across 
couples, my baseline model (model 2) includes the variable for number of children in the 
household and it’s interaction with gender at level 2. Subsequent models include control 
measures for spouse’s human capital and labor supply. Model 3 adds age and years of 
education for each spouse to account for human capital characteristics. Lastly, model 4 
accounts for work effort and includes measures for each spouse’s weekly work hours and 
annual weeks worked. After examining the additive effects of children net of human 
capital and household labor supply, my last set of analyses compare four separate models 
for couples based on work hour arrangements to assess how household specialization 
shapes the distribution of within-couple wage gaps associated with children across 
couples. 
Findings 
Descriptive Results  
To begin to assess wage inequalities within and across couples, Table 1 presents 
descriptive results for both individual and couple-level measures used in the analysis. The 
first panel of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the level 2 (between or joint- 
couple measures) variables used in the analysis. These measures capture the average 
variation across couples based on differences in family composition. Chi-square and t-
tests for paired means were conducted to test for significant differences across couples by 
parental status. Couples with children average higher hourly wages ($15.36) compared to 
the childfree ($14.01).17 These averages provide some support to hypothesis two and 
                                                          
17 This is the dependent variable used in my multivariate analyses that is the combination of scores for each 
member of the dyad. The dyadic models used in later analyses use each spouse’s score on wages in each 
year to estimate the wage discrepancies within couples. Therefore, the dependent variable contains both 
husband and wives’ wage scores. 
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three that the gender wage gap grows with the arrival of children in the household and 
that the alignment of child wage effects within couples will explain variation in wages 
across households. While roughly 19 percent of couples remain childfree in the sample, 
the average number of children living in the household is approximately 2 children 
among parents. The proportion of couples that have one child is roughly 31 percent, 
while 46 percent of couples have two children, and 23 percent have 3 or more over the 
course of the survey period. Having two children is the modal category among couples, 
followed by couples with only 1 child, followed by larger families with three or more 
children. 
The second panel displays the means, proportions, and standard deviations of 
individual level (within-couple) measures by parental status. Chi-square and t-tests in the 
second panel capture significant differences between husbands and wives by parental 
status. Although husbands have higher hourly wages than wives regardless of parental 
status, fathers garner the highest average hourly wage of $18.16, roughly $5.43 higher 
than mother’s average wage of $12.73. Meanwhile, the gap within childfree couples is 
smaller at $3.34 ($15.71-12.37). This also lends preliminary support to my first and 
second hypotheses that husbands have a sizable and positive wage advantage within 
couples and that children amplify this advantage. Despite recent reporting that the gender 
gap in wages has closed among childfree unmarried workers, it does not appear to be the 
case for childfree married couples. The results suggest that marriage itself continues to be 
a contributing factor to gender inequality within couples (South and Spitze 1994; West 
and Zimmerman 1987; Gupta 1999; 2007), but that children increase wage gaps within 
marriages. 
32 
 
There are also differences between couples in wives’ employment participation 
between childless and parental households. In both childfree and parental couples, 
husbands have a higher likelihood of being employed than wives, but wives’ type of 
employment (part-time versus full-time) varies by parental status. A larger proportion of 
mothers, 33 percent, work part-time (less than 35 hours per week) compared to only 20 
percent of childfree wives. Since I limit my observations to couples where both spouses 
report non-zero wage scores, I may be underestimating the overall wage penalty of 
married women18 by excluding wives who drop out of the workforce after having 
children.  It appears that the likelihood of wives’ employment is indeed shaped by the 
presence of children, but based on my sampling restrictions, the majority of mothers in 
my sample maintain employment in some fashion after having children. However, it is 
clear that mothers are much more likely to work part-time compared to childfree wives. 
In terms of human capital, parents are more similar in terms of age and years of 
education than spouses without children. While wives have more education on average 
than husbands regardless of parental status, the gap within couples with children is much 
smaller. These results suggest that parental couples should experience less within 
household inequality than childfree couples as they are more similar on factors that shape 
wage outcomes.  Or, spouses who are more similar may be more likely to have children. 
To evaluate this further, however, multivariate analyses are required.  
Turning to measures of work hours and annual weeks worked, Table 1 suggests 
that household specialization is occurring to a greater degree within parental couples. 
                                                          
18 Unfortunately, spouse’s wages in the NLSY contains a large amount of missing values. Since dyadic 
multi-level models require valid (non-missing) values on wages, this has truncated the number of spouses 
who would normally report a “0” for wages if not employed.  
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Fathers work an average of roughly one hour more per week (45 hours) than husbands 
without children (44 hours), while childfree wives work roughly 38 hours compared to 
mothers’ 35 hours per week, reflecting mothers’ increased likelihood to work part-time. 
Indeed, the average gap in hours within couples with children is considerably larger 
(roughly 10 hours) compared to childfree couples (6 hours). The same pattern appears 
when comparing annual weeks worked between childfree and parental couples. The gap 
in weeks worked between childfree spouses is a little less than half (2 weeks) of the gap 
of couples with children (5 weeks). This pattern provides initial support for the theory of 
household specialization and indicates that the wider wage gaps within parental couples 
may result from wives curtailing paid work time when they have children. Again, further 
analysis using multi-leveling modeling is required to directly test my hypotheses.  
To make better sense of how work hour tradeoffs are distributed within couples 
and across families, Table 2 presents the proportion and sample sizes of couples by work 
hour arrangement strategies and parental status. The majority of couples in the sample 
become parents over the survey period, but full-time dual earning couples are the modal 
category among couples, regardless of whether children are present in the household. In 
roughly 71 percent of childfree couples both spouses work full-time compared to only 59 
percent of couples with children. In the next most common category of parents (31 
percent), husbands work full-time while wives work part-time (less than 35 hours per 
week) compared to only 18 percent of childfree couples.19  
                                                          
19 A smaller 10 percent of parents follow the breadwinner/homemaker model described by Becker (1981), 
but this is true for only 7 percent of childfree couples, suggesting that children do increase the likelihood of 
mothers leaving employment. The two least common couple-types, where husbands work part-time and the 
wives works full-time, is 4 and 3 percent for childless couples and parents, respectively, followed by “non-
traditional” breadwinner/homemaker couples at 3 percent among parents and 2 percent among those 
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Overall, the table suggests that specialization is occurring to a greater degree 
within households with children, as there are a substantial number of couples where 
fathers working full-time are married to mothers who work part-time, but the modal 
category is full-time dual-earning couples, regardless of parental status. The table also 
shows that in 12 percent of couples without children, husbands work 50 hours or more 
per week and wives work full-time, compared to 10 percent of couples with children.  
Meanwhile, only 3 percent of childfree and 6 percent of parental couples have a husband 
who works excessive hours while wives work part-time. It is surprising that a larger 
proportion of couples with children where husbands work long hours have wives who 
work full-time compared to part-time. It is possible that these couples are more likely to 
purchase services to address work and family obligations (Treas and DeRuijter 2008). 
Multivariate Results  
Table 3 presents the results estimating the effect of husbands’ wage advantage 
and number of children within and across couples.  The first column presents the 
unconditional model that estimates the gross gender discrepancy in wages within and 
between couples before accounting for the effects of children. To calculate a percentage 
change in the dependent variable for a 1-unit change in the number of children, I 
exponentiate the coefficients from the models, subtract one, and multiply by 100. The 
initial model that includes only a dichotomous measure to capture the gender of the 
spouse (1=male) and year of interview reveals that husbands’ wage advantage within 
couples is a staggering 35 percent higher than wives’ wages ([exp [.30]-1] *100). Since 
                                                          
without children. I do not include breadwinner/homemaker couples or couples where men work less than 
full-time in the analyses. Proportions, Standard Deviations, and sample sizes for all couples are available in 
Appendix Table A2. 
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the variance for gender is significant in the second panel of the table, I next investigate 
how children impact husband advantage within households.  
To assess how the gender wage gap changes with the addition of the number of 
children in the household, I next fit a baseline dyadic model that includes a dichotomous 
measure for spouse’s gender (1=male), year of interview, a continuous measure for 
number of children in the household, and an interaction term for gender and number of 
children in the household. The second column of Table 3 shows that there is again 
significant husband wage advantage within childfree households of roughly 21 percent 
([exp [.19]-1] *100), but this advantage increases to 31 percent with one child ([exp [.19 
+ .08]-1] *100) and to 42 percent in families with two children ([exp [.19 + .08 + .08]-1] 
*100). The main effect for number of children in the household, which can be interpreted 
as the effect of children for wives, reveals a 3 percent per child penalty for motherhood. 
For fathers, there is a 5 percent premium ([exp [-.03 + .08]-1] *100) associated with each 
additional child. This confirms my first and second hypotheses: Husbands’ wage 
advantage within households occurs among parents and childfree couples, but this 
advantage increases according to the number of children in the household. 
To evaluate my third hypothesis, the random effects results that capture the 
variation across couples are presented in the second panel of Table 3. By calculating the 
proportional reduction in the variance components, the random effects in dyadic multi-
level models tell us how much of the variation within and between couples is explained 
after including control measures. The first row of the table presents the level 1 variance, 
or variation around the average wage gap within couples.  Comparing the gross to the 
baseline model, it appears that including the effect of children and the interaction with 
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gender does explain a significant portion of the average wage gap within couples. Since 
the variance around the within-dyad mean is reduced from .1205 to .0825, accounting for 
children in the household explains roughly 31.5 percent of initial within-couple wage 
variation.20 The random effects at level 2 gives us the variance in slopes across dyads (or 
the disparity in wages between couples) in the gender wage gap and per child effects on 
hourly wages. After adding number of children to the model, the variance around the 
mean wages across couples is reduced from .1465 to .1444, only a 2 percent reduction in 
the proportional variance. This confirms my third hypothesis that accounting for number 
of children would explain some the variation across households, but this is a very small 
decrease. Overall, it appears that the effects of children initially explain proportionally 
more wage variation within couples than wage inequality between couples.  
To assess my fourth and fifth hypotheses regarding assortative partnering and 
human capital, the third column of Table 3 presents the results after including spouses’ 
age and education in the model.21 The pattern of the coefficients in the upper panel 
remains the same as in the previous model, but the variance around the average gap 
within couples increases slightly from .0825 to .0838, a proportional increase of roughly 
2 percent. This disproves my fourth hypothesis that including controls for age and 
education of each spouse in the model will decrease the gender and parental gap within 
couples. The coefficients remain unchanged from the baseline model and the variance 
within couples slightly increases, instead of declining as expected. These results indicate 
                                                          
20 The formula for the proportional reduction in variance is as follows: ((.1205 -.0825)/.1205) * 100). 
 
21 In results not shown, I included alternate measures for the proportion of spouses’ age and years of 
education that yielded the same results for the gender gap and the effects of children. See Table A6 in 
Appendix. 
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that human capital actually has a suppressing effect on wage inequality within couples.  
However, including controls for age and education of each spouse in the model explains 
more wage variation across couples, supporting my fifth hypothesis. The variance around 
the mean across dyads is reduced to .0989 from .1444, a 31.9 percent reduction in the 
proportional variance across couples. In addition, controlling for human capital reduces 
more of the variance around the motherhood penalty (11 percent) than the fatherhood 
premium (6 percent), indicating that human capital has more explanatory power for the 
effect of children on wives’ wages than for husbands. I explore variation in the 
distribution of within couple wage gaps across education in more detail in the next 
chapter. Overall, these results suggest that accounting for spouses’ age and education 
does little to explain within-couple wage inequality, but does partially explain inequality 
in wages across households.  
To evaluate my sixth hypothesis regarding household specialization, the fourth 
column of Table 3 presents the results from the full model after including controls for 
weekly work hours and annual weeks worked for each spouse.  This allows me to 
investigate to what degree spouses’ work effort explains the variation in the wage gaps 
within and among couples, controlling for age and educational attainment.  Again, the 
coefficient for husbands’ advantage within childfree couples remains unchanged. 
However, the motherhood penalty is slightly reduced to 2 percent while fathers incur a 
larger premium of 6 percent. Supporting my sixth hypothesis, it appears that the theory of 
household specialization has more explanatory power for the motherhood wage penalty 
than the fatherhood premium, but accounting for work effort produces only a small 
reduction in the penalty. 
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Turning to the variance components, accounting for labor supply again increases 
the within-couple variation from .0838 to roughly .0867, a 3.2 percent increase in the 
proportional variance, while the variation in wages across couples decreases by 7.5 
percent, from .0989 to .0915, a smaller reduction than when age and education were 
added to the model.  These results suggest that after accounting for couple’s work effort, 
the wage gap within couples is wider, but work effort differences explain more of the 
wage inequality across couples. In terms of the effects of children, however, more of the 
variance around the motherhood penalty (or the variance around number of children) is 
reduced from .0083 to .0072 (13.3 percent reduction), while the variance around the 
fatherhood premium is reduced from .0289 to .0284 (a 2 percent reduction), a 
considerable difference. These results confirm my sixth hypothesis that adding work 
hours would have more explanatory power for the motherhood penalty than the 
fatherhood premium.  
The last row in the lower panel of Table 3 shows very small reductions in the 
residual variance with the addition of each set of controls in subsequent models. The 
residual variance in the gross model declines from .2530 to .2402 (a 5.1 percent 
reduction) in the baseline model, but increases slightly with the addition of human capital 
measures to .2412. After including measures for spouses’ work effort, the variance 
decreases to .2320, a 3 percent proportional reduction in the residual variance. A great 
deal of unexplained variation remains around the error term in the full model.  Although 
human capital and work effort have some effect on reducing variation among couples, 
these results indicate that these factors do not fully explain the wage inequality within or 
across couples. It is possible that the remaining unexplained gender and child effects on 
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wages may be in part the result of differential treatment by employers, but I cannot 
account for this explanation with my data. 
To visually demonstrate the wage gaps within couples, Figure 1 graphically 
illustrates the results from the full model using dummy measures for one, two, or three or 
more children in the household along with the corresponding interaction term with 
husband’s wage advantage.22 Figure 1 shows that while childfree husbands garner a 
substantial wage advantage of 23 percent, fathers garner no extra premium for having 1 
child.  However, with the arrival of the second child, it appears that the gender 
discrepancy in wages grows to a staggering 58.3 percent premium, while the effect of 
husbands’ advantage with 3 or more children is yet larger at approximately 68 percent. 
The results reveal that there are important differences between families in how children 
impact the gender wage gap within couples. It is possible that couples who only have one 
child are differentially selected into marriage or that husbands and wives who are closer 
in wages may stop having children after their first. Moreover, it is also possible that 
wives who maintain full-time employment after the first child reduce work time with the 
arrival of a second child. 
Figure 2 presents the alignment of the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood 
premium associated each successive child within couples. As with Figure 1, there are 
clear differences between families who only have one child and those who have two or 
more. There is no significant motherhood penalty within couples associated with one 
child (effect is non-significant), but a substantial bonus of 6 percent for fathers. This is 
supported by previous work that finds small and non-significant wage penalties 
                                                          
22 Full results available in Appendix Table A4.  
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associated with the arrival of the first child for women in fixed effect models (see Budig 
and England 2001, Appendix Table B: 223). Again, it may be the case that the arrival of 
the second child may be when mothers who remained employed after their first child 
leave paid employment (Stone 2007). For families with two children, the gap between 
spouses grows. There is a motherhood penalty of 3.5 percent associated with two children 
while the fatherhood premium grows to substantially larger 17.8 percent. Within couples 
with three or more children the gap between spouses is again further amplified: the 
motherhood penalty for wives increases to 8.5 percent, but the fatherhood premium 
decreases slightly to 15.4 percent. Figures 1 and 2 indicate that while the initial child 
does not have a significant effect on mothers’ wages, it could be the case that the arrival 
of the second child is a “tipping point” for household specialization. Wives attempt to 
maintain full-time employment after their first child, but reduce work time with the 
arrival of the second, and reduce time even further with a third child. Overall, the results 
reveal that wage inequality increases within couples as the number of children in the 
household grows.  
Household Specialization across Couples by Work Hour Arrangements 
Table 4 presents the results for separate models for the effect of children on 
couple’s hourly wages based on different work time arrangements, controlling for 
spouses’ age and years of education. To assess Cha’s (2010) claims about the relationship 
between spousal overwork and within-couple inequality, in addition to comparing 
couples where both spouses work full-time to couples where wives work part-time, Table 
4 also includes the results for couples where husbands work over 50 hours per week and 
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wives work either part-time or full-time.23 As with Table 3, the first panel of the table 
presents the results from the fixed effects and I exponentiate the coefficients to ease 
interpretation.  
Looking across all 4 types of couples, Table 4 reveals some unexpected findings 
in terms of husband wage advantage and the alignment of parental penalties and premia 
within couples. Figure 3 graphically presents the results for husband wage advantage 
across couples from the first panel of Table 4. The results only partially support my 
seventh hypothesis: husbands’ wage advantage is larger within couples with children, but 
husbands’ wage advantage is not larger within couples when husbands work excessive 
hours instead of standard full-time. Among couples where husbands work standard hours, 
the gender wage gap within childfree couples when wives work part-time is a quite large 
41.9 percent, but this advantage grows to a substantial 52 percent within parental couples. 
Among couples where both partners work full-time, male wage advantage is significantly 
lower (16.1 percent), but husbands in dual-earning parental households garner an 8 
percent wage advantage over childfree men (22.1 percent). When wives work part-time, 
wage advantage for husbands who work long hours is 32.3 percent within childfree 
couples and 43.3 percent in couples with children. However, when women work full-
time, husband advantage within childfree couples is a non-significant 6.2 percent and 
only a 13.9 percent for parents, considerably smaller than couples where wives work 
reduced hours. The results indicate that husbands who work excessive hours do not 
necessarily garner more advantage compared to husbands who work a standard 40 hour 
work week, regardless of parental status. In terms of male wage advantage, the results do 
                                                          
23 See Table A3 for results including all possible couple-types from initial analyses.  
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not support Cha’s claims that excessive hours necessarily intensifying household wage 
inequalities. The wage advantage for childfree husbands and fathers is smaller when 
husbands work long hours. Overall, fathers in all couples experience substantial wage 
advantage, but this advantage is reduced within couples where wives work full-time, and 
particularly if husbands work long hours. 
To assess my eighth hypothesis, Figure 4 graphically presents the results from 
Table 4 for the alignment of the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium within 
couples working standard and excessive hours. I posited that the per child wage gap 
within couples will be largest in households where men work excessive hours, followed 
by couples with wives who work part-time, and full-time dual-earners will have the 
smallest wage gaps associated with children. Again, the results only partially confirm my 
hypothesis. Looking first at couples where husbands work standard full-time and wives 
work part-time, the motherhood penalty is 2 percent, while the effect of fatherhood is 
roughly 5 percent. Meanwhile, in couples where both husbands and wives work full-time, 
the fatherhood premium is reduced to 2 percent and the motherhood penalty grows to 3 
percent. This indicates that when wives work full-time, the fatherhood premium is 
significantly smaller, but the motherhood penalty is slightly larger. However, as 
expected, the gap within couples is larger when wives engage in part-time employment.  
For couples where husbands work excessive hours, Figure 4 reveals that the 
motherhood penalty is not significant for part-time wives, but significant and 
substantially larger for wives who work full-time. Moreover, fathers do not incur larger 
premiums for working excessive hours when wives work full-time (1 percent), but 
receive the same premium when wives work part-time (5 percent) as if they worked 
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standard work hours. Here, the results do support Cha’s (2010) argument that long work 
hours exacerbate gender inequalities within households. Across all households, husband 
wage advantage is larger for fathers than childfree men, but the fatherhood premium does 
not accrue based on fathers’ increased work time. Rather, it is the effect of children on 
wives’ wages that amplifies within-couple wage inequality. Husbands who work 
excessive hours do not garner more advantage for having children than husbands who 
work standard hours. However, the size of the motherhood penalty varies based on both 
wives and husbands’ work time. The results only partially confirm my last hypothesis, as 
the wider wage gaps associated with children within couples appear to be primarily 
driven by the penalties incurred by wives who work full-time, not part-time. This 
indicates that the theory of household specialization does not fully explain the differential 
gender effects for having children. 
As with Table 3, however, there are significant residual effects within couples that 
remain unexplained. It is likely that other factors not included in the analysis, such as 
spouse’s work experience or occupation, may reduce some the of the unexplained gender 
gap and child wage effects. I discuss these factors in more detail in the next section. 
Moreover, as previous work on the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium argues, 
it is also possible that the remaining wage inequality within and between households 
could result from differential treatment by employers based on gendered notions of the 
“ideal worker” (Williams 2000; Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Correll et al 2007). 
Unfortunately, I can only speculate regarding employers since information on employer 
behavior is not available in the data. 
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Conclusion 
While progress in the decline of the wage gap among childfree workers is 
encouraging, a substantial gender pay gap remains among US workers. This paper 
contributes to the literature on work and family and speaks to current debates regarding 
the decline in the gender wage gap. The results from this chapter reveal a strong 
relationship between gender, parenthood, and wage inequality within and across 
households. Much of the remaining wage gap is situated within marriages and 
compounded by the arrival of children. In terms of my first research question, within 
households, husbands’ wage advantage increases substantially with the arrival of the 
second child and grows with each additional child thereafter. In line with current 
discussions about the stalled reduction in the gender wage gap (Blau et al 2006), within 
married households, on average, husbands have substantial wage advantage over wives, 
regardless of parental status, but this wage advantage is not fully explained by either 
human capital or labor supply differences between spouses.  
In terms of my second research question, the alignment of parental wage effects 
within couples illustrate that on average, fathers enjoy substantial wage premiums while 
mothers incur larger wage penalties as the number of children increases. Regardless of 
spouses’ human capital and work effort, wage inequality within marriage is exacerbated 
as more children enter the household. Prior work finds that husbands’ careers often take 
precedent in work and home tradeoffs made between spouses and this appears to be the 
case as more children enter the household. Spouses’ human capital characteristics explain 
less of the variation in the effects of children on wages within households, but a large 
proportion of the average wage variation across couples. Moreover, human capital and 
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spousal work effort also explain more of the variation in the motherhood penalty than the 
fatherhood premium. The results suggest that within-couple wage gaps are shaped by 
wives’ characteristics more so than husbands,’ but these wage discrepancies are not fully 
explained by either spouses’ human capital or work effort. 
Finally, my last research question asked how much of the variation across 
households could be explained by the presence of children based on couples’ work hour 
arrangements. The results indicate that the theory of household specialization does not 
fully explain the differential gender effects for having children across all households 
based on couples work time tradeoffs. Moreover, Cha’s (2010) claims regarding 
excessive work hours are informed by my results. The wider child gaps within couples 
appear to be primarily driven by the penalties incurred by wives who work full-time. 
When wives work full-time, husbands’ advantage and the fatherhood premium are 
significantly smaller, but husbands who work excessive hours do not garner more 
advantage for having children than husbands who work standard hours. Across all 
households, wage advantage is larger for fathers than childless men, but as seen in 
previous work, (Glauber 2008a&b; Hodges and Budig 2010) the fatherhood premium 
does not accrue based on fathers’ increased work time., However, both wives and 
husbands’ work time shape the size of the motherhood penalty. Regardless of whether 
husbands work standard or excessive hours, when wives work full-time, wage penalties 
are larger and premiums are smaller. When wives work part-time, fatherhood premiums 
are larger, but motherhood penalties are small or non-significant. 
The residual wage premiums for fatherhood and the motherhood penalty remain 
largely unexplained. Although human capital and work effort have some effect on 
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reducing variation among couples, the results indicate that these factors do not fully 
explain the gender wage gap nor the family gap within and across couples. Prior work 
had found that employers tend to evaluate workers based on assumptions regarding their 
parental status. Correll et al (2007) find that fathers are more likely to be viewed 
favorably by evaluators, followed by childfree women, childfree men, and lastly mothers 
in terms of dependability and productivity. It is likely that the remaining unexplained 
gender and child effects on wages may be in part the result from differential treatment by 
employers.  
There are some important limitations to my analyses. First, the variables available 
for both spouses in the NLSY are limited. A number of measures for human capital and 
job characteristics, such as work experience, job seniority and tenure, number of jobs 
ever held, public/private sector, and self-employment, would have been useful as control 
measures. Future research should investigate how other measures of human capital, such 
as work experience, and job characteristics shape the wage inequality within married 
couples with children. Also, since there are a large number of missing values on spouse’s 
wage in the NLSY, thus truncating the number of unemployed wives who might report a 
“0” for wages, my analysis is limited to couples reporting non-zero scores on wages. This 
means that I am potentially missing couples where mothers “opt out” of paid employment 
and that the results may understate wives’ motherhood penalty and the wage gap between 
husbands and wives. Lastly, although it is likely that the residual unexplained variation in 
my models may be caused by employer actions and behaviors, I cannot assess with 
certainty the role of factors outside of households in shaping wage outcomes. 
47 
 
However, the remaining unexplained variation both within and across couples 
suggests that lack of flexibility in workplaces may play a role in maintaining gender wage 
inequality. My analysis finds that is it wives, not husbands, who continue to adjust work 
time in response to having children. While popular media encourages women to “lean in” 
(Sandberg 2013), it appears that the structure of work continues to be a strong factor that 
exacerbates work and family conflict, but also contributes to the reproduction of gender 
inequality within and across families. Moreover, employers may also reward parents 
differently based on gendered expectations about parents as employees as prior research 
would suggest (Correll et al 2007). Therefore, calls for individual women to “lean in” do 
not appear to make much sense if we are to close the gender wage gaps occurring within 
families. Further research should also concentrate on investigating how work structure 
and employer behaviors reproduce wage inequality within families. Overall, it is clear 
that “brining the household back in” uncovers how gender wage inequality based on 
family composition contributes to the gender wage gap both within and across married 
couple households. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CLASS MATTERS: WAGE GAPS WITHIN COUPLES ACROSS HOUSEHOLDS 
BY INCOME AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
 
In the previous chapter, I assessed the ways in which within-couple wage 
inequality varies across couples based on spousal tradeoffs in work time. This chapter 
seeks to situate those findings within couples across socioeconomic class by education 
and income level. The motivation for this analyses stems from recent academic and 
popular media attention paid to the growth of US income inequality in the latter half of 
the 20th century. Recently, studies by Greenwood and colleagues (2014) and Cherlin 
(2014) have found that a partial explanation for the growth in US earnings inequality is 
based in partnership and marriage patterns among different socioeconomic groups. The 
earnings gap between couples with relatively high and those with relatively low levels of 
education has widened substantially since 1960 relative to the average household income 
(Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov, and Santos 2014) and marriage gaps between 
socioeconomic groups have widened in accordance with widening wage inequality. 
However, it is unclear how wage effects associated with parenthood contribute to these 
trends. Since individuals are more likely to partner with those of similar educational 
attainment (Blackwell and Lichter 2004; Swartz and Mare 2005) and income level, the 
literature suggests that processes of family formation are important factors shaping 
current wage inequality.  
It is well documented that the processes affecting wage inequality are different for 
high-skill and low-skill workers (Brown and Misra 2003; Williams 2010; Williams and 
Boushey 2010; Bianchi, Robinson, and Milkie 2006) and at different levels of income. 
Highly educated and/or higher earning couples face different constraints and make 
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different work-family decisions than couples with lower earnings and educational 
attainment based on different job constraints (Williams and Boushey 2010; Williams 
2010) and access to resources that better facilitate outsourcing of domestic services to 
resolve work-family conflict. Since workers’ labor marking position has a direct effect on 
family organization (Collins 1998), in this chapter I consider how within-couple wage 
inequality is situated across families by social class and how processes of family 
composition are related to the growth in US wage stratification.   
As Chapter 2 demonstrated, wage inequality is not only shaped by marriage 
patterns. Children also contribute to wage inequality between and among parents. On 
average, children are associated with pay penalties for motherhood while fatherhood is 
associated with wage premiums (Waldfogel 1997, 1998; Budig and England 2001; 
Hodges and Budig 2010; Lundberg and Rose 2000; Glauber 2008a&b). While there has 
been much debate regarding the appropriate unit of analysis and metric for studying wage 
stratification (Sorenson 1994), both educational attainment and income level, two proxies 
for social class position, are both important axes of variation for the motherhood penalty 
and the fatherhood premium (Budig and Hodges 2010; Glauber 2008; Cooke 2014; 
Anderson, Binder and Krause 2003). However, as discussed previously, the bulk of the 
research examining child wage effects uses individuals as the unit of analysis and does 
not consider how the effects of children on wages accrue within families. If wage 
inequality can be partially attributed to processes of assortative partnering and family 
composition, it is also important to consider the role child wage effects play in the wage 
stratification process as well.  
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This study draws on feminist theoretical understandings of interlocking systems 
of privilege and disadvantage (Collins 2006) to assess how wage inequality associated 
with parenthood within couples is tied to socioeconomic stratification.  Three research 
questions guide this work: 1) how does husbands’ wage advantage (or the gender wage 
gap) vary within households across income and educational attainment? 2) How do the 
effects of children accrue within couples at different income and educational levels? And 
3) Does within-couple wage inequality associated with children follow the same pattern 
across the distribution of couples’ income and educational attainment? To date, there is 
no study that considers how these processes within couples vary across socioeconomic 
class by income and educational attainment.   
I argue that due to processes of assortative partnering, wage gaps within couples 
may be wider among couples at the tails of the income and educational distributions. In 
couples who are highly skilled or high income workers, men who garner the largest 
premiums are more likely to be married to women who incur potentially larger penalties. 
Meanwhile, it is also possible that men who incur small fatherhood premiums may be 
married to women who receive small motherhood penalties, resulting in smaller gender 
pay differences within households, but greater inequality between households. The goal 
of this paper is to assess how class structures gender and parental wage inequality within 
couples and across households using dyadic multi-level models on the 1980-2008 waves 
of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. I first discuss the different approaches 
taken in the stratification literature to measuring class inequality before I review the 
relevant literature that examines the effects of children by income level and educational 
attainment among individuals. I then discuss my expectations regarding potential 
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differences in the distribution of the gender wage gap and child wage effects across 
income and education. I explain how I operationalize and test the arguments in my 
analyses before moving on to the empirical section of my study. 
Explaining Variation in Couples’ Wages across Class 
 There has been much debate among researchers regarding the appropriateness of 
using either the family or the individual as the unit of analysis for measuring wage 
stratification. Much of the debate hinges on the importance of women’s employment for 
understanding hierarchies within and across households. The conventional approach 
among early stratification and status attainment scholars (Becker 1981; Blau and Duncan 
1967) used the family as the unit of analysis, assuming all family members’ class position 
mirrored that of the male head of household. In other words, women’s class position was 
assumed to be the same as her husband and children. Feminist scholars have since 
critiqued this approach, arguing that it does not fully account for women’s own labor 
market position or experiences. In response, the focus of scholarship shifted to using 
individual women and men as the unit of analysis for measuring stratification. This 
productive area of research has generated the majority of the literature investigating the 
effects of children on wages.  
 The family itself is a primary site for the production of gender inequality 
(Hartmann 1981; Collins 1994) and the labor market position of families directly shapes 
both gender and parenting practices within households (Shows and Gerstel 2008; Lareau 
2003).  Thus, valuable insight can be gained from using the family as the unit of analysis 
to understand wage inequality within married couples and macro-level wage inequality 
across families. This chapter again “brings the family back in” through use of dyadic 
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multi-level models that employs couples as the unit of analysis, but also simultaneously 
accounts for individual spouse’s class position within families. Taking the wages of both 
members of a couple into account makes it possible to address many questions that are 
central to our understanding of wage inequality in the context of families.   
Since social class can be measured along multiple dimensions, how to assess the 
distribution of within-couple wage gaps across socioeconomic groups is not 
straightforward. To structure my analysis, I draw on previous work examining child wage 
effects at the individual level that have used both earnings and education to assess the 
distribution of child penalties and premiums. Some scholars have found that motherhood 
penalties tend to be largest for women at the low end of the wage distribution (Budig and 
Hodges 2010; England, Bearak, Budig, and Hodges 2012), while larger fatherhood wage 
premiums are found at higher wage levels (Cooke 2014). In terms of educational 
attainment, other work has found that high school graduates tend to incur larger wage 
losses for  motherhood than either low- or high-skill mothers (Anderson, Binder, and 
Krause 2003),24 while married men who are college graduates and whose jobs emphasize 
cognitive skills receive the largest fatherhood earnings bonuses (Hodges and Budig 
2010). Taking married couples as the unit of analyses, I assess the variation in the gender 
and parental wage gaps within and between households based on household income level 
and the educational attainment of spouses. Previous work suggests that the distribution of 
the effects of children will produce somewhat different patterns of within-couple wage 
                                                          
24 The wage penalties for medium-skill mothers are thought to be due to differences in job and work time 
constraints. High school graduates are more likely to hold jobs requiring their presence during regular 
office hours, and are unlikely to gain flexibility by finding work at other hours or by taking work home in 
the evening (Anderson, et al 2003).  
53 
 
inequality across income and education. Based on previous findings from the literature, I 
posit two initial hypotheses:  
H1: Husbands will garner a wage advantage within couples regardless of parental 
status, income level, and educational attainment.  
H2: Husband wage advantage within couples will increase with the presence of children 
in the household as income level and education level rises. 
Within-Couple Wage Inequality by Family Income  
What drives variation in the returns to children for parents at different income 
levels? Couples’ family resources and income level are linked to women’s labor force 
attachment and work effort (Williams and Boushey 2010) with consequences for wage 
discrepancies within and among households.  Despite the rise of the dual-earning couple, 
the institutional context of work in which US families live has not changed accordingly to 
accommodate workers’ family obligations (Moen 2003; Albiston 2007; Gornick and 
Meyers 2005), thus producing differences in strategies for combining work and family 
across socioeconomic groups (Williams and Boushey 2010). Among dual-earners, and 
particularly among those with the highest earnings, one partner’s success at work often 
comes at the expense of the other (Moen 2003; Presser 1994) after the arrival of 
children,25 with wives more likely than husbands to take non-traditional work 
arrangements, such as working part-time, to better blend work and family (Moen 2003). 
                                                          
25 While there has been considerable debate in the past decade over whether highly educated mothers are 
“opting out,” (Belkin 2003) of paid work, women overall continue to have strong labor market attachment 
(Boushey 2008; Stone 2007; Carr 2005). Recent findings do not indicate that women have opted out in 
significant numbers or that the phenomenon has increased (Goldin 2006). Since I am considering wage 
gaps within in this analysis, I focus on households where women remain employed after having children, 
but include consideration of how women’s work hours change in response to having children.  
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Studies of highly skilled professional women find that husbands’ careers are often taken 
into account when making their decisions to remain employed, reduce work time, or 
leave employment (Stone 2007).  Furthermore, those in upper income levels are more 
likely to be employed in jobs with benefits that may better facilitate combining work and 
family responsibilities (Williams and Boushey 2010; Stone 2007).  Couples at the highest 
earnings levels also tend to outsource care responsibilities by paying for services (Moen 
2003; Treas and DeRuijter 2008) and are thus better able to address work and family 
obligations. Meanwhile, for the poor and working class, reducing work time for either 
spouse may not be an option due to economic necessity, suggesting that tradeoffs in time 
spent working or providing care between spouses may be more likely to occur within 
couples at higher versus lower income levels.  
A new direction in the child wage effects literature uses quantile regression 
models to assess how the wage penalties and premiums associated with parenthood vary 
across men and women’s earnings distributions (Budig and Hodges 2010; Killewald and 
Bearak 2014; Budig and Hodges 2014; England, Bearak, Budig and Hodges 2012; Cooke 
2014). A recent study by England et al (2012) examining the motherhood wage penalty 
using NLSY79 data finds that among white women, although the unadjusted wage 
penalty is highest for mothers with high skills and high wages, net wage penalties are 
higher for low-wage mothers (England et al 2012). High-wage/high-skill motherhood 
penalties are largely driven by mothers lost work experience from taking time off after 
having a child, but this is not the case for low-wage mothers.26 Using LIS data to 
                                                          
26 As in the previous chapter, I use age as a proxy control measure for work experience. Unfortunately, the 
spousal data contained in the household roster of the NLSY does include sufficient measures that allow for 
a construction of work experience for spouses. In results not shown, I also tested the effect of potential 
work experience as used by Killewald (2013). See Appendix Table A9 for results. 
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compare fatherhood premiums in the US and UK, Lynn Prince Cooke also finds that the 
fatherhood premium grows as earnings increase, such that the highest-earning men garner 
the largest fatherhood premium, but low-earning fathers incur wage penalties (Cooke 
2014). Taken together, these findings suggest that the gender wage gaps associated with 
children will be widest in the upper tail of the income distribution, net of couples’ work 
effort. Unfortunately, at this time there is no method for quantile regression using dyads 
as the unit of analysis. To assess within-couple wage inequality across the income 
distribution, I use the NLSY’s measure for net family income and run separate models for 
couples as the bottom fifth (.05), the bottom tenth (.10), the twenty-fifth (.25), the median 
(.50), the seventy-fifth (.75), the ninetieth (.90), and ninety-fifth (.95) percentiles of the 
income distribution. As in all analyses in this chapter, I control for differences across 
income in work-time tradeoffs by including measures for the effects of each spouse’s 
weekly work hours and annual weeks worked in my estimates wage inequality within 
couples by income level.  
H3: I expect that net husbands’ wage advantage will grow larger within couples as 
income rises. 
H4: The net wage gaps within couples associated with children will be largest in the 
upper half of the family income distribution. 
Within-Couple Wage Inequality by Educational Attainment 
As Greenwood et al (2014) and Cherlin (2014) demonstrate, processes of 
assortative partnering in terms of age and along educational lines also have important 
implications for wage inequality within and across households. Empirical studies of 
marital sorting have found that education is a primary factor now shaping marriage 
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patterns (Kalmijn 1998; Rosenfield 2007). High earning women are more likely to 
partner with men with high expected future earnings and similar educational credentials 
(Schwartz and Mare 2005). Winslow (2009) finds that regardless of work effort, for both 
men and women, having a bachelor’s degree or more is associated with higher odds of 
earning as much as or more than one’s spouse. If men who receive the largest premiums 
tend to be married to women who incur the smallest penalties (because both are highly 
skilled or highly educated workers), then this would result in smaller gender pay 
differences within households with more education, but contribute to greater wage 
inequality across households as child wage gaps may be larger among couples with less 
education. Given the increased likelihood of individuals to select a spouse with similar 
education, it is possible that the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium may 
exacerbate both wage inequality within households, but also contribute to wage 
inequality among coupled households across educational groups.  
Previous work on the wage effects of children has shown that education matters 
for the distribution of the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium.  However, 
findings are mixed. While Loghren and Zissimopoulous (2008) find no differences in the 
penalty by education, previous work by Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel (2005) and 
Taniguchi (1999) found higher penalties among less educated women. Waldfogel (1997) 
found larger penalties among well educated women, while Anderson et al. (2002, 2003) 
find larger penalties in the middle levels of education. Moreover, in terms of educational 
requirements for jobs, Budig and England (2001) found that the penalty differs little by 
occupational status, while Wilde, Batchelder and Ellwood (2010) find that mothers in 
jobs with high skill requirements incur larger motherhood penalties than low-skilled 
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women. Meanwhile, highly educated, professional/managerial fathers garner the largest 
premiums (Hodges and Budig 2010). To sort out these mixed findings in the household 
context, I compare couples’ in terms of spouses’ degree attainment to assess variation in 
the gender wage gap and the influence of children on within-couple wage gaps across 
levels of educational attainment.  
H5: Husbands’ wage advantage within households will be smaller if wives have the same 
or more education than husbands.  
H6: The parental wage gaps will be widest in couples where wives have less education 
than husbands.  
Comparing Within-Couple Wage Inequality across Income and Education  
Given that education is not perfectly correlated with income, I expect differences 
in the distribution of within couples parental wage gaps across income and education. 
Based on previous work (Budig and Hodges 2010; England et al 2013) motherhood 
penalties, net of experience may be largest at the lowest income levels but should decline 
as income rises. However, the opposite should be true of the fatherhood premium (Cooke 
2014), with high-earning fathers garnering larger bonuses than low-earning fathers. 
Therefore, within-couple wage inequality based on children should widen as income level 
increases. In terms of education, previous findings are more inconclusive: while the 
fatherhood premium should be largest amongst highly educated couples (Hodges and 
Budig 2010), it is unclear whether motherhood penalties would be largest for less versus 
more educated wives, net of spousal work effort. Based on the trajectory of the 
fatherhood premium, previous work suggests that the child gaps within couples should be 
widest in the tails of the educational distribution. 
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H7: Wage gaps associated with children will be larger in the top half of the income 
distribution, while the gaps within couples will be largest in the tails of the education 
distribution. 
Selection into Marriage and Parenthood 
In addition to selection into marriage and parenthood based on education and 
income, most research finds that marriage itself is linked to greater motherhood penalties 
(Budig and England 2001; Glauber 2007; Misra et al. 2007; Budig and Hodges 2010), 
possibly because married women’s greater family resources allow them to reduce their 
work effort when children are young. Hodges and Budig (2010) and Glauber (2008a&b) 
also find that the effect of marriage explains roughly one-half of the fatherhood earnings 
bonus. Moreover, as discussed in the literature on the motherhood penalty and fatherhood 
premium, factors that influence wages within couples may be due to unmeasured factors, 
such as individual career ambition, that cannot be captured by adding controls to the 
model. Also, factors that influence wages may increase or decrease a couple’s likelihood 
of having children. As in my previous chapter, to address this, prior research has 
primarily employed fixed-effect models that provide estimates that are robust to 
unobserved differences among respondents that do not change over time (Allison 2009). 
However, the fixed-effects in multi-level dyadic models cannot control for unmeasured 
differences among couples that influence the effect of children on earnings or that 
statistically interact with another variable that influences these effects. Thus, time 
changing variables that could simultaneously influence both the likelihood of couples 
having children and how much each spouse earns must be explicitly included in the 
model.  
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Factors outside the Household 
As discussed in Chapter 2, another explanation for the fatherhood premium and 
the motherhood penalty is discriminatory employer evaluations that penalize or reward 
men and women differently based on perceptions of job performance and parental status. 
Experimental and audit studies have found employers are more likely to judge and 
reward employees differentially by gender and parental status (Correll, Benard, and Paik 
2007).  However, as in my previous chapter, because the NLSY does not contain 
information on employers, I cannot capture employer effects in my data. In line with 
previous work on the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium (Budig and England 
2001; Glauber 2008a&b; Hodges and Budig 2010; Budig and Hodges 2010), I again 
argue that any residual unexplained variation that remains within and between couples 
after controlling for other explanatory factors could potentially result from employer’s 
behavior.  
Data and Methods 
I use the 1980-2008 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, a 
national probability sample of individuals.27 Respondents were interviewed annually until 
the 1994 survey and bi-annually thereafter. In 1979, the initial year of the survey, 
respondents were aged 14-21; in 2008, the ages of respondents range from 41 to 58. All 
models include all racial/ethnic categories in the NLSY: non-Hispanic white, non-
Hispanic black, and Latino. The NLSY is a rich source of data on employment and 
households, however, spousal data obtained from the household roster is less complete, 
                                                          
27 1979 is omitted from the analysis as there were too few couples available that met sampling criteria.  
60 
 
but includes key measures of spouses’ age, education, and work effort necessary for this 
analysis.28  
I construct a dyadic data set by identifying married couples with partners over the 
age of 18, not currently enrolled, and not in the military, with valid (non-zero) scores on 
wages for least two time periods for each spouse. Over the survey waves, the NLSY 
captures up to three marriages of respondents.29 I follow couples from their first marriage 
until they divorce (thus dropping out the sample), separate (one member leaves the 
household) or until the last year of interview. Once a couple divorces or no longer lives 
together, they drop out of the sample as they cease to be engaged in a co-residential 
relationship. The sample contains a total of 5,769 couples for analysis (13,550 childfree 
and 47,740 parental couple-years).  
Measures 
The dependent variable used in this analysis is the natural log of hourly wage, 
reported by each member of the dyad.30 I include both individual and couple-level 
independent variables to investigate the effects of children on within-couple wage gaps 
across income and education. First, I include a dichotomous measure for gender (male 
                                                          
28 Because data on cohabitation is only available in the NLSY79 for years 1994 -2010, I limit my analysis 
to married couples only. 
  
29 Should a respondent remarry, I created another couple identification number and assign the 
corresponding measures to this new couple. I tested for differences in the effect of gender and children on 
couple wages for second and third marriages. Results were only significant for second marriages and given 
selection differences between first and second marriages, I only present the results for first marriages.   
30 Multi-level dyadic discrepancy models require reorganization of the NLSY data into dyadic format. 
Table A1 in the Appendix illustrates how the data is organized for the analysis. The dependent variable 
includes a wage score for each member of the dyad, or the outcome score for the natural logarithm of 
hourly wages in each dyad j. 
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=1) to account for the discrepancy in hourly wages. I also include a control variable for 
year of interview to reduce period effects.  Next, I include a continuous measure for 
number of children in the household and an interaction term with gender. Continuous 
control measures include age (in years) of husbands and wives and measures for the usual 
weekly work hours and annual weeks worked in main job for each spouse. To compare 
couples at different quantiles across the income distribution, I use a couple-level measure 
for net family income provided in the NLSY household roster. I also created dichotomous 
measures to capture spouses’ degree attainment for having less than a high school 
diploma, high school graduate, and having a Bachelor’s Degree or higher. I compare 
couples based on different combinations of spouses’ degree attainment. 
 
Dyadic Multilevel Models 
I investigate couples’ wage gaps over time using longitudinal dyadic discrepancy 
models, a subset of multi-level models (Raudenbusch and Bryk 2002; Sayer and Klute 
2005). The model is estimated at two levels with time in years nested within individuals. 
Individuals are then nested within couples. At level 1, the units are the repeated responses 
over time (for example, the log of wages) within each couple. At level 2, the unit of 
analysis is the couple.31 The level 1 (within-dyad) model estimates the average 
differences in hourly wages within couples at each time point, while level 2 estimates 
average gaps in wages between couples. To establish the gross discrepancy within and 
                                                          
31 Conceptually, the model contains 3 levels with two levels of nesting. Responses at each time point are 
nested within individuals and individuals are nested within couples. However, at the level of analysis it is a 
2 level model with a single level of nesting because responses are nested within couples. In the dyadic 
model, gender is a characteristic of the repeated responses (a fixed effect) rather than a level in the model. 
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between couples, I first fit an unconditional model that only includes a control for year of 
interview and the gender discrepancy dummy at level 1. The unconditional level 1 and 
level 2 models are as follows: 
 LNWAGEij = β0j + β1j*(YEARij) + β2j*(MALEij)   + rij  
 
B0j = γ00 + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + u1j 
β2j = γ20 + u2j 
 
 
LNWAGEj is the outcome score of the log of hourly wage for each member of the couple i 
in each dyad j (see Table A1). I fix effects across time by including a control variable for 
year of interview to reduce period effects.  For each dyad, the responses of the spouses 
are regressed on an indicator variable, MALEij, or the variable that will capture the gender 
gap, coded 1 for men and 0 for women. The intercept represents the earnings score for 
wives when the year is 1980, or when both MALE and YEAR are equal to zero. 
At level 2, the coefficients from level 1 become the dependent variables and a 
separate equation for each dependent variable (or level 1 coefficient) is estimated. The 
term, B0j represents wages for women at year zero, while, γ00, represents the average 
wives’ wage across all couples, and u0j is the unexplained residual variance in wives’ 
wages. The term, β1j is the gap in wages between husbands and wives, controlling for 
year, and γ10 is the average wage gap across all couples. The term β2j represents the 
relationship between time and wages, or the rate of change in wages, given a spouse’s 
gender, controlling for the gender gap, while the term γ20 is the average wage relationship 
(rate of change) across all couples. 
Each level 2 equation includes an intercept that represents the value of the 
dependent variable for the average couple, plus a term that captures the unexplained or 
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residual variance for each dependent variable at level 2.  This variance can be interpreted 
as the heterogeneity across couples, or how each couple differs from the average couple.  
Significant variance in the unconditional model indicates unexplained variability across 
couples, thus allowing me to introduce predictors of this variability into the model. For 
example, if there is significant variation in husband advantage in the unconditional 
model, I can introduce dyad characteristics, such as number of children, to explain this 
variance. Subsequent conditional models include predictors (number of children, it’s 
interaction with gender, and spouse’s characteristics) that may reduce or enlarge the 
gender wage gap. The baseline model that introduces child effects is as follows: 
LNWAGEij = β0j + β1j*(YEARij) + β2j*(MALEij) + β3j (NUMKIDS) +β4j*(MALE 
*NUMKIDS) + rij  
 
B0j = γ00 + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + u1j 
β2j = γ10 + u1j 
β3j = γ20 + γ21 + u2j 
β4j = γ30 + γ31 + u2j 
 
I approach my analyses of wage inequality within and across couples by 
categorizing couples according to family income level and educational degree attainment.  
To ease comparison of the differences between education and income level in the 
distribution of within-couple wage inequality, I use 7 quantiles to assess income 
differences and also grouped couples into 7 categories based on spouses’ education. My 
first set of analyses compares within couple wage gaps across seven income quantiles 
(the .05, .10, .25, .50, .75, .90, and .95). In my next set of analyses, I compare different 
educational “couple-types” where: 1) both spouses have less than a high school diploma 
(< 12 years completed); 2) couples where husbands have less than a high school diploma, 
but wives have more education; 3) couples where wives have a high school diploma and 
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husbands do not; 4) couples where both husband and wives are high school graduates (12 
years of education); 5) couples where husbands have graduated high school, but wives 
have obtained some education beyond high school; 6) couples where husbands have a 
bachelor’s degree (or higher), but wives do not; and 7) couples where both spouses have 
a bachelor’s degree (16 years completed) or more. I run models separately for each 
education couple-type and income quantile.  
Findings  
Descriptive Results  
Table 5 presents descriptive results for both couple and individual-level measures 
used in the analysis. The first panel of Table 5 displays the means and standard deviations 
for the between- couple variables used in the analysis. Chi-square and t-tests for paired 
means were conducted to test for significant differences across couples by parental status. 
As in my previous empirical chapter, couples with children average significantly higher 
hourly wages ($15.36) compared to childfree ($14.01) couples.32 Couples with children 
also have significantly higher net family income ($71,183.98) compared to childfree 
couples ($67,374.41). Again, the average number of children living in the household is 2 
children. As with the previous chapter, these averages demonstrate that husband wage 
advantage grows when children are present in the household.  
The second panel of Table 5 presents the means, proportions, and standard 
deviations of individual, within-couple measures by parental status. The first row again 
                                                          
32 This is the dependent variable used in my multivariate analyses that is the combination of scores for each 
member of the dyad. The dyadic models used in later analyses use each spouse’s score on wages in each 
year to estimate the wage discrepancies within couples. Therefore, the dependent variable contains both 
husband and wives’ wage scores. See Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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indicates that husbands will have a large and positive wage advantage within couples and 
that having children will increase this advantage. Looking at hourly wages, husbands 
have significantly higher wages than wives overall, but fathers garner the highest average 
hourly wage of $18.16, compared to $15.71 for childfree husbands. The gap within 
couples is larger among parents ($5.43 compared to $3.34) than childfree couples, 
indicating that marriage itself continues to be a contributing factor to gender inequality 
within couples (South and Spitze 1994; West and Zimmerman 1987; Gupta 1999; 2007), 
but the presence of children amplifies within-couple wage gaps.  
There are also differences in wives’ employment participation between childless 
and parental households. As with my previous chapter, since I am concerned primarily 
with estimating wage gaps within dual-earning couples, I limit my observations to 
couples who have non-zero responses for wages. Thus, the sample primarily includes 
couples with employed wives. Given that I am missing wives who drop out of the 
workforce after having children, I may be underestimating the overall wage penalty of all 
married women33 in the larger population. As expected, husbands are more likely than 
wives to be employed regardless of whether they have children or not, but wives’ type of 
employment (part-time versus full-time) varies by parental status. A larger proportion of 
wives with children, 33 percent, work part-time (less than 35 hours per week) compared 
to only 20 percent of childfree wives. It appears that the likelihood of wives’ employment 
is indeed shaped by the presence of children, but based on my sampling restrictions, the 
majority of mothers in my sample maintain employment. 
                                                          
33 Unfortunately, spouse’s wages in the NLSY contains a large amount of missing values. Since dyadic 
multi-level models require valid (non-missing) values on wages, this has truncated the number of spouses 
who would normally report a “0” for wages if not employed.  
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Spouses with children are also more similar in terms of age and years of education 
than those without children. While wives have more education than husbands within 
childfree and parental couples, the gap between spouses with children is much smaller, 
suggesting that since they are more similar on factors that can shape wage outcomes, 
couples with children should experience less within-household inequality than childfree 
couples, or that spouses who are more similar in terms of human capital may be more 
likely to have children. The next four rows show differences in degree attainment by 
gender within couples and by parental status. Regardless of parental status, husbands are 
more likely to be high school dropouts than wives, with fathers at 18 percent and 
childfree husbands at 14 percent, compared to wives’ 9 and 6 percent, respectively. 
Among couples with less than a high school diploma, husbands’ likelihood is double that 
of wives, regardless or parental status. Overall, wives are more likely to obtain degrees 
within all marriages, with the exception of couples who have obtained a bachelor’s 
degree or higher. Among the college-educated, there are very small differences in the 
proportion of degree attainment between childfree couples and parents. Within childfree 
couples, 36 percent of wives have a college degree compared to 39 percent of husbands. 
Within parental couples, however, the gap in the proportion of obtaining a bachelor’s 
degree is roughly the same (24-27 percent), but less overall than childfree couples, 
suggesting that parents are, on average, less educated than childfree married couples. To 
evaluate my fifth and sixth hypotheses, however, multivariate analyses are required.  
In terms of household work effort, Table 5 reveals only slight variation in average 
weekly work hours among husbands, regardless of parental status. Fathers work an 
average of roughly one hour more per week than husbands without children. As expected, 
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the reverse is true for wives: childfree wives work more hours than mothers, roughly 38 
hours per week compared to mothers’ 35 hours per week. The gap in hours within 
couples with children is significantly larger (roughly 10 hours) than the gap for childfree 
couples (6 hours). The same pattern appears when comparing annual weeks worked 
between mothers and childfree wives. Mothers work less weeks per year compared to 
childfree wives, with little variation between fathers and childfree husbands. The gap 
between childfree spouses in terms of annual weeks worked is also less than (2.5 weeks) 
the gap of couples with children (6 weeks). As seen in the previous chapter, this pattern 
indicates that the child gaps in wages result not from husbands increasing work effort, but 
rather from wives curtailing work time when they have children. However, these within-
couple tradeoffs in work time may vary across the distributions of education and family 
income. Again, further analysis using multi-leveling modeling is required to directly test 
my hypotheses regarding the variation in the gender and child wage gaps within couples. 
Multivariate Results 
Within-Couple Wage Inequality across Family Income 
To evaluate variation in wage gaps within couples across family income, Table 6 
presents the results from the fully specified model across couples’ income distribution.34 
To calculate a percentage change in the dependent variable for a 1-unit change in the 
number of children, I exponentiate the coefficients from the models, subtract one, and 
multiply by 100. Following previous work that investigates the motherhood penalty and 
the fatherhood premium across women and men’s wage distribution (Budig and Hodges 
                                                          
34 For variance components, see Table A7 in the Appendix. 
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2010; Cooke 2014), I include results for estimating separate discrepancy models for the 
following seven quantiles: the .05, .10, .25, .50, .75, .90, and .95.  
Figure 5 graphically illustrates the variation in husband wage advantage by 
parental status from Table 6. The results show that husband wage advantage and the 
effect of children on parent’s wages net of couple work effort do indeed vary across wage 
levels in distinct ways, but provide mixed support for my hypotheses. While it is clear 
that childfree husbands’ and fatherhood wage advantage grows as net family income 
increases, they do not follow the same pattern. Among couples at the bottom fifth and 
tenth percentiles of family income, there is no significant gender wage advantage 
afforded to childfree husbands. Meanwhile, fathers at the lowest fifth of the income 
distribution incur a small wage penalty of roughly 2 percent. Contrary to my first 
hypothesis, this indicates that among the poorest families, husbands do not garner wage 
advantage over wives. At the tenth percentile of income, the results begin to fall in line 
with expectations: although there is again no significant husband wage advantage within 
childfree couples, fathers garner a large 30 percent wage advantage over wives. 
Meanwhile, at the 25th percentile, there is significant wage advantage (roughly 39 
percent) for husbands among childfree couples, but this advantage grows by only 1 
percent in households with children. Overall, the results demonstrate that there is less 
within-household wage inequality in the bottom third of the family income distribution, 
based on the presence of children.  
At the median of the family income distribution, within-couple wage inequality 
grows, but to a smaller degree within parental couples.  Childfree husbands’ wage 
advantage is smaller (29 percent) than at the 25th percentile, but this advantage remains 
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the same at 40 percent within couples with children. At the 75th percentile the gaps 
between childfree and parental couples are similar: wage advantage within childfree 
couples is 31 percent compared 39 percent within couples with children. It appears that 
although husbands receive substantial wage advantage over wives at the middle of the 
income distribution, there is little variation for fathers from the 25th to the 75th 
percentiles. While childfree husbands have greater wage advantage at the 25th percentile, 
the distributional pattern of husband advantage at the median and 75th percentile is 
roughly the same.  
However, among couples at the highest income levels, husbands’ wage advantage 
grows significantly larger. At the 90th percentile, there is a 35 percent gap within childfree 
couples compared to a substantial 47 percent gap within parental households. Among the 
top fifth of the income distribution, the 46 percent gap within childfree couples grows to 
a staggering 58 percent within couples with children. The results illustrate that among the 
highest earners, husbands make significantly higher wages than wives, net of work effort, 
and children increase within-couple wage inequality. Table 6 and Figure 5 reveal stark 
variation in within- couple wage gaps across the family income distribution. The results 
confirm hypotheses three: husbands’ wage advantage within couples grows as income 
rises and within-couple wage inequality is largest amongst households at the highest 
income levels. However, contradicting my first hypothesis, not all husbands receive 
higher wages than their wives. In the bottom tenth of the family income distribution, 
childfree husbands do not earn more than wives while fathers’ wage advantage increases 
from the tenth percentile and up. 
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To evaluate my fourth hypothesis, Figure 6 graphically presents the results from 
Table 6 for the distribution of the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium on 
wages within couples across the family income distribution.  As with Figure 5, there is 
distinct variation across households in terms of the effects of children on parent’s wages 
between the bottom and top half of the income distribution. However, it appears that the 
fatherhood premium varies to a lesser degree across income levels compared to the 
motherhood penalty.  While the largest fatherhood premium of roughly 4 percent occurs 
at the median, the premium only varies slightly (from roughly 2 to 3 percent) across all 
other quantiles. Wives in the bottom fifth of income incur a larger penalty of 4 percent 
that decreases to approximately 3 percent at the tenth and 25th quantiles. The penalty 
returns to 4 percent at the median and 75th quantiles, but grows to approximately 6 
percent among the top tenth of the income distribution. Clearly, couples in the bottom 5 
percent of income and those above the median have the largest gaps between parents. The 
motherhood penalty is largest within couples at the highest and the very lowest income 
levels, but the fatherhood premium varies only slightly across the distribution. The 
comparable wage gaps within couples at the bottom fifth and top half of the distribution 
partially contradicts hypothesis 2 and 4 that predicted that child wage gaps would be 
largest only in the upper half of the income distribution. Most noteworthy, however, is 
that parental wage inequality within couples is driven by different effects for children 
(e.g. motherhood or fatherhood effects) by gender at different levels of income. While the 
fatherhood premium is relatively stable across the family income distribution, the 
motherhood penalty is largest among couples in the top tenth of the distribution, possibly 
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reflecting wives higher likelihood of reducing work time after children at higher income 
levels.  
Within-Couple Wage Inequality across Education 
Measuring socioeconomic class in terms of education rather than family income 
reveals differences in the distribution of within-couple wage inequality. Table 7 presents 
the results from the multi-level dyadic discrepancy models across all seven educational 
couple-types.35 To get a visual sense of the results, Figure 7 graphically presents the 
exponentiated coefficients from the results in Table 7. The results confirm my first 
hypothesis that husbands would garner wage advantage over wives regardless of parental 
status and educational attainment. The table also confirms my fifth hypothesis that 
predicted that husbands’ wage advantage would be smaller in couples where wives had 
the same or more education as their husbands. Looking first at couples in the lower half 
of the education distribution, within couples where both spouses have less than a high 
school diploma, childfree husbands’ advantage is 21.4 percent compared to 33.6 percent 
within households with children. Meanwhile, within couples where husbands have not 
graduated high school but their wives have, their wage advantage is a smaller 15 percent 
and does not vary by parental status. Most surprising, husbands’ wage advantage is 
largest within households where husbands have graduated high school but wives have 
not, but this advantage does not vary by parental status. It appears that within couples 
where at least one spouse has not obtained a high school diploma, husbands maintain 
wage advantage over wives, but fatherhood is less likely to confer greater wage 
advantage. Furthermore, the results also indicate that obtaining a high school diploma is a 
                                                          
35 For variance components, see Table A8 in the Appendix. 
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key factor that raises wages for both men and women, as evidenced by the large wage 
advantage for high school graduate husbands over wives who have not and the smaller 
gaps within couples where wives, but not husbands, have graduated. These results 
support my prediction that husbands have less wage advantage within couples when 
wives have the same or more education than husbands. 
Within-couple wage gaps in the upper half of the education distribution also 
support to hypothesis 5. The wage advantage husbands receive when both spouses have 
both graduated high school is a large 37 percent and is amplified by the presence of 
children in the household (50 percent). The results for the next four couple-types also 
reveal the importance of wives educational attainment for wage inequality within 
households. The gender gaps are considerably smaller in the next set of columns for 
couples where wives have more education than their high school graduate husbands: 
there is an advantage of 17 percent for childfree couples compared to 23 percent for 
parents. Meanwhile, when husbands have a college degree but wives do not, husbands 
earn 36 percent more in households without children, but the advantage for fathers is the 
same as for high school graduate couples at 50 percent. Finally, in couples where spouses 
both have a Bachelor’s degree, husbands’ advantage is smaller for both childfree couples 
(28 percent) and parents (46 percent). The results confirm that across education, husband 
wage advantage occurs within all couples, but this advantage also varies based on wives’ 
educational attainment. If wives have more education than their husbands, husbands still 
enjoy wage advantage, but the within-couple gender gaps are smaller. However, it 
appears that husband wage advantage within couples is highest within couples at lower 
levels of education, regardless of parental status.  
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To fully assess my second and sixth hypothesis, Figure 8 shows the results from 
Table 7 examining the distribution of the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood 
premium within couples by couples’ degree attainment. As with Figure 7, important 
differences are revealed by using education as the metric for investigating variation in the 
effects of children by social class. The wage advantage associated with fatherhood is 
clearly apparent, but not within all couples. There are no significant motherhood penalties 
within couples where one or both spouses have less than a high school degree. The 
fatherhood premium is a large 6.6 percent in couples where both spouses have less than a 
high school diploma, but there are no significant premiums within couples where both 
spouses have not completed high school or where wives have a high school diploma and 
husbands do not. Reflecting the substantial wage advantage for husbands regardless of 
parental status at lower levels of education, the results also indicate that the impact of 
children on within-couple wage inequality is reduced in couples where one or both 
spouses have not graduated from high school. 
Among couples at higher levels of education, the distribution of child wage 
effects are dramatically different. When both spouses are high school graduates, the 
premium is 4.7 percent, while the motherhood penalty is a significant 3.4 percent. In 
couples where husbands have graduated high school and wives have more education, 
child effects are considerably smaller. The fatherhood premium decreases to 1.5 percent 
and the motherhood penalty also declines to 2.7 percent. Looking at the college-educated, 
in couples with husbands that have a bachelor’s degree but his wife does not, the 
motherhood penalty is a large 6.6 percent, but the fatherhood premium grows to roughly 
3 percent. When both spouses have college degrees, however, the within-couple wage 
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gap is largest: wives incur a 3.8 percent motherhood penalty, while fathers receive an 8.7 
percent premium. The results support hypothesis 6 that predicted parental wage gaps will 
be largest in couples where wives have the same or less education as husbands, but it 
appears that the widest parental gaps occur within couples when both spouses are 
college-educated.  
Income vs Education: Measuring Within-Couple Inequality across Class 
Comparing the distributions of the effects of children within couples by income 
level and couple’s education suggests that since income is not perfectly correlated to 
education, it is important to consider multiple means of assessing class inequality across 
families. To ease comparison, Figure 9 presents the distribution the wage effects of 
children across income and couple education categories. The X-axis in the figure is 
labeled 1-7 corresponding to the 7 quantiles I use to assess income differences and the 7 
educational categories of couples. Clearly, the patterns in the distribution the motherhood 
penalty and the fatherhood premium are different across income and education. The wage 
gaps associated with motherhood and fatherhood follow a more stable pattern of growth 
across income, with the widest gaps among the highest earning families. Meanwhile, the 
child wage gaps are amplified in the middle and the tails of the education distribution. 
Here, my seventh hypothesis is confirmed, but also informed. The alignment of child 
wage effects within couples creates greater inequality within couples in the upper half of 
the incomes distribution, but also among families at the lowest levels of income. 
Meanwhile, within-couple parental wage gaps are largest in the tails of the educational 
distribution as well. This supports the findings of Greenwood et al (2014) that the 
earnings gap between couples with relatively high and those with relatively low levels of 
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education has widened substantially since 1960 relative to the average household income. 
Moreover, the results illustrate that although marriage gaps between the middle and 
working class are associated with the growth in US wealth inequality (Cherlin 2014), 
family composition also contributes to wage inequality among married couples. These 
findings also help to clarify prior work in the motherhood penalty and fatherhood 
premium literature regarding differences in education and income level. Gender wage 
inequality associated with children is most pronounced amongst the most privileged 
families both in terms of income and education. 
As in my previous chapter, in both sets of analyses, there are substantial residual 
effects that remain after including controls for spousal work effort in the models. As 
previous work on the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium argues, it is also 
possible that the remaining wage inequality within and between households could result 
from differential treatment by employers based on gendered notions of the “ideal worker” 
(Williams 2000; Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Correll et al 2007). Unfortunately, I can 
only speculate regarding employers since information on employer behavior is not 
available in the data. 
Conclusion 
To date, there is no study that considers how these processes within couples vary 
across socioeconomic class by income level and educational attainment.  Using the 1980-
2008 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, the goal of this chapter was to 
assess how the gender wage gap, the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium are 
distributed within married households and across couples by social class. The motivation 
for the analyses is that simply investigating the average effects of parenthood for all 
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couples obscures significant variation within couples across families.  The results 
illustrate that gender wage inequality within households is compounded by parental 
status, but the wage gaps associated with children also vary among different 
socioeconomic groups and contribute to between-household wage inequality.  
 I first examined variation in the distribution of within-couple wage inequality 
based on family income. Husbands’ wage advantage conditioned on fatherhood grows 
within couples as family income increases, suggesting that gender wage inequality is 
exacerbated within and among wealthier households. However, in low-income families, 
not all husbands receive higher wages than their wives.  At the fifth and tenth percentiles 
of income, there is no significant wage advantage of husbands over wives within 
childfree households, while fathers in the tenth quantile of the income distribution have a 
30 percent wage advantage over mothers.  
Meanwhile, the alignment of parental wage effects across income reveals stark 
differences across class in within-couple wage inequality. Across income, with the 
exception of couples in the bottom fifth of the distribution, wage gaps associated with 
children are slightly wider  These results support previous work by Cooke (2014) that 
finds that while low-earning fathers incur wage penalties, the premium grows as income 
increases. However, motherhood penalties also grow as income level rises. Overall, in 
terms of my first research question, within-couple wage inequality is largest amongst 
households in the top half of the income distribution and this inequality is exacerbated by 
the presence of children in households. 
Next, I considered variation in terms of the distribution of husband wage 
advantage and child wage effects within couples across levels of education. This set of 
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analyses reveals that wage inequality within couples is more pronounced in the tails of 
the distribution. Within all couples, husbands earn more than wives, but for couples 
where spouses have completed high school or above, wage advantage conditioned on 
children is primarily larger when husbands have more education than wives. If wives 
have more education than their husbands, husbands still enjoy wage advantage, but the 
gaps are considerably smaller. Moreover, the results demonstrate that gender wage 
inequality within families varies in distinct ways for low versus highly educated couples. 
Within couples with low educational attainment (where one or both spouses have not 
graduated high school), with the exception of couples where both spouses did not 
graduate, husbands’ wage advantage does not increase with the arrival of children in the 
household.  
There are also key differences in the distribution of child effects across levels of 
education. However, this depends on whether spouses have more or less than a high 
school education. There are no significant fatherhood premiums at the .10 and .25 
quantiles or significant motherhood penalties in the bottom third of the distribution. This 
suggests that much of the wage inequality generated by the differential wage effects 
associated with children appears to be occurring primarily among couples with at least a 
high school education or more, perhaps because within these couples, wives are more 
likely to face tougher job constraints or reduce work time in response to having children 
(Anderson et al 2003; Waldfogel 1997; Stone 2007). The results also support England et 
al.’s (2013) work that finds higher penalties for high skill and high earning women. 
Does the variation in the wage gap and the effects of children follow the same 
pattern across the distribution of couples’ wage and educational attainment? Here it is 
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apparent that how socioeconomic class is conceptualized and measured is important. The 
results in Figure 9 reveal that the distribution of the wage gap and the effects of children 
by educational attainment do not follow the same pattern as within couple gaps across 
couple income levels. While the distribution of the effects of motherhood and fatherhood 
follows a more stable pattern across income, the parental wage gaps are largest in the tails 
of the education distribution. This supports the finding of Greenwood et al (2013) that the 
earnings gap between couples with relatively high and those with relatively low levels of 
education has widened substantially since 1960 relative to the average household income. 
It appears that couples who are already disadvantaged in the labor market are not 
necessarily penalized or rewarded for having children, while those in the middle and 
above experience more within-couple inequality.  
The residual wage premiums for fatherhood and the motherhood penalty after 
adding controls for work effort and human capital differences remain largely 
unexplained.  These unexplained residual effects may result from factors located outside 
of households and suggest that other factors occurring in work places, such as employer 
discrimination, are contributing to the remaining gender wage inequality within families. 
It is possible that employers are rewarding parents differently based on gendered 
expectations about parents as employees as prior research would suggest (Correll et al 
2007). Further research investigating employer behaviors would help to shed light on 
these processes.  
As with the previous chapter, there are some limitations to my analyses. First, 
although it is likely that the residual unexplained variation in my models may be caused 
by employer actions and behaviors, I cannot assess with certainty the role of factors 
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outside of households in shaping wage outcomes.  Also, a number of measures for human 
capital and job characteristics, such as work experience, job seniority and tenure, number 
of jobs ever held, public/private sector, and self-employment, would have been useful as 
control measures. While this chapter considers variation in couple wage inequality across 
social class, this analysis does not account for how the gender gap and child wage effects 
may vary by race/ethnicity. In my next chapter, I assess how children influence inequality 
both within and between families given the labor market disadvantage experienced by 
workers of color.  Moreover, my analysis is limited to employed persons. This means that 
I am missing couples where mothers “opt out” (Belkin 2003; Stone 2007) of paid 
employment and that these results understate wives’ motherhood penalty and the wage 
gap between husbands and wives.  
This project speaks to broad patterns of inequality regarding how class shapes 
gender wage inequality across families, both in terms of wages and educational 
attainment and contributes to the literature on social stratification, the gender wage gap, 
as well as work and family policy.  These findings have important implications for 
understanding where the revolution has “stalled” (Blau, Brinton, and Grusky 2006) for 
the gender wage gap. Although much attention has been paid to the growth in income 
inequality since the 1960s, but less consideration has been given to the role of family 
patterns in shaping this inequality. Little work has been done to date to directly situate 
these effects within couples or to unpack variation in within-couple inequality across 
households by social class. The results illustrate how the differential impact of children 
on parent’s wages within couples contributes to wage inequality within married couples, 
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but also how children contribute to overall wage stratification across married couple 
households.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
CHAPTER 4 
THE INTERSECTION OF GENDER, RACE, AND PARENTAL STATUS 
WITHIN AND ACROSS HOUSEHOLDS 
 
 
In previous chapters of this dissertation I have established that parenthood 
amplifies husbands’ earnings advantage over wives within heterosexual married couples, 
and that this within-couple male earnings advantage is further moderated by spousal work 
hours, education, and family income. In this chapter, I bring my analysis to bear on the 
question of whether these findings hold across racial groups. Specifically, I consider how 
the impact of parenthood on within-household male earnings advantage varies between 
black and white couples. Using the 1980-2008 waves of the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY), I examine factors contributing to husbands’ earnings advantage 
and parental wage effects among black and white families, including assortative 
partnering, household specialization, and relational ties to children.  
My contribution is assessing whether differences in gender and parenthood wage 
gaps among married couple households hold across racial groups. In contrast to my focus 
on the wages of married couples, the majority of research on the wage effects of having 
children has concentrated on individuals’ earnings. Some of this literature addresses 
differences by racial/ethnic group. For example, black women receive smaller 
motherhood penalties and for having two or more children compared to white women, 
who incur a larger penalty with the first child onward (Budig and England 2001; Glauber 
2007; England, Bearak, Budig, and Hodges 2013), possibly resulting from black 
women’s lower likelihood of experiencing work interruptions after having children than 
white women. But does this lower motherhood penalty imply lower male and parenthood 
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advantages within black married households, compared to whites? My analysis will 
address this question. And while past research finds that white men receive larger 
fatherhood earnings bonuses compared to black men (Glauber 2008a&b; Hodges and 
Budig 2010), even after including work hours and human capital characteristics, it is 
again unclear whether this indicates lower male and parenthood earnings advantages 
within black coupled households, compared to whites. Finally, a recent study by 
Killewald (2013) finds that the fatherhood premium is conferred only on fathers who co-
reside with their biological children, but finds no variation in the effect of fatherhood by 
race/ethnicity. Yet given the lower likelihood of black children to co-reside with their 
biological fathers (Furstenberg 1988; Krieder and Ellis 2011a), does this also imply lower 
couple earnings inequality within black households compared to white households? To 
date, how the varying sizes of fatherhood bonuses and motherhood penalties are aligned 
within dual-earner coupled households by racial group remain unexamined. 
I anticipate that varying constellations of interfamilial relationships among black 
and white families may produce differences in the distribution of husbands’ wage 
advantage and parenthood wage effects within couples. For example, marital status of co-
residing couples matters: The marriage gap between high earning and highly educated 
couples and low-income, less educated couples has grown in the latter half of the 20th 
century (Cherlin 2014). Marriage is linked to greater motherhood penalties (Budig and 
England 2001; Glauber 2007; Misra et al. 2007; Budig and Hodges 2010) and only 
married men garner a fatherhood premium (Glauber 2007a&b; Hodges and Budig 2010; 
Killewald 2013). However, declines in marriage rates have been more pronounced among 
blacks than whites (Carlson, McLanahan, and England 2004; Harknett and McLanahan 
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2004; Western and McLanahan 2000), suggesting that due to differential selection into 
marriage, the penalties and premiums within black couples may align differently than 
within white couples. Working class black women are less likely to marry in response to 
a pregnancy or to delay early child-bearing (Krieder and Ellis 2011b; Edin and Kefalas 
2005; Pagnini & Morgan 1996) than their white counterparts. Since working class 
couples are less likely to marry or delay children until after marriage (Cherlin 2014; Edin 
and Kefalas 2005), these differences in marriage rates and the timing of marriage and 
childbirth indicate stronger selection into marriage among black couples, particularly 
among couples with more human capital and resources.  Positive selection into marriage 
based on earnings potential may also be stronger among black women given black 
women’s greater competition in the marriage market or the greater rarity of 
“marriageable” black men. This greater selectivity into marriage among black couples 
with more human capital implies that black wives’ wages may be more commensurate 
with their husbands’ compared to white couples. Thus, I expect that within-couple wage 
gaps may be smaller within married black households. 
The distribution of child penalties and premiums within couples may also vary 
between black and white households due to different patterns of co-residence with 
children among black families (Krieder and Ellis 2011a; Furstenberg 1987; 1988). 
Although racial/ethnic differences were non-significant in her results, Killewald (2013) 
demonstrates that the effects of children on wages are mediated by whether children are 
biologically related to and co-residing with parents. However, prior research on the 
fatherhood premium finds that co-residential white fathers garner a substantially larger 
bonus compared to co-residential black fathers (Glauber 2008a&b; Hodges and Budig 
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2010). To date, there is also no study that investigates variation in the motherhood 
penalty by biological and residential status of children, since most children are more 
likely to co-reside with mothers. To address this puzzle, I examine how the effects of 
children vary by race/ethnicity within couples who co-reside with biological children, 
have biological children living outside of the household, or have co-residential step-
children.  Exploring how the patterns of gender wage discrepancies associated with 
children within households vary by relational ties and co-residence among white and 
black married couples may clarify how wage inequality within families is linked to the 
reproduction of wage inequality between racial/ethnic groups.  
In this chapter I review previous scholarship on gender wage gaps within 
racial/ethnic groups and how these gaps relate to within-household inequality.  I then 
draw on the central findings in the literature that examines variation in the motherhood 
penalty and the fatherhood premium by race/ethnicity to make predictions for the 
distribution of wage effects within white and black married couples.  I next consider how 
wage variation among families based on co-residence and relational ties to children may 
shape within-couple wage inequality for black and white couples. As with my two 
previous empirical chapters, I also theorize how other factors known to shape parental 
wage effects, including educational attainment and household specialization, may also 
shape wage variation within couples between white and black families. Lastly, I discuss 
the potential role of employer discrimination based on assumptions regarding an 
employee’s race/ethnicity, gender and parental status as an explanation for residual wage 
gaps within couples that persist in the fully-specified models. I explain how I 
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operationalize and test the arguments in my analyses before moving on to the empirical 
section of this study. 
Explaining Gendered Wage Variation within Couples by Race/Ethnicity 
To date, there is no study that considers how male earnings advantage and 
parental wage gaps vary within married couples by race/ethnicity. However, evidence 
suggests that these gaps should be larger within white couples compared to black couples. 
Most studies of wage gaps at the individual level have documented a consistent and 
strong pattern of gender gaps within racial/ethnic groups (Brown and Misra 2003), such 
that the gender gap between white men and white women is larger than gender gap 
between black men and black women. Researchers argue that within-group gender wage 
discrepancies result from differential returns to human capital characteristics for white 
and black workers and the gender and racial composition of jobs (Tomaskovic-Devey 
1993). These differences in wage returns to education and the over-representation of 
minority workers in lower-earning occupations are linked to more compressed wage 
structures (Grodsky and Pager 2001) and truncated wage trajectories for black compared 
to white workers. These findings imply that there may be less wage variation (or smaller 
wage gaps) within black couples compared to white couples. Therefore, I expect the 
differences in gender wage gaps among black and white men and women to characterize 
the gap between husbands and wives within black and white married couples. 
Moreover, since the 1960s, much of the reduction in the gender wage gap has 
resulted from stagnation among middle and working class men’s wages (Bernhardt, 
Morris, and Handcock 1995; Fortin and Lemieux 2000). Yet, during this period, high-
income white men’s wages have increased dramatically relative to all women and black 
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men (Bernhardt, et al 1995), while the growth in black men’s wage rates have not kept 
pace with black women (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008). These findings suggest that 
husbands are likely to experience wage advantage over wives within their respective 
racial/ethnic group. However, given that black men’s wages have not grown in tandem 
with white men’s and that gender wage gaps tend to be wider among white workers 
compared to black workers, it is likely that husbands’ wage advantage will be wider 
within white households than black households. Therefore, I expect that:  
H1: The gender wage gap (i.e., husbands’ wage advantage) will be wider within white 
couples, relative to black couples. 
Racial/Ethnic Variation in Parental Premia and Penalties  
Previous research on the fatherhood premium shows that not all men benefit from 
marriage and parenthood in the same way (Glauber 2008a&b). While both white and 
black husbands receive wage premia for fatherhood, black fathers garner smaller returns 
for having children than white fathers (Glauber 2008a&b; Hodges and Budig 2010). 
Hodges and Budig (2010) found that with the transition to fatherhood, black fathers 
receive the smallest earnings premiums compared to Latinos and white fathers even after 
accounting for educational attainment, work effort, and job characteristics. Using fixed-
effects models, Glauber (2008a&b) also found that for married white and black men, the 
birth of the first child is associated with an increase of hourly wages of roughly 8 percent, 
but with the second child, wage increases are considerably smaller for married black 
fathers (9 percent compared to 14 percent for white fathers). These differences in size of 
the fatherhood premium by race and number of children suggest that male wage 
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advantage associated with children within married black couples may be lower than 
within married white couples.  
Race differences in the motherhood penalty also occur among married women 
(Glauber 2007). Individual-level work on parental wage effects find smaller motherhood 
penalties for black women compared to white women and differences in the penalty 
based on the number of children within households (Waldfogel 1997; Budig and England 
2001; Glauber 2007; England, Bearak, Budig, and Hodges 2013).  While all married 
white mothers pay a wage penalty for each successive child, only married black mothers 
with more than 2 children pay a wage penalty (Glauber 2007). Budig and England (2001) 
also found that black women have smaller penalties for higher order births compared to 
their white counterparts. Since married white fathers tend to garner the largest wage 
premiums while married white mothers incur larger wage penalties, the alignment of 
parental wage effects within couples may produce wider parental gaps within white 
couples. Furthermore, within-couple parental gaps may widen as the number of children 
in the household increases. Based on these findings, I hypothesize that:  
H2a: Within-couple male wage advantage (or the gender wage gap) will increase with 
the number of children in both black and white households, but to a lesser degree within 
black couples. 
H2b: The degree of husbands’ advantage increase in H2a will be larger within white 
couples than within black couples, such that white fathers will garner larger wage 
premiums than black fathers, while white mothers will experience larger wage penalties 
than black mothers. 
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Biological Ties and Co-residency of Children  
Less than 60 percent of children live with married, biological parents, and this is 
tied to race, such that black children are less likely to co-reside with both biological 
parents than white children (Krieder and Ellis 2011a). Race differences in the size of 
parental wage gaps within couples may result from variation in parents’ residential status 
and relational ties with children. Killewald (2013) finds that the fatherhood premium is 
only conferred to married fathers who co-reside with their biological children, while no 
premium is associated with biological children living outside the household or step-
children. Furthermore, she claims that these findings hold across racial/ethnic groups. Co-
residency and biological ties with children thus appear to be a requirement for garnering 
increased wage advantage associated with fatherhood.  
However, given that other work on the fatherhood premium finds important 
differences across groups (Glauber 2008a&b; Hodges and Budig 2010), Killewald’s 
(2013) finding of no differences by race in the returns to residential/biological fatherhood 
or other fatherhood types is rather surprising. Both Glauber (2008a&b) and Hodges and 
Budig (2010) find that the fatherhood bonus for married, co-residential black fathers was 
smaller relative to married white fathers, possibly due to black fathers’ higher likelihood 
of living with non-biological or step-children (Furstenberg 1988). Moreover, the 
residential and biological status of children has yet to be examined in relation to the 
motherhood penalty, perhaps because mothers are more likely to co-reside with children 
than fathers (Kreider and Ellis 2011). To explore Killewald’s claims, I consider how 
relational ties and co-residence of children influence within-couple wage inequality 
between white and black families. I hypothesize that:  
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 H3: Husband’s wage advantage will be larger within couples who co-reside with 
their biological children than among those who co-reside with non-biological children 
(e.g., stepchildren).  
 H4: The wage gaps associated with residential biological children will be smaller 
within black couples compared to white couples. 
 
Race, Assortative Partnering, and Educational Attainment: 
In my previous chapters, I first assessed how assortative partnering along 
educational lines shaped within-couple wage inequality and then how within-couple wage 
inequality varied across couples by socioeconomic class. Assortative partnering also 
occurs along the dimension of race and ethnicity. Prior work suggests that individuals are 
more likely to choose spouses within their respective racial/ethnic group (Kalmijn 1998; 
Blackwell and Lichter 2004; Schwartz and Mare 2005).36  This tendency towards same-
race/ethnicity marriages has implications for within-couple wage inequality because there 
remain persistent racial gaps in educational attainment, work experience, and wages. In 
addition to these gaps, there are differences in the wage returns to human capital among 
white and black workers (Tomaskovic-Devey 1993). To unpack these differences by 
                                                          
36 Rates of intermarriage across racial/ethnic groups have steadily increased over time, but continue to 
comprise a small portion of married couples. Compared to 3.2 percent in 1980, the share of mixed-race 
marriages reached an all-time high of 8.4 percent in 2010 (Wang 2013). I compare differences in wage gaps 
between couples where both spouses identify as non-Hispanic black or non-Hispanic white.  
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race/ethnicity, I include years of education and potential work experience of each spouse 
in my models.37 
The results from my previous two chapters suggest that wage gaps within couples 
are largest among households in the tails of the education distribution, but it is unclear 
whether this holds across racial groups. Individual level analyses have found that the 
relationship between education and parental wage effects vary by racial group 
membership. In fixed effects models, Anderson and colleagues (2002) find that black 
high-school and college graduates receive no significant motherhood penalty for one 
child, but the penalty for two or more children is similar to the penalty of white women 
(Anderson et al 2002). College-educated fathers and those employed in 
professional/managerial occupations, which typically have higher educational 
requirements, also garner the largest premiums (Hodges and Budig 2010), but this is 
primarily the case for white husbands. The premium for married black fathers does not 
vary by educational attainment (Hodges and Budig 2010): Married black fathers receive 
the same premium regardless of degree acquisition. Given the variation across levels of 
education in the distribution of penalties and premia among black and white parents at the 
individual level, I expect that education will explain a larger proportion of within-couple 
wage gaps for white couples.  
H5: Including age and education will reduce the wage gaps within couples, but more so 
within white couples, relative to black couples. 
 
                                                          
37 I use age in years of both spouses as a measure of potential work experience. In results not shown, I also 
ran models including an alternative control for the relative education of spouses. Results are available in 
Appendix Table A14 and A15. 
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Selection into Marriage and Parenthood for Black and White Couples 
Differential selection into marriage and parenthood for white and black couples is 
another potential source of variation in within-couple wage gaps by race/ethnicity. By 
assessing the impact of the transition to parenthood within married couples, I am 
examining a highly select set of couples, particularly in the case of black families.38 
Marriage itself is associated with greater motherhood penalties (Budig and England 2001; 
Glauber 2007; Misra et al. 2007; Budig and Hodges 2010), possibly because married 
women’s greater family resources allow them to reduce their work effort when children 
are young. Marriage is also an important factor for the fatherhood premium: Hodges and 
Budig (2010) and Glauber (2008a&b) find that marriage explains roughly one-half of the 
earnings bonus, while Killewald (2013) finds that only married fathers garner a wage 
premium for co-residential, biological children. The literature suggests that since the 
decline in marriage has been more pronounced among blacks than whites (Carlson, 
McLanahan, and England 2004; Harknett and McLanahan 2004; Western and 
McLanahan 2000), there are fewer black households comprised of married parents and 
their biological children. These differences in marriage patterns by race imply greater 
positive selection into marriage and parenthood among black couples.  
Given the greater rarity of “marriageable” black men and black women’s greater 
competition in the marriage market, positive selection into marriage based on earnings 
potential may be stronger among black women. However, social class position also plays 
an important role shaping family formation patterns (Cherlin 2014; Carlson, McLanahan, 
                                                          
38 Multiple marriages occur among NLSY respondents over the course of survey waves. As with my 
previous empirical chapters, I limit my analyses to first marriages. 
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and England 2004; Harknett and McLanahan 2004; Pagnini & Morgan 1996; Edin and 
Kefalas 2005; Furstenberg 1987), such that couples who transition to parenthood after 
marriage may be more positively selected in terms of human capital and family resources. 
Indeed, coinciding with the growth in overall US wage inequality, the marriage gap 
between middle and working class couples has increased in the post-war period (Cherlin 
2014).  Among the working class, black mothers are less likely than white mothers to 
postpone having children until after marriage or to marry in response to a pregnancy 
(Pagnini & Morgan 1996; Edin and Kefalas 2005; Furstenberg 1987). Moreover, for 
working class black mothers, early childbearing has less of an impact on wages, as they 
are already likely to have a truncated earning trajectories prior to having children (Edin 
and Kefalas 2005; Furstenberg 2003).39 On the other hand, since delayed motherhood is 
associated with smaller motherhood penalties (Amuedo-Durantes and Kimmel 2005), 
black wives who postpone childbearing may also incur smaller penalties similar to their 
white counterparts. Prior work also finds that black fathers are less likely to co-reside 
with their biological children than white fathers (Kreider and Ellis 2011a; Furstenberg 
1988); suggesting that black fathers may garner smaller fatherhood premia. While both 
black husbands and wives are more highly selected into marriage than white spouses, 
black wives may incur smaller motherhood penalties while black fathers garner smaller 
premiums. Differences in selection into marriage and parenthood between white and 
                                                          
39 Since child penalties tend to be largest for married mothers, the penalty for the select group of 
married black mothers I examine may be larger than the penalty for unmarried black mothers, but smaller 
than the penalty for married white mothers. Since I include only married couples in my sample, I cannot 
directly test this possibility in my analysis.   
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black couples serve to reinforce my previous hypotheses that within-couple wage gaps 
will be wider within white couples compared to black couples.  
The literature on child penalties and premia also suggests that factors that 
influence wages within couples may be due to unmeasured factors that cannot be 
captured by adding controls to the model. Factors that influence wages may also shape a 
couple’s likelihood of having children, making assessment of causality difficult. 
Researchers of parental penalties and premiums have primarily employed fixed-effect 
models that provide estimates that are robust to unobserved differences among 
respondents that do not change over time (Allison 2009) to address unmeasurable 
selection. However, the fixed-effects in multi-level dyadic models cannot control for 
unmeasured differences among couples that influence the effect of children on earnings 
or that statistically interact with another variable that influences these effects. Thus, time 
changing variables that could simultaneously influence both the likelihood of couples 
having children and how much each spouse earns must be explicitly included in the 
model.  
Race and the Household Division of Labor 
As in my previous chapters, I also consider how processes of household 
specialization shape the distribution of gender and parental wage gaps within black and 
white couples. According to Becker (1981), due to women’s disadvantage in the labor 
market, their specialization in reproductive work in the household rather than paid labor 
is potentially a rational choice for enhancing household utility. Women are thus more 
likely to incur a wage penalty for motherhood due to reduced time spent in paid work or 
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foregoing paid employment altogether after the arrival of children. Meanwhile, the 
fatherhood premium is thought to occur because men may increase their work hours in 
response to a birth and in turn garner a bonus relative to childfree men for their 
specialization in market work. Although it is the most widely tested explanation for the 
motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium (Budig and England 2001; Hodges and 
Budig 2010; Lundberg and Rose 2000; Glauber 2007), household specialization has 
drawn much criticism from feminist scholars. Critics argue that the theory assumes a 
white, middle class breadwinner/homemaker model of the family that comprises only a 
small proportion of existent family forms. 
Research findings in terms of the explanatory power of household specialization 
for the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium are also mixed. Accounting for 
work time only partially explains the motherhood penalty (Budig and England 2001; 
Glauber 2007; Budig and Hodges 2010) and the fatherhood premium (Glauber 2008a&b; 
Hodges and Budig 2010). In Chapter 2, I found that the portion of the parental wage gap 
within couples explained by household specialization was due to wives reducing paid 
work time, rather than husbands altering their work effort. Yet, the degree of household 
specialization also varies across households by race/ethnicity (Budig and England 2001; 
Glauber 2007; 2008a&b; Lundberg and Rose 2001). Black couples typically have a 
weaker division of labor and share household responsibilities more equally compared to 
white couples (Shelton and John 1993; Kamo and Cohen 1999). Black women’s 
historically higher rates of employment compared to white women (Winkler, McBride, 
and Andrews 2005; Winslow-Bowe 2006) also suggest that black mothers are more likely 
to be economic as well as care providers for their children, thus they incur smaller 
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motherhood penalties relative to white mothers.  Glauber (2008a&b) also found that the 
birth of a child is associated with an increase in annual time spent at work for white 
fathers, but not married black fathers. Thus, household specialization may have more 
explanatory power for wage gaps within white families. I test the theory by including 
control measures for both spouses’ work hours and annual weeks worked in my multi-
level models.  
H6: The inclusion of measures for spousal work effort will explain more of the wage gap 
within white couples than black couples.  
 
Gendered and Racialized Employer Discrimination 
Another key explanation in the literature for variation in the fatherhood premium 
and the motherhood penalty lies in the differential treatment of workers by employers. 
Experimental and audit studies provide convincing evidence that employers are more 
likely to judge and reward employees differentially by gender and parental status 
(Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007) based on erroneous assumptions of the impact of these 
characteristics on work performance. Correll et al.’s (2007) study demonstrates that 
evaluators of job applicants discriminate against mothers and in favor of fathers, 
compared to childless women and men, in hiring, wage offers, and evaluations of work 
commitment. Furthermore, it is well documented that employer discrimination in hiring 
against minority workers persists in the labor market (Pager 2003; Pager and Quillian 
2005) and this discrimination is shaped by gendered and racialized conceptions of a 
worker’s family status (Kennelly 1999). Unfortunately, I cannot capture employer 
behaviors in my data. It is possible that residual wage gaps within couples might result 
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from employer’s discriminatory evaluations of workers, or from other unmeasured 
factors.  
Data and Methods 
For this chapter’s analysis, I again use the 1980-2008 waves of the NLSY79, a 
national probability sample of individuals.40 Respondents were interviewed annually until 
the 1994 survey and bi-annually thereafter. The initial year of the survey took place when 
respondents were aged 14-21; in 2008, the ages of respondents range from 41 to 58. As in 
my previous chapters, I construct a dyadic data set by identifying married couples41 with 
partners over the age of 18, not currently enrolled, not in the military, and with non-zero 
scores on wages for at least two time periods for each spouse. Since I limit my sample to 
couples with wage scores above zero, I am not observing couples where mothers leave 
paid employment following the arrival of children, which may lead to underestimating 
the total wage penalty for all women. These selection criteria produced a sample of 774 
black couples and 2,288 white couples for analysis.  
For this analysis, I compare married, same-race couples with the goal of assessing 
wage effects within multi-racial households in future work. I created a variable that 
captures the race of the respondent’s first spouse42 using a retrospective variable from the 
2008 wave of the survey that records the race of all the respondent’s past and current 
                                                          
40 1979 is omitted from the analysis as there were too few couples available that met sampling criteria. 
 
41 Because reliable data on cohabitation was only made available in the NLSY79 beginning in 1994, I limit 
my analysis to married couples only.  
 
42 From 1979-2006, the NLSY did not collect information on the race/ethnicity of respondents’ spouses. 
Moreover, the variable for spouse’s race in the household roster does not include a category for Hispanic 
spouses. For this analysis, I compare only households where both spouses are listed as either Non-Hispanic 
white or Non-Hispanic black. 
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spouses. Over the course of the survey respondents in the NLSY divorce and remarry 
multiple times.43 I follow couples in their first marriage until they divorce (thus dropping 
out the sample), separate (one member leaves the household) or until the last year of 
interview. Once a couple divorces or no longer lives together, I do not continue to 
observe them in my data as they cease to be engaged in a co-residential relationship.  
The NLSY79 is a rich source of data on employment and households, however, 
spousal information contained in the household roster is less complete. As with my 
previous two chapters, there are a number of measures for human capital and job 
characteristics that would be useful for this analysis, such as work experience, job 
seniority and tenure, number of jobs ever held, public/private sector, and self-
employment that are unavailable for respondents’ spouses. 
Measures 
The dependent variable used in this analysis is the natural log of hourly wage 
reported by each member of the couple or dyad.44 I also include a control measure for 
year of interview to control for time period effects over the course of the survey. As with 
my previous chapters, I include both individual and couple-level independent variables to 
investigate the effects of couples’ human capital characteristics and household 
specialization on husbands’ wage advantage and the effects of children on within-couple 
                                                          
43 As with my previous chapters, should a respondent remarry, I created another couple identification 
number and assign the corresponding measures to this new couple. I tested for differences in the effect of 
gender and children on couple wages for second and third marriages. Results were only significant for 
second marriages and given selection differences between first and second marriages, I only present the 
results for first marriages. 
44 Table A1 in the appendix illustrates how the data has been reorganized into dyadic format for the 
analysis. The dependent variable includes a wage score for each member of the dyad, or the outcome score 
for the natural logarithm of hourly wages in each dyad j. 
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wage gaps. Initial models include a dichotomous measure for gender (male =1) to analyze 
the extent of male advantage within the household as measured by the discrepancy in 
spousal hourly wages. I also include a continuous measure for number of children in the 
household, and an interaction term for the effect of number of children and gender. These 
models allow me to estimate 1) differences in male advantage between fathers and 
childfree husbands and 2) how children differentially impact the wages of mothers 
compared to fathers.  
Next, I include continuous measures for the age and years of education of 
husbands and wives to account for the impact of assortative partnering and education on 
within-couple wage gaps. Years of education and age serve as both as an indicator of 
human capital and an indicator of assortative mating.45 To assess household 
specialization based on spouses’ work effort, the fully-specified model includes 
continuous measures for the usual weekly work hours and annual weeks worked in the 
main job for each spouse.  
I also consider differences between households based on the residential status and 
relational ties of children. Using respondent’s annual reports of household composition 
and the usual residence of children, I construct dichotomous measures to capture the 
effects of biological residential/nonresidential children and step-children within 
households and subsequent interactions with gender and race. The reference category in 
                                                          
45 The NLSY does not include adequate measures for creating a variable capturing spouse’s work 
experience, an important explanatory factor found in the literature on parental wage effects.  In 
supplementary analyses, I constructed a measure for potential experience, as suggested by Killewald (2013) 
by subtracting each spouse’s years of education from their age in years and subtracting 5 (since most US 
children begin schooling at age 5). Potential labor market experience adjusts for the life-cycle pattern of 
wages, but is exogenous to parenthood, unlike actual labor market experience. Results were unchanged 
when this measure was added to the model in place of age and years of education. Results from sensitivity 
tests are available in Appendix Table A15.  
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the dyadic discrepancy model are white, childless couples. In my last set of analyses, I 
conduct tests for robustness based on variation in family size among couples with 
children by including dummy variables for one, two, and three or more children in the 
model. 
 
Dyadic Multilevel Models 
I investigate couples’ wage gaps over time using longitudinal dyadic discrepancy 
models, a subset of multi-level models (Raudenbusch and Bryk 2002; Sayer and Klute 
2005). The level 1 (within-dyad) model estimates the average differences in hourly wages 
within couples at each time point, while level 2 estimates average gaps in wages between 
couples. The model is estimated at two levels with time in years nested within 
individuals. Individuals are then nested within couples.  At level 1, the units are the 
repeated responses over time (for example, the log of wages) within each couple. At level 
2, the unit of analysis is the couple.46 To establish the gross discrepancy (or the gender 
gap) within couples, I first fit an unconditional model that only includes a control for year 
of interview and the gender discrepancy dummy at level 1. The unconditional level 1 and 
level 2 models are as follows: 
 LNWAGEij = β0j + β1j*(YEARij) + β2j*(MALEij)   + rij  
 
B0j = γ00 + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + u1j 
β2j = γ20 + u2j 
 
 
                                                          
46 Conceptually, the model contains 3-levels with two levels of nesting. Responses at each time point are 
nested within individuals and individuals are nested within couples. However, at the level of analysis it is a 
two-level model with a single level of nesting (responses nested within couples). This is because gender is 
treated as a characteristic of the repeated responses (a fixed effect) rather than a level in the model. 
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LNWAGEj  is the outcome score of the log of hourly wage for each member of the couple i 
in each dyad j (see Table A1). I also include a control variable for year of interview to 
control for period effects.  The YEAR variable is an estimate of the change in wages for 
each member of the couple. Thus, a 1-unit change in YEAR is a β1 change in LNWAGE, 
given a spouse’s gender. For each dyad, the responses of the members (spouses) are 
regressed on an indicator variable, MALEij, or the variable that will capture the gender 
gap, coded 1 for men and 0 for women. The intercept represents the earnings score for 
wives when the year is 1980, or when both MALE and YEAR are equal to zero. 
The coefficients from level 1 become the dependent variables at level 2 and a 
separate equation for each dependent variable (or level 1 coefficient) is estimated. The 
term, B0j represents wages for women at year zero, while, γ00, represents the average 
wives’ wage across all couples, and u0j is the unexplained residual variance in wives’ 
wages. The term, β1j is the gap in wages between husbands and wives, controlling for 
year, and γ10 is the average wage gap across all couples. The term β2j represents the 
relationship between time and wages, or the rate of change in wages, given a spouse’s 
gender, controlling for the gender gap, while the term γ20 is the average wage relationship 
(rate of change) across all couples. 
Each level 2 equation includes an intercept that represents the value of the 
dependent variable for the average couple, plus a term that captures the unexplained or 
residual variance for each dependent variable at level 2. This variance can be interpreted 
as the heterogeneity across couples, or how each couple differs from the average couple. 
Significant variance in the unconditional model indicates unexplained variability across 
couples, thus allowing me to introduce predictors of this variability into the model. For 
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example, if there is significant variation in male advantage in the unconditional model, I 
can introduce couple characteristics, such as number of children, to explain this variance. 
Subsequent conditional models will test my hypotheses concerning predictors (number of 
children and spouse’s characteristics) that may reduce or enlarge the gender wage gap.47  
The baseline model that introduces child effects is as follows: 
 
LNWAGEij = β0j + β1j*(YEARij) + β2j*(MALEij) + β3j (NUMKIDS) +β4j*(MALE 
*NUMKIDS) + rij  
 
B0j = γ00 + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + u1j 
β2j = γ10 + u1j 
β3j = γ20 + γ21 + u2j 
β4j = γ30 + γ31 + u2j 
 
I first approach my assessment of the variation in wages across households by 
estimating separate models for black and white same-race couples. In results not shown, I 
also ran pooled models including race interactions for the effects of being male, being a 
parent, and being a male parent to confirm significant differences between groups. In all 
additive models, I found significant effects across groups.48 My nested modeling strategy 
first estimates a gross model for the effect of gender within households, followed by a 
second model (baseline model) that accounts for the number of children in the household. 
Model 3 includes controls for spouse’s age and education to assess how spouse’s human 
capital characteristics shape wage effects within couples. I next compare the distribution 
of male wage advantage and the effects of children across couples controlling for spousal 
work effort in model 4. The next set of analyses investigates the effect of co-residence 
                                                          
47 For variance components for all models, see Tables A11-A13 in the Appendix. 
 
48 See Tables A16-A18 in Appendix. 
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and relational ties of children in the fully specified pooled interactive model.49 To test the 
robustness of my results, in my last set of analyses I assess how estimates of model 4 
vary based on the presence of one, two, or three or more children in the household.  
Findings 
Descriptive Analysis 
Table 8 includes descriptive results for both individual and couple-level measures 
used in the analysis. The first panel presents the means, proportions, and standard 
deviations of couple-level measures, including the dependent variable for couples’ wages, 
continuous and dichotomous measures for the number of children, and dummy variables 
for the relational and residential status of children for black and white couples. In the first 
panel, chi-square and t-tests for paired means were conducted to test for significant 
differences across couples by racial/ethnic group. The first row of the table shows that 
white couples have significantly higher average wages ($16.67) than black couples 
($14.24), demonstrating initial wage inequality between black and white couples, 
unadjusted for other factors. 
In terms of family size, the number of children in the household is slightly higher 
for black couples than white couples (2.07 compared to 1.96). There are also significant 
differences in the distribution of number of children across families. While a similar 
proportion of both black and white couples have one child in the household (25 compared 
to 24 percent), white couples are more likely to have two children (35 percent of white 
couples compared to 31 percent of black couples). Black couples are also about 7 percent 
                                                          
49 Estimates from the 2-way interactive model are reported in Table 11. Full results from 3-way interactive 
model are available in Table A18 in Appendix.  
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more likely to have 3 or more children (23 percent) compared to 16 percent of white 
couples. These differences in number of children between groups suggest that variation in 
family size between black and white families may shape the alignment and size of wage 
gaps within couples.  
Table 8 also shows that within married couples, the likelihood of co-residing with 
biological children also varies across groups. Approximately 63 percent of children co-
residing with married black parents are biological children compared to 67 percent within 
married white households. Although having biological children living outside of the 
household is rare for all couples, it is significantly more likely for black couples: 14 
percent of black couples compared to 5 percent of white couples have biological children 
residing outside of the household. The likelihood of step- children is also significantly 
larger for black couples at 6 percent compared to 4 percent for whites. The table 
illustrates variation among married couples in residential status and familial ties to 
children by race/ethnicity that may shape the distribution of parental wage effects within 
couples.50  
The second panel of Table 8 presents the means, proportions, and standard 
deviations of individual-level measures for each spouse used in the analysis. T-tests in the 
second panel capture significant differences between husbands and wives within each 
group. White husbands garner the highest average wages of $19.48, compared to white 
wives’ average of $13.86, while black husbands average $15.68, compared to black 
wives’ $12.80. The gender gap between white spouses is the largest, at $5.62, while black 
                                                          
50 However, as previously discussed, given differentials in the rate and timing of marriages across groups, I 
may be selecting out a larger proportion of black mothers and fathers in the sample.  
104 
 
couples have a smaller wage gap of $2.88. This provides preliminary support to my 
predictions that husbands’ wage advantage will be larger within white households.51 
Comparing within-couple differences in educational attainment reveals that 
average differences in education within couples are similar across groups.  White and 
black wives have approximately 14 years of education, while black and white husbands’ 
average roughly 13 years of education. However, differences within and across couples 
average years of education are not substantively different. Since wives, on average, have 
slightly more schooling than husbands across all groups, the wage advantage of husbands 
over wives in both groups suggests that education does not necessarily translate into 
higher wages for wives. The results imply that if returns to education are the same for 
black and white husbands and wives, then there should be no differences in the effect of 
education on couples’ wages between groups.  Yet, given the disparity in average wages 
both within and between black and white couples, the results indicate that education may 
not confer the same wage returns to black husbands and wives compared to white 
spouses. 
Looking at the distribution of work hours within couples suggests that household 
specialization is more salient within white families.  Black wives work roughly 38 hours 
                                                          
51 Wage differences presented in the second panel of Table 8 do not result from significant differences 
employment patterns within couples. Roughly 97 percent of white husbands in the sample are employed 
compared to 94 percent of black husbands. There also is only slight variation among wives across groups in 
terms of employment. 91 percent of black wives in the sample are employed compared to 92 percent of 
white wives. While previous work finds that black women typically have higher rates of employment 
compared to white women, they are roughly the same in this sample. However, because the sample is 
limited to persons with non-zero scores on wages, I am potentially missing a large proportion of women 
who leave paid employment following the arrival of children. 
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per week and 47 weeks annually, compared to black husbands 44 hours per week and 49 
weeks per year. White husbands work 45 hours per week and roughly 50 weeks per year, 
while white wives average 35 hours and 46 weeks, respectively. The difference in work 
hours within couples is largest for whites (roughly 10 hours), while blacks couples have a 
difference of only 6 hours. In the case of annual weeks worked, the difference among 
husbands is not significant: both white and black men average approximately 49 weeks 
per year, but black husbands work approximately two weeks more than their wives while 
white husbands work four weeks more than their wives. The smaller differences in work 
time within black couples suggest that wage gaps are likely smaller within black couples 
compared to white couples. Although there are differences in wages by race and gender, 
overall, Table 8 demonstrates that there is less variation in factors known to affect wages 
across groups, suggesting that mechanisms located outside of households may be driving 
the remaining gender and racial wage gaps. However, to better test causal mechanisms, 
multivariate analyses are required.  
Multivariate Analyses 
To test my theoretical arguments and hypotheses, I turn to multivariate analyses 
to examine the wage gaps within black and white couples. Table 9 presents the results 
from nested dyadic multi-level models for the gender wage gap and the effect of children 
within households for white and black couples, separately. To calculate a percentage 
change in the dependent variable for a 1-unit change in the number of children, I 
exponentiate the coefficients from the models, subtract one, and multiply by 100. The 
first column of the table presents the results for the gross gender wage discrepancies 
within couples, not accounting for number of children. Confirming my first hypothesis, 
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initially there is substantial wage advantage over wives for both white (54 percent ([(exp 
[.43])-1]*100) and black husbands (26 percent ([(exp [.23])-1] *100), but white 
husbands’ advantage is close to double that of black husbands. Clearly, initial within-
couple gender wage gaps are substantially larger for white couples. 
The baseline estimates after accounting for children in the model are presented in 
the next column of Table 9. Again, I discuss the exponentiated coefficients to ease 
interpretation. Adding number of children in the household and the interaction with 
gender also reveals clear differences in parental returns to having children across groups.  
The model shows that after accounting for children in the model, the wage advantage for 
childfree husbands in the first row is reduced from 26 percent to roughly 17 percent for 
black husbands and is also reduced from 54 to 35 percent for white husbands. However, 
supporting hypothesis 2a, husbands’ wage advantage over wives increases with the 
number of children. White husbands’ wage advantage grows with fatherhood to roughly 
48 percent while black husbands receive smaller returns for the first child of 23 percent. 
These differences grow even larger with the arrival of the second child, where white 
fathers earn 62 percent ([exp [.30 + .09 +.09]-1] *100) more than their wives while black 
fathers earn a smaller 30 percent ([exp [.16 + .05 +.05]-1] *100) more than their wives 
under the condition of two children.  
Next, to assess the alignment of the penalties and premia associated with children, 
I interpret the interaction from the model in the other direction. For both black and white 
wives, the initial motherhood penalty (the main effect of number of children in the 
model) is a substantial 4 percent, but the effects of fatherhood are substantially different 
by race, producing differences in the gender wage gap within couples. While black 
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fathers receive a small wage premium of 1 percent ([exp [-.04 + .05]-1] *100), white 
fathers garner a five percent premium (exp [-.04+ .09]-1] *100). Supporting hypothesis 
2b, the results clearly show that parental wage gaps are larger within white couples and 
the degree of increase associated with children is larger within white couples. In the 
baseline model, however, differences in the gaps by race are primarily driven by variation 
in the fatherhood premium while the motherhood penalty is initially the same for white 
and black wives. 
To control for the impact of assortative partnering, potential work experience and 
education on couples’ wages, the next model includes measures for both spouses’ age and 
education. For black couples, adding controls for age and education reduces the 
motherhood penalty from -.04 to -.03, but the coefficient for fatherhood remains 
unchanged at .05. For white couples, the effect of fatherhood for white husbands also 
remains unchanged at .09, but adding age and education to the model increases the 
motherhood penalty for wives by one percentage point, from -.04 to -.05. This indicates 
that education has a suppressor effect on the penalty for white wives, such that white 
wives with more education have slightly higher wage penalties. This disconfirms my fifth 
hypothesis that controlling for age and education would explain a larger portion of the 
wage gap within white couples. It appears that controlling for education does little to 
reduce male advantage within all households, regardless of racial group membership, but 
also explains less of the motherhood penalty for white wives. 
The last set of results in Table 9 includes controls for household specialization 
within couples. Adding measures for work hours and annual weeks worked to the model 
reduces the gap within both black and white couples, but also affects spouses’ wages 
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differently across groups. The effect of fatherhood within black couples is reduced from 
.05 to .04 while the motherhood penalty for black wives remains unchanged at -.03. 
Meanwhile, the fatherhood coefficient remains unchanged for white fathers at .09, but the 
penalty for white mothers is reduced from -.05 to -.04. Weekly hours and annual weeks 
worked appear to matter more for black husbands and white wives in terms of explaining 
the child wage gaps within married couples.52 This disconfirms hypothesis six that 
predicted including controls for spousal work hours would explain more of the wage gap 
within white couples. Within-couple wage gaps are reduced for both groups to a similar 
degree, but for opposite reasons. The fatherhood premium is reduced within black 
couples while the motherhood penalty is reduced within white couples, indicating that 
work effort explains different portions of the gap for black and white couples. While I 
found that household specialization was explained more so by wives’ work time in both 
Chapters 2 and 3, these results suggest that household specialization works differently 
within couples by race. Husbands are more likely to alter work behavior within black 
couples while wives change their work effort within white couples. However, the 
difference in the size of within-gaps remains, with wider gaps occurring within white 
couples. The results in the last model also reveal that there are substantial unexplained 
effects that remain for both groups. 
To graphically illustrate the distribution of net wage differences within couples in 
the fully-specified model, Figure 10 shows the distribution of husbands’ wage advantage 
and child wage effects within couples by race/ethnicity from the full models in Table 9. 
                                                          
52 In the pooled model, the interaction term for black motherhood is not significant at the p<.05 level, thus 
it appears that the per child motherhood penalty is the same for both black and white married wives after 
controlling for household specialization (See Table A16 in Appendix). Effects of fatherhood were robust. 
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To ease interpretation, the results presented in the figures are exponentiated coefficients 
from the table. Figure 10 clearly shows that white men garner the largest within-couple 
wage advantage and that the within-couple wage gap is amplified when there are children 
present in the household. Husbands’ wage advantage is largest within white households 
at 34.6 percent, but this advantage grows to 47.7 percent with the addition of children. 
Within childfree black households, husbands earn roughly 17.8 percent more than wives 
that grows to 23.4 percent in households with children, but this advantage is considerably 
smaller than the gaps within white couples.53  
To visually demonstrate how the effects of children align within black and white 
couples, Figure 11 graphically presents the exponentiated average per child effect on 
wages within couples based on the results from Table 9. The graph illustrates that 
parental wage gaps are larger within white couples compared to black couples. While 
white fathers are rewarded with a significant bonus of 5.2 percent, white mothers incur a 
penalty of 4.2 percent, producing a wage difference of roughly 9 percent within white 
couples per child. For black couples, there is less disadvantage associated with 
motherhood, but also less advantage associated with fatherhood.  Black mothers incur a 
penalty of 2.9 percent and black fathers receive a significantly smaller premium of 1.5 
percent, a gap of roughly 4 percent per child. Again, more within-couple wage inequality 
associated with children occurs within white families, such that black mothers incur 
smaller per child penalties than white mothers while black fathers garner smaller 
premiums than white fathers.  
                                                          
53 Results were robust in the pooled interactive model (See Appendix Table A16). 
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Table 10 presents the results from the pooled interactive model including both 
black and white couples to evaluate the role of biological ties and residential status of 
children. Figures 12-14 graphically depict the exponentiated results from Table 10. 
Figure 12 shows that husbands’ advantage among childfree couples is largest within 
white couples at roughly 35 percent compared to a 17 percent gap within childfree black 
couples. The largest gender gap occur, however, within white couples with biological, co-
residential children. Figure 12 shows that within white couples, male advantage increases 
from 35 to staggering 54 percent with the addition of residential biological children. The 
wage advantage within black couples with residential, biological children is less at 33 
percent. Husbands’ wage advantage associated with non-residential/biological or step-
children children is also not significantly different from childfree husbands within both 
white and black couples. Confirming hypothesis 3, Figure 12 illustrates that male wage 
advantage is largest for married white fathers who co-reside with their children. Other 
parental ties to children are not associated with a wage premium. However, the gap 
between white and black fathers (or the relative premia for whites) is widest among those 
who live with their children, white husbands earn a larger premium in all groups. 
Figures 13 and 14 present the distribution of child penalties and premia within 
white and black couples. Figure 13 again shows that there are significant motherhood and 
fatherhood wage effects associated with biological, co-residential children, but also a 
significant motherhood penalty for biological, non-residential children. Within white 
households, the fatherhood premium is a significant 8.2 percent for residential, biological 
children while the penalty is roughly 5 percent for white wives, producing a wide wage 
gap within white couples. Meanwhile, there is no significant premium for fatherhood and 
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a 9.5 percent penalty associated with non-residential, biological children. Again, the 
effects for step-children are not significant for either group in the pooled model. 
Meanwhile, Figure 14 shows that within black couples, the motherhood penalty is not 
significantly different from white wives. It appears that parsing out the motherhood 
penalty along children’ relational status renders the penalty non-significant for these 
subgroups. I conclude that while black mothers experience a motherhood wage penalty 
(see Figure 11), it does not vary by the residential or biological status of their children. 
This might be an artifact of small sample sizes for these subgroups. For black fathers, the 
fatherhood premium revealed in Figure 11 appears here to be driven by the slightly 
smaller 7.3 percent premium for co-residential, biological children and there is no 
significant premium for biological, co-residential children or step-children.  
In terms of my third and fourth hypotheses, the results show that male advantage 
and the fatherhood premium are larger within couples who co-reside with their biological 
children than among those who co-reside with non-biological children. However, these 
effects are not significantly different by race.  My fourth hypothesis that the effects of 
residential biological children may be smaller within black household is fully not 
confirmed. Result from the pooled model show that black fathers’ premiums do not 
significantly differ from white fathers across parental subgroups, but that husband 
advantage conditioned on children within white households is higher than within black 
households. It appears that among married, homogamous households, the distribution of 
child wage effects by race/ethnicity does not vary significantly based on the type of 
parent-child relationship. Co-residential, biological children are primarily what drive the 
largest gaps in terms of child premia and penalties within couples, but this is not the case 
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for step-children. Non-residential, biological children are also associated with significant 
wage penalties, but these penalties also do not vary across racial groups. 
Robustness Analysis 
To test whether measuring parenthood in a different way, with dummy variable 
indicators for one, two, and three or more children, produces different results from using 
total number of children as a linear variable above, the following set of results tests for 
differences between couples in the effects of specific number of children on wages. Table 
11 presents the results for the effects of one, two, and three or more children on couple 
wages from the baseline and full models across groups. I again exponentiate the 
coefficients from the model for the ease of interpretation. The results reveal the specific 
family sizes at which greater male and parenthood advantages emerge, and how this 
varies by racial group. In the baseline model in Table 11, there are no significant 
motherhood penalties within black households for one or two children, but a large penalty 
of roughly 14 percent (exp [-.0135]-1] *100) for three or more children. Meanwhile, the 
fatherhood premium within black households is also not significant for one child, but 
grows to 6 percent for two children and decreases to 2 percent for three or more children. 
This illustrates that the wage gaps associated with children within black couples become 
significant after the arrival of the second child and the alignment of the motherhood 
penalty and the fatherhood premium amplify the wage gap when couples have three or 
more children.  
The baseline model in Table 11 for white couples also shows that there are clear 
differences in wage gaps between groups. Unlike black couples, within white couples 
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there is a small, but significant motherhood penalty of one percent associated with one 
child that grows to roughly 7 percent with two children. The motherhood penalty within 
white couples is also largest at 17 percent within couples with three or more children. 
However, white fathers garner substantial premiums that widen the within-couple wage 
gap with the addition of children to the household. One child is associated with a 7 
percent premium that grows to 16 percent with two children. For three or more children, 
the premium is a slightly smaller 11 percent. Unadjusted for other factors, it is clear that 
the alignment of child penalties and premia produce larger wage gaps within white 
couples and that these gaps widen according to the number of children in the household. 
The distribution of wage gaps within couples changes very little with the addition 
of control measures to the models. While the motherhood penalty for three or more 
children declines to roughly 12 percent within black couples, the fatherhood premium 
associated with two and three or more children remains unchanged. Meanwhile, within 
white couples, the motherhood penalty for one child becomes insignificant, suggesting 
that controlling for age, education, and couple household specialization explains the 
small penalty associated with one child for white wives. However, the penalty associated 
with two children is roughly 6 percent while the penalty for three or more children is 16 
percent. This supports the results found in Chapter 2 that having a second child produces 
the motherhood penalty. The second child may be the “tipping point” at which mothers 
who attempt to maintain full-time employment after the first child seek alternative work 
hour arrangements. However, as with the results from Table 9, adding controls to the 
model does not alter the size and distribution of the fatherhood premium within white 
couples. 
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To illustrate these within-couple gaps graphically, Figure 15 and Figure 16 
present the alignment of motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium for one, two, and 
three or more children from the full model for white and black couples, respectively. The 
graphs clearly show how wage inequality associated with family composition varies 
across racial/ethnic groups. Figure 15 shows that parental wage gaps within white 
couples grow with the addition of more children to the household. For white mothers 
there is no significant motherhood penalty, but a large fatherhood premium of 7 percent 
for having one child. This gap is further amplified with the arrival of the second child. 
While white mothers incur a penalty of 6 percent for two children and 14 percent for 
three or more children, within-couple wage inequality is further compounded by large 
fatherhood premiums associated with two children of 16 percent and 12 percent for three 
or more children.  
Comparing Figure 16 to Figure 15 also illustrates that the alignment of penalties 
and premia vary significantly between black and white couples based on the number of 
children within households. Overall, there are insignificant or smaller parental wage gaps 
within black families compared to white families based on the number of children in the 
household. Figure 16 shows that there are no significant wage effects associated with one 
child within black couples, but for two children, the motherhood penalty is not 
significant, but black fathers garner a 5.2 percent premium. The motherhood penalty and 
the fatherhood premium for three or more children produce the widest gaps within black 
couples. In black households with three or more children there is a substantial penalty of 
10.3 percent that coincides with a smaller fatherhood premium of roughly 4 percent. This 
differences in the distribution of the child penalties and premium suggests that having 
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one child may not require as much care commitment for both white and black mothers, 
but having 2 children appears to produce motherhood penalties within white households. 
Meanwhile, having one child seems to impart fatherhood status (a potential signal to 
employers) on husbands in both groups, but white fathers are rewarded to a greater 
degree than black fathers. 
Overall, the results demonstrate the intersection of gender and race within 
families in shaping wage outcomes. Wage inequality varies within and among couples by 
racial/ethnic group membership. Across all analyses, male wage advantage for childfree 
couples is larger within white households. The motherhood penalty and the fatherhood 
premium also align differently to produce wider wage gaps within white compared to 
black couples. While black mothers tend to incur less wage disadvantage associated with 
children, black fathers do not garner the same rewards associated with children as white 
fathers. And while only co-residential biological children significantly impact parental 
wages, these children amplify wage inequality to a greater degree within white families. 
However, there are substantial wage gaps that remain after accounting for factors known 
to affect wages, such as age, education, and spouses’ work effort.  These residual effects 
suggest that employers may possibly by rewarding employees differently based on the 
gender, race, and parental characteristics of workers.   
Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter was to assess the distribution of male wage advantage and 
the alignment of parental wage effects within black and white married couples. The 
results show that while all husbands receive substantially higher wages than their wives 
within each group, white husbands’ wage advantage is also substantially larger than black 
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husbands’ across all analyses. White husbands’ wage advantage is also compounded to a 
greater degree by the number of children in the household. Robustness analyses reveal 
that within white couples, fathers receive significant premiums from the first child on, 
while mothers receive substantial wage penalties for having 2 or more children. The 
parental gap within black households is much narrower, however, and occurs primarily 
when couples have two or more children. Black wives incur non-significant child 
penalties for the first and second child and smaller penalties for having three or more 
children while black husbands receive non-significant premiums for one child or smaller 
premiums for two or more children.  The results confirm my first three hypotheses and 
show that the gender wage inequality associated with having children is much larger 
within white families based on the distribution of larger penalties and premiums within 
white couples that amplify as number of children increase. The gap between black 
spouses also increases with children, but not to the same degree. 
What explains this variation in the effects of children on within-couple wage 
inequality? I first included measures for years of education and age in my models, 
predicting that education would explain more of the wage gap within white couples. 
Including education and age does little to reduce male advantage within all households, 
regardless of racial group membership. However, while effects for wives are not 
significant in the pooled model (see Table A16), education affects white and black 
couples differently based on the relationship between wives’ education and the 
motherhood penalty. Education acts as a suppressor for the effect of children on the 
wages for white wives, indicating that white wives with more education have slightly 
higher wage penalties. Given assortative partnering based on educational attainment, this 
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suggests that wage gaps are wider within white couples with highly-educated wives.  
These findings are supported by the work of England et al (2014), who find that highly 
skilled (or highly educated) white women have the highest motherhood penalties, while 
black women, on average, incur smaller wage penalties than their white counterparts. 
However, effects are not significant in the pooled model (see Table A16), thus the 
differential impact of age and education within white and black couples should be viewed 
with caution. Yet, accounting for age and education does little to alter variation in the 
alignment of parental wage effects within black and white couples.  
The results also demonstrate that the theory of household specialization (Becker 
1981) also has differential explanatory power within couples across racial/ethnic groups, 
but does little to alter the size of parental gaps in both black and white couples. As found 
in the two previous chapters, accounting for spouses’ work hours and annual weeks 
worked does not fully explain within-couple wage inequality for all couples. Spousal 
work hours and annual weeks worked have more explanatory power for the motherhood 
penalty in white households but are more predictive of the fatherhood premium within 
black couples. This may reflect white mothers’ higher likelihood of decreasing work 
hours after having a child relative to black women, while black fathers may be increasing 
work time in response to the birth of a child more so than white men do. However, 
accounting for spousal work hours only decreases child effects on wages by one 
percentage point within couples in both groups. The wage advantage for white fathers 
does not change across all models, suggesting that white husbands’ wages are not 
explained by their labor market behavior. My analysis suggests that the form of 
household specialization may differ by race/ethnicity and support previous research that 
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finds differences across groups in the degree couples engage in specialization (Shelton 
and John 1993; Kamo and Cohen 1999). Among white households, greater specialization 
may be attained by women reducing work hours (while white men maintain their work 
hours). Among black households, it is men who appear to change behaviors to achieve 
specialization, by black men increasing their work hours (while black women maintain 
their work hours). This pattern supports prior research on the motherhood penalty and the 
fatherhood premium, with one exception: Glauber (2008a) found that the premium for 
black fathers did not vary based on work time. However, the reductions in child wage 
effects are small and substantial residual effects remain in both black and white couples. 
Another main finding of this chapter is that specific types of familial relationships 
also shape the wage inequality associated with children within white and black families. 
While previous work has not investigated variation in relational ties to children on the 
motherhood penalty, this chapter adds to the literature by situating these effects within 
couples and estimating how motherhood and fatherhood impact wages within couples. 
My third and fourth hypotheses predicted that male wage advantage would be largest 
within couples who co-reside with their biological children and that these wage gaps 
would be larger in white compared to black households. Confirming my third hypothesis, 
the results support Killewald’s (2013) findings that the fatherhood premium is afforded to 
married fathers who co-reside with their children. However, the results from this analysis 
reveal that there is a significant motherhood penalty associated with co-residential and 
non-residential biological children. In line with Killewald’s (2013) findings, confirming 
my fourth hypothesis, it appears that gender wage inequality is largest within married 
couples who co-reside with their biological children regardless of racial/ethnic group 
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membership. However, husband wage advantage is not as pronounced within black 
couples. The results from Table 8 also illustrate that there are fewer black families in the 
sample that consist of married couples co-residing with only their biological children, 
while white families have lower likelihoods of having step-children or biological children 
living outside of the household. This indicates that white fathers receive larger wage 
premia associated with co-residential, biological children than black fathers while black 
mothers incur wage penalties similar to white mothers. 
The residual unexplained wage effects within couples suggest that other processes 
outside of the household may explain some of the remaining male wage advantage within 
couples, possibly because employers are evaluating employees differently based on their 
gender, race, and status as parents. Pager’s (2003) work finds that employers are more 
likely to view white men positively over black men, even when white men have a 
criminal record (Pager 2003). Kennelly’s (1999) research also finds that employers typify 
black women employees, assuming that all black women employees are single mothers.  
Meanwhile, Correll et al (2007) find that fathers are more likely to be viewed favorably 
by evaluators, followed by childfree women, childfree men, and lastly mothers, in terms 
of dependability and productivity. It is possible that employers view white fathers as 
being most closely associated with the “ideal worker” or “breadwinner” (Williams 2000), 
but assume that black fathers are not involved in the support of children and are thereby 
less likely to reward black fathers to the same degree as whites. Employers may also 
assume that married white mothers are more likely to take time off or leave jobs to take 
on domestic obligations, but presume that black women are less likely to do so based on 
assumptions that black women employees are single mothers who are solely responsible 
120 
 
for the economic support of children. At this time, there is no study that directly tests 
employer treatment of workers based on gender, race and parental status. Although it is 
possible that the residual unexplained variation in my models may be caused by employer 
actions and behaviors, I cannot assess with certainty the role of employers in shaping 
wage outcomes within couples. Future research into the role of employers would help to 
shed light on these unexplained differences in the wage returns for children by gender 
and race. 
There are also some limitations to my analyses that provide directions for future 
research. First, because the sample is limited to couples where both spouses have non-
zero values on wages, the results may be understating the total child wage gaps between 
husbands and wives by omitting couples where mothers drop out of the labor force 
following the arrival of children. Given that black mothers are more likely than white 
mothers to maintain employment after having children, by excluding male breadwinner 
families it is likely that I am not observing couples where white women more often 
reduce hours for extended periods of time or exit employment after the birth of a child, 
which would contribute to a wider gender gap within white relative to black couples. 
However, given that dual-earning families have increasingly become more prevalent in 
the US (Bianchi, Robinson, and Milkie 2006), the results in this study likely reflect what 
is occurring among a large portion of married couples in the US.  
Another explanation for wage inequality for black women is differential returns to 
human capital characteristics (Kilbourne et al. 1994; England et al. 1999) compared to 
white women, an explanation that has often been cited as a potential reason the smaller 
motherhood penalties black mothers incur. England et al (2014) suggest that work 
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experience, a key explanatory factor behind the motherhood penalty also matters: Highly 
skilled, low-wage women have the lowest rates of return to experience and the lowest 
motherhood penalties, compared to their highly skilled, high-wage counterparts (England 
et al 2014). Unfortunately, the NLSY does not have adequate measures available for 
spouses in the household roster to directly test the effects of work experience within 
couples. I attempted to capture the effects of potential work experience by including both 
spouse’s age in my models. Future research investigating the motherhood penalties 
within couples should expand the investigation of the effect of human capital on within-
couple wages gaps, including consideration of work experience.54  
In his most recent work, Andrew Cherlin (2014) concludes that the growth in the 
marriage gap between couples with more versus less education is driven by differential 
access to well-paying jobs among the working class. Thus, variation in wage gaps 
between white and black families may also arise due to differences in the job 
characteristics, such as the gender and racial composition of jobs (Tomaskovic-Devey 
1993), which I cannot account for in my models due to data limitations. Scholars have 
argued that in addition to human capital characteristics, another key source of racial wage 
inequality is the exclusion of black workers from desirable jobs (Tomaskovic-Devey 
1993; Huffman and Cohen 2004) and that black women’s wages are more adversely 
affected by working in low-paying, predominantly female occupations (Kilbourne et al. 
1994) compared to white women.  While white wives may be more likely to reduce work 
                                                          
54 Using Killewald (2013) as a guide, in supplementary models I included controls for husband and wives’ 
potential labor market experience to adjust for the life-cycle pattern of wages that is exogenous to parental 
transitions. Including this control measure for potential experience yielded no change in the overall pattern 
of results. See Table A14 for results from models including potential work experience.  
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hours or spend more time out of the labor force, the over-representation of black women 
in predominantly female occupations, which tend to have lower wages and higher 
turnover compared to other jobs, may explain black women’s smaller penalties compared 
to white women. Unfortunately, the variables available for both spouses in the NLSY are 
limited. A number of measures for job characteristics, such as public/private sector, self-
employment, the percent female, and percent black of occupation would be useful in 
future research to investigate how job characteristics contribute to within-couple wage 
gaps. 55   
Exploring variation in gender wage discrepancies within families among different 
racial/ethnic groups allows for further examination of how families are linked to the 
reproduction of US wage inequality. The key finding of this chapter is that the effects of 
children produce smaller within-couple wage gaps within black couples compared to 
white couples. Black husbands with and without children do not receive the same 
advantage over wives compared to white husbands, while black wives incur smaller 
penalties compared to white wives. The results clearly demonstrate that family 
organization is shaped by interlocking systems of oppression and are also locations where 
such systems are reproduced (Collins 1998). The gender wage gap within different-sex 
married households is exacerbated by the arrival of children. However, gender wage 
inequality within black couples is less pronounced than wage inequality within white 
couples. While future research in is needed to explore these processes in more detail 
among multi-racial families, this chapter illustrates that family composition itself is an 
                                                          
55 Some researchers argue that it is inappropriate to include measures of job characteristics as they are 
endogenous factors. However, given that much of the race wage gap has been attributed to job segregation 
among workers, testing these effects could be useful in future work. 
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important factor shaping current US wage stratification and must also be taken into 
consideration in order to reduce gender and race/ethnic wage inequality. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION: FAMILY COMPOSITION AND WAGE INEQUALITY 
WITHIN AND ACROSS HOUSEHOLDS 
 
 
 In this dissertation, I argue that the growth in earnings inequality overtime is 
shaped by and reflected through patterns of family formation and examine how this 
inequality is situated within coupled households. The growth in income inequality and a 
slowing of the rate of decline in both race and gender wage gaps since the early 1980s 
(McCall 2001; Blau, Brinton, and Grusky 2006) has garnered much academic and 
popular media attention.  However, recent work documents a decline in the average 
gender wage gap among young, childfree workers (Gap 2013: McGregor 2013). The 
results from each empirical chapter demonstrate the persistence of the gender wage gap is 
related to processes of family formation and composition in the United States.  
In the three preceding empirical chapters, I examine the distribution of the gender 
wage gap and the alignment of child wage effects within married, different-sex couples to 
assess how within-household wage inequality varies across households in terms of 
spousal work time, socioeconomic class, and race/ethnicity. My analyses reveal that 
although husbands’ wage advantage occurs in all households, gender wage inequality 
within households is not experienced in the same manner for all couples in terms of 
household composition, spousal work behavior, educational attainment, income level, 
and race/ethnicity. Directly examining how family composition shapes both women and 
men’s wages within heterosexual married couples uncovers the relationship between 
gender wage inequality located within families and larger processes of social 
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stratification. In this chapter, I review the main findings and discuss their broader 
implications for addressing work/family conflict and labor market inequality. 
The primary contribution of this dissertation is “bringing the household back in” 
to the investigation of wage stratification research by using couples as the unit of 
analysis.  The results from Chapter 2 reveal a strong relationship between gender, 
parenthood, and wage inequality within and among married couple households. Gender 
wage inequality is not just a matter of individual differences, rather, the results 
demonstrate that substantial gender wage gaps are situated within marriages and 
compounded by the arrival of children. Husbands’ wage advantage over wives occurs in 
all households, but increases with the arrival of the second child and grows with each 
additional child. Although progress in the decline of the wage gap among childfree 
workers is encouraging, these results are in line with current discussions about the stalled 
reduction in the gender wage gap (Blau et al 2006). However, net of human capital, the 
wage advantage afforded to husbands conditioned on children varies among couples 
based on wives’ work hours while husbands’ work time has little effect. On average, 
within married households husbands have substantial wage advantage over wives, but 
this wage advantage is not fully explained by either human capital or labor supply 
differences between spouses.  
Chapter 2 also exposes the alignment of the motherhood wage penalty and 
fatherhood premium within married couples. I find that overall, parental wage effects 
produce considerable wage gaps within marriages that are amplified as more children 
enter the household, net of spouses’ human capital and work effort. Fathers enjoy 
substantial wage premiums over mothers that grow as the number of children increases, 
126 
 
while the motherhood penalty appears with the birth of the second child and increases 
with the arrival of subsequent children. The results again show that having children 
affects women’s labor supply negatively but has little effect on fathers’ employment 
participation. Thus, wide parental gaps are shaped by wives’ characteristics more so than 
husbands’, but again, these wage discrepancies are not fully explained by either spouses’ 
human capital or work effort. These findings are in line with previous individual-level 
work that finds reducing work hours has some explanatory effect for the motherhood 
penalty (Budig and England 2001; Budig and Hodges 2010; Glauber 2007), but 
increasing work hours has not been found to be a primary explanatory factor behind the 
fatherhood premium (Glauber 2008a; Hodges and Budig 2010). The results demonstrate 
that household specialization only partially explains the wage gaps within couples with 
two or more children. 
Moreover, Chapter 2 also provides insight into what happens to within-couple 
wage inequality when husbands work long hours. Comparing couples with different 
work-time arrangements shows that, across all households, wage advantage is larger for 
fathers than childfree men, but the fatherhood premium does not accrue based on fathers’ 
increasing work time or working excessive hours. Instead, when wives work full-time, 
husbands’ wage advantage and fatherhood premium are significantly smaller. The size of 
the motherhood penalty varies based on both wives and husbands’ work time, with the 
wider child gaps within couples being primarily driven by the penalties incurred by wives 
who work full-time.  Husbands who work excessive hours (50 hours per week or more) 
do not garner more wage advantage for having children than husbands who work 
standard hours, but when wives work full-time, wage penalties for motherhood are larger 
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and wage premiums for fatherhood are smaller. Overall, the results from Chapter 2 
indicate that within- couple work time tradeoffs shape the distribution of wage inequality 
across households, but this is mainly driven by wives’ who work full-time.  
However, within couple work time tradeoffs and decision-making between spouses occur 
in the context of an unequal labor market. The growth in income inequality and the 
marriage gap between socioeconomic groups (Cherlin 2014) in recent decades suggests 
that wage gaps resulting from children within households are not evenly distributed 
across families by socioeconomic class for several reasons. First, social class has been 
cited as an important factor that shapes how dual-earning families “do gender” based on 
the ideologies of female caretaker and male breadwinner. Middle and upper-class spouses 
are also most likely to change their division of labor after the arrival of children 
(Blossfield and Drobnic 2001). Meanwhile, working class wives are more likely to 
maintain employment based on financial necessity and working class families divide paid 
work more equitably than the middle class (Blossfied and Drobnic 2001). In Chapter 3, I 
uncover important variation in the distribution of child wage effects within couples across 
education and family income levels. To date, this is the only study that considers how 
parental wage effects vary by socioeconomic class in the couple context 
The results reveal that family composition exacerbates wage inequality across 
households at different income levels, but that gender wage inequality within couples 
tends to be most pronounced at the middle income levels and above. Overall, husbands’ 
wage advantage and the gaps produced by effects of children on mothers’ and fathers’ 
wages grow as income rises.  However, there are a few exceptions: not all husbands 
receive higher wages than their wives at all income levels.  Among couples at the bottom 
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tenth of the family income distribution, there is no significant wage advantage for 
husbands over wives within childfree households. Husband advantage conditioned on 
fatherhood is also associated with a small wage penalty of 2.3 percent within families at 
the bottom fifth of the income distribution. These results support previous work by Cooke 
(2014) that finds that low-earning fathers incur wage penalties, possible due to the types 
of jobs available at the lowest income levels, which are more likely to be contingent with 
higher turnover rates.  
In terms of parental gaps within couples, the fatherhood premium is largest at the 
median of income, but is rather stable across all income levels. The motherhood penalty, 
however, is the largest among the couples at the median of income and above. The widest 
wage gaps within parental couples are driven by the motherhood penalties among 
households with more resources. The results support England et al.’s (2013) work that 
finds higher penalties for high earning women before controlling for work experience. It 
appears that within-couple wage inequality grows with family income and is largest 
amongst households at higher income levels. It is among these couples where Becker’s 
theory of household specialization is most salient: Husbands receive large wage 
premiums but do not increase work effort, while the largest motherhood penalties are 
incurred by wives who work full-time. 
Chapter 3 also shows that there are also differences in the distribution of within-
couple wage gaps across levels of education. In terms of the distribution of husbands’ 
wage advantage, all husbands earn more than wives within all couples, but wage 
advantage conditioned on children is primarily larger when husbands have more 
education than wives. If wives have more education than their husbands, husbands still 
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enjoy wage advantage, but the gaps are smaller. However, class position matters here: the 
size of parental wage gaps depend on whether spouses have obtained more or less than a 
high school education. Within couples where one or both spouses have not graduated 
high school (with the exception of couples where both spouse have not completed high 
school), husbands’ wage advantage does not grow with the arrival of children in the 
household. Thus, within less-educated households, husbands are not rewarded for 
fatherhood, while wives do not incur motherhood penalties. Meanwhile, the widest 
within-couple wage gaps generated by children occur primarily among the college 
educated, perhaps because college-educated wives are more likely to reduce work time in 
response to having children. 
The results from Chapter 3 makes apparent that the patterns in the distribution of 
both male advantage conditioned on children and the motherhood penalty and the 
fatherhood premium are somewhat different. The distribution of the wage gap and the 
effects of children by educational attainment does not follow the same pattern across 
couple income levels, illustrating that how class is measured is important for assessing 
the distribution of within-couple wage inequality. While the distribution of the effects of 
motherhood and fatherhood follows a more stable pattern across income, significant 
parental wage gaps are widest at the lowest and highest levels of education in the tails of 
the distribution. The combined results suggest, however, that the effects of children on 
earnings further compound between-household wage inequality. It appears that couples 
who are already disadvantaged in the labor market are not necessarily penalized or 
rewarded for having children, while those in the middle have more within-couple 
inequality that increases among the highest earners.  
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Chapter 4 illustrates the interlocking structures of gender and race in the 
production of wage inequality within and across households, revealing distinct variation 
in the distribution of the effects of children within and between households for black and 
white families. Moreover, differences in selection into marriage and parenthood between 
white and black couples appears to shape gender wage inequality within households. 
While all husbands enjoy substantially higher wages than wives, white husbands garner 
the largest within-couple wage advantage, and this advantage is amplified with children. 
Meanwhile, the gender wage gap is smaller in childfree black families and the presence 
of children increases black husbands’ wage advantage to a lesser degree.  Moreover, 
more wage inequality associated with having children occurs within white families based 
on larger penalties and premiums for white mothers and fathers. However, parental wage 
effects vary according to the number of children. For black mothers, there are no 
significant wage effects for the first two children while white mothers receive penalties 
for two or more children. Meanwhile, white fathers receive significant fatherhood 
premiums from the first child on, but black fathers garner much smaller premiums for 
two or more children. Given the considerable labor market disadvantage experienced by 
workers of color (Pager 2003; Kennelly 1999; Pager and Quillian 2005), the effects of 
children on wages also shape inequality across race/ethnic groups. 
Another main finding of this chapter is that specific types of familial relationships 
also shape the wage inequality associated with children within white and black families. 
While previous work has not investigated variation in relational ties to children on the 
motherhood penalty, this chapter adds to the literature by situating the effects of both 
motherhood and fatherhood within couples. The results support Killewald’s (2013) 
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findings that the fatherhood premium is afforded to married fathers who co-reside with 
their children and this is regardless of racial/ethnic group membership. However, 
husband wage advantage is not as pronounced within black couples. The results also 
reveal that there are significant motherhood penalties associated with co-residential and 
non-residential biological children for both white and black wives. White fathers receive 
larger wage premia associated with co-residential, biological children than black fathers 
while black mothers incur wage penalties similar to white mothers. 
What explains this variation between racial groups in the effects of children on 
within-couple wage inequality? Including education and age does little to reduce male 
advantage or variation in the alignment of parental wage effects within all households, 
regardless of racial group membership. My analysis does suggest, however, that the form 
of household specialization may differ by race/ethnicity. Supporting prior work (Shelton 
and John 1993; Kamo and Cohen 1999), the results demonstrate that household 
specialization (Becker 1981) has differential explanatory power within couples across 
racial/ethnic groups, yet does not greatly reduce the size of parental gaps in both black 
and white couples. Spousal work hours and annual weeks work have more explanatory 
power for the motherhood penalty in white households but are more predictive of the 
fatherhood premium within black couples. This may reflect white mothers’ higher 
likelihood of decreasing work hours after having a child relative to black women, while 
black fathers may be increasing work time in response to the birth of a child more so than 
white men do. The wage advantage for white fathers does not change across all models, 
suggesting that white husbands’ wages are not explained by their labor market behavior. 
Among white households, greater specialization may be attained by women reducing 
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work hours (while white men maintain their work hours). Among black households, it is 
men who appear to change behaviors to achieve specialization, by black men increasing 
their work hours (while black women maintain their work hours). However, the 
reductions in child wage effects are small and substantial residual effects remain in both 
black and white couples. 
 While there has been some encouraging news about the closing of the wage gap, 
it is clear for some families, the “revolution has stalled” (Blau et al 2006). The result 
clearly demonstrate that gender wage inequality is most pronounced among the most 
privileged families. The patterns revealed in this analysis have important implications for 
understanding work-family conflict. Couples where both spouses white, college- 
educated, and at higher levels of income have the most pronounced wage gaps. This does 
not vary according to husband’s behavior, but wives’ work effort mediates this slightly. It 
appears that the wage gap within couples is exacerbated by the wage penalties incurred 
by working mothers. However, since my sample is limited to only employed persons, my 
analysis may understate wives’ motherhood penalty and the wage gap between husbands 
and wives. By excluding male breadwinner families it is likely that I am not observing 
couples where mothers may “opt out” of paid employment after the birth of a child. 
However, given that dual-earning families have increasingly become more prevalent in 
the US (Bianchi, Robinson, and Milkie 2006), the results in this study likely reflect what 
is occurring among a large portion of US families. Overall, the results indicate substantial 
wage gaps occur within marriages, regardless of parental status, but the arrival of 
children contributes more to gender wage inequality within more privileged families.  
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Findings from each chapter speak to current academic debates over whether 
women should “lean in” (Sandberg 2013) instead of “opting out” (Belkin 2003; Stone 
2007) to address gender wage inequality and as a means of dealing with work and family 
conflict. Across all three chapters, the residual wage premiums for fatherhood and the 
motherhood penalty remain largely unexplained.  Although human capital and work 
effort have some effect on reducing variation among couples, the results indicate that 
spousal characteristics factors do not fully explain the gender wage gap nor the family 
gap within and across couples. Although popular media encourages women to “lean in” 
(Sandberg 2013) to the world of paid work to reduce gender wages gaps,  findings from 
each empirical chapter illustrate that the conflict between the structure of work and the 
structure of families may largely be driving the remaining gender wage gap. Research 
documenting the effects of children on parents’ earnings points to differences in 
employer evaluations of workers with children based on the gendered ideology of the 
“ideal worker” (Williams 2000) as a contributing factor to the motherhood penalty and 
fatherhood premium. Experimental studies have found that due employers often evaluate 
workers with care responsibilities, who are more likely to be women, in a negative light 
(Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Kennelly 1999), while fathers are more likely to be viewed 
favorably (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007). While previous work has been unable to 
directly investigate employer discrimination due to data limitations, researchers have 
argued that residual penalties and premiums result from employers evaluations of 
workers based on parental status (Budig and England 2001; Glauber 2008a&b). 
Moreover, the results indicate that it is the most privileged married women that work full-
time who incur the largest wage penalties. Therefore, calls for women to “lean in” do not 
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make much sense if we are to close the gender wage gaps occurring within families. 
Something is occurring in work places to reproduce gender wage inequality within 
families, but further research investigating employer behaviors would help to shed light 
on these processes.  
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Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations for Individual and Couple-Level Measures 
by Parental Status: NLSY 1980-2008ab 
  Childfree Parents 
Couple Characteristics 13,550 47,740 
Couple Hourly Wage 14.01a 15.36a 
  (12.90) (14.95) 
Ln Couple Hourly Wage 2.34a 2.44a 
  (0.82) (0.83) 
Number of Children in Household   1.99 
    (0.90) 
One Child   0.31 
    (0.46) 
Two Children   0.46 
    (0.50) 
Three or More Children    0.23 
     (0.42) 
Spousal Characteristics     
  Husbands Wives Husbands Wives 
Total N 6,775 6,775 23,870 23,870 
 Hourly Wage 15.71ab 12.37ab 18.16ab 12.73ab 
  (14.44) (10.90) (17.13) (11.65) 
Currently Employed 0.97a 0.92a 0.96a 0.89a 
  (0.17) (0.26) (0.20) (0.30) 
Part-time 0.06ab 0.20ab 0.04ab 0.33ab 
  (0.24) (0.40) (0.20) (0.45) 
Age  34.61ab 32.70ab 36.75ab 35.35ab 
  (8.45) (8.63) (8.87) (7.98) 
Years of Education 13.29ab 13.99ab 12.98ab 13.39ab 
  (3.83) (3.26) (4.58) (4.05) 
Weekly Hours 44.00ab 38.41ab 44.77ab 34.73ab 
  (10.97) (11.02) (10.36) (12.31) 
Annual Weeks Worked 49.09ab 46.92ab 49.42ab 44.48ab 
  (14.02) (11.19) (10.18) (13.82) 
a p <.05, two tailed significance test for differences across couples. 
b p < .05, two tailed significance test for differences within couples.
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Table 2. Proportions, Standard Deviations, and Sample Size of Couples by Parental Status and Work Hour 
Arrangements  
  
Total N 
(Couple-Years) 
Childfree Parents 
Total N (Couple-Years)  6,775 23,870 
 
 Proportion  
(SD) 
 
Proportion 
 (SD) 
 
Dual Earners    
Full-Time Dual Earners 4725 0.71 0.59 
   (0.45) (0.49) 
FT Husband/PT Wife 3067 0.18 0.31 
   (0.38) (0.46) 
Excessive Hours    
Husband > 50 Hours/FT Wife 1610 0.12 0.10 
   (0.33) (0.30) 
Husband > 50 Hours/PT Wife 880 0.03 0.06 
   (0.16) (0.24) 
Note: Couples’ work hour arrangements shift from year to year across survey waves, therefore, the total number of couples do not add to the total 
number of couples (5,769) in the sample. 
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Table 3. Effect of Husband Wage Advantage and Number of Children within Married Couples a,b,c 
Fixed Effects 
  Gross 
Baseline 
Human 
Capital 
Work Effort 
Couple N 5769 5769 5769 5769 
Husband Advantage (Childfree Gender Gap) 0.30 ** 0.19 ** 0.19 ** 0.19 ** 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  (0.01)  
Year 0.05 ** 0.05 ** 0.03 ** 0.03 ** 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  
Number of Children (Motherhood Penalty)     -0.03 ** -0.03 ** -0.02 ** 
     (0.01)   (0.01)  (0.01)  
Number of Children * Husband Advantage     0.08 ** 0.08 ** 0.08 ** 
 (Fatherhood Premium)    (0.01)   (0.01)  (0.01)  
               
Level 1 Variance   
Within Couple Mean 0.1205 ** 0.0825 ** 0.0838 ** 0.0867 ** 
  (0.0039)   (0.0038)   (0.0038)   (0.0039)   
Level 2 Variance Components 
Husband Advantage * Number of Children     0.0307 ** 0.0289 ** 0.0284 ** 
 (Fatherhood Premium)     (0.0024)   (0.0023)   (0.0023)   
Number of Children (Motherhood Penalty)     0.0093 ** 0.0083 ** 0.0072 ** 
     (0.0011)   (0.0010)  (0.0009)  
Mean Across Couples 0.1465 ** 0.1440 ** 0.0989 ** 0.0915 ** 
  (0.0061)   (0.0063)   (0.0051)   (0.0049)   
Residual 0.2530 ** 0.2402 ** 0.2412 ** 0.2320 ** 
  (0.0021)   (0.0021)   (0.0021)   (0.0020)   
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Gross model includes dummy variable for gender and control for year of interview. bBaseline model includes dummy variable for 
gender, year of interview, number of children in the household, and an interaction term for gender * number of children. cModel includes all measures 
from the baseline model plus measures for age in years and years of education. Model contains all measures from the human capital model, plus weekly 
hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the couple/dyad.  
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Table 4. Effect of Husband Wage Advantage and Number of Children within Couples by Work Hour Arrangement a 
  Dual Earners Excessive Hours 
 
Husband FT/Wife 
PT 
Husband FT/Wife 
FT 
Husband > 50 
Hours/Wife PT 
Husband > 50 
Hours/Wife FT 
  3067   4725   880  1610  
Husband Advantage (Childfree Gap) 0.35 ** 0.15 ** 0.28 ** 0.06  
  (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.07)  (0.04)  
Number of Children (Motherhood Penalty) -0.02 * -0.03 ** -0.03  -0.06 ** 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)  (0.02)  
Number of Children * Husband Advantage 0.07 ** 0.05 ** 0.08 ** 0.07 ** 
  (Fatherhood Premium) (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.03)  (0.02)  
Level 1: Variance Components         
Within Couple Mean 0.1127  ** 0.0937  ** 0.1817   0.0185  
  (0.0083)   (0.0046)   (0.0243)   (0.0132)  
Level 2: Variance Components         
Husband Advantage * Number of Children 0.0169 **  0.0167 **  0.0000 
  
0.0103 ** 
(Fatherhood Premium) (0.0032)  (0.0021)  (0.0000) (0.0042)  
Number of Children (Motherhood Penalty) 0.0057  ** 0.0059  ** 0.0000  ** 0.022 ** 
  (0.0015)   (0.0010)   (0.0000)   (0.0021)  
Mean Across Couples 0.0862  ** 0.0909  ** 0.0689  ** 0.0817 ** 
  (0.0086)   (0.0056)   (0.0187)   (0.0132)  
Residual 0.2368  ** 0.1939  ** 0.3074  ** 0.2695 ** 
  (0.0041)   (0.0023)   (0.0149)   (0.0096)  
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes dummy variable for gender, control for year of interview, number of children in household and it’s interaction 
with gender, plus measures for age in years and years of education for each member of the couple/dyad. 
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Table 5. Means and Standard Deviations for Individual and Couple-Level Measures 
by Parental Status: NLSY 1980-2008ab  
 Childfree Parents 
Couple-Years 13,550 47,740 
Couple Characteristics   
     
Couple Hourly Wage 14.01a 15.36a 
 (12.90) (14.95) 
Ln Couple Hourly Wage 2.34a 2.44a 
 (0.82) (0.83) 
Net Family Income $67,374.41a $71,183.98a 
 ($84,351.50) ($77,277.90) 
Number of Children in Household   1.99 
   (0.90) 
Spousal Characteristics 
  Husbands Wives Husbands Wives 
Person-Years 6,775 6,775 23,870 23,870 
 Hourly Wage 15.71
ab 12.37ab 18.16ab 12.73ab 
 (14.44) (10.90) (17.13) (11.65) 
Part-Time  0.06
ab 0.20ab 0.04ab 0.33ab 
 (0.24) (0.40) (0.20) (0.45) 
Currently Employed 0.97
a 0.92a 0.96a 0.89a 
 (0.17) (0.26) (0.20) (0.30) 
Age  34.61
ab 32.70ab 36.75ab 35.35ab 
 (8.45) (8.63) (8.87) (7.98) 
Years of Education 13.29
ab 13.99ab 12.98ab 13.39ab 
 (3.83) (3.26) (4.58) (4.05) 
High School Dropout 0.14ab 0.06ab 0 .18ab 0.09ab 
 (0.35) (0.24) (0.38) (0.29) 
High School Graduate 0.29ab 0.34ab 0.37ab 0.42ab 
 (0.45) (0.47) (0.48) (0.49) 
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher 0.39ab 0.36ab 0.27ab 0.24ab 
 (0.49) (0.48) (0.44) (0.43) 
Weekly Hours 44.00
ab 38.41ab 44.77ab 34.73ab 
 (10.97) (11.02) (10.36) (12.31) 
Annual Weeks Worked 49.09
ab 46.92ab 49.42ab 44.48ab 
 (14.02) (11.19) (10.18) (13.82) 
a p <.05, two tailed significance test for differences across couples. 
b p < .05, two tailed significance test for differences within couples.
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Table 6. Effect of Husband Wage Advantage and Number of Children Within Couples by Income Levela 
Quantile 0.05  0.1  0.25  0.5  0.75  0.9  0.95  
Couple N 880  972  2068  3072  3120  2100  1313  
Husband 
Advantage -0.089  0.216  0.325 ** 0.255 ** 0.268 ** 0.303 ** 0.378 ** 
 (0.053)  (0.040)  (0.023)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.024)  (0.037)  
Year 0.030 ** 0.016 ** 0.016 ** 0.017 ** 0.013 ** 0.013 ** 0.039  
 (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.003)  
Number of 
Children -0.042 * -0.032 * -0.032 ** -0.042 ** -0.043 ** -0.058 ** -0.062 ** 
 (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.014)  
Husband 
Advantage * 0.066 * 0.049 * 0.057 ** 0.079 ** 0.061 ** 0.081 ** 0.077 ** 
# of Children (0.032)  (0.020)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.018)  
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes dummy variable for gender and control for year of interview, number of children in the household and an 
interaction term for gender * number of children, and., age in years, years of education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the 
dyad. See Appendix Table A7 for variance components.    
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Table 7. Effect of Husband Wage Advantage and Number Children within Couples by Educational Attainment Levela,b 
               
 Both < 
High 
School 
Husband < 
High 
School/Wife 
Higher 
Husband 
High 
School/Wife 
Lower 
Both High 
School 
Husband 
High 
School/Wife 
Higher 
Husband 
Bachelor's/Wife 
Less 
Both 
Bachelor's 
Couple N 381 413 375 1450 970 554 933 
Husband Advantage 
(Childfree Gap) 
0.194 ** 0.140 ** 0.537 ** 0.317 ** 0.164 ** 0.307 ** 0.247 ** 
 (0.070)  (0.048)  (0.064)  (0.024)  (0.031)  (0.043)  (0.031)  
Year 0.049 ** 0.027 ** 0.038 ** 0.041 ** 0.041 ** 0.043 ** 0.043 ** 
 (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.003)  
Number of Children 
(Motherhood 
Penalty) 
-0.033  -0.026  -0.025  -0.034 ** -0.027 * -0.068 ** -0.038 ** 
 (0.023)  (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.017)  (0.013)  
Husband Advantage 
* Number of 
Children 
0.096 ** 0.040  0.028  0.080 ** 0.042 ** 0.101 ** 0.121 ** 
(Fatherhood 
Premium) 
(0.028)  (0.025)  (0.028)  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.024)  (0.016)  
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes dummy variable for gender and control for year of interview, number of children in the household, and its 
interaction term for gender * number of children, plus weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad. b See Table A8 in 
Appendix for variance components. 
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Table 8. Means and Standard Deviations for Individual and Couple-level Measures 
by Race/Ethnicity: NLSY 1980-2008a,b 
 Black White 
Couple N 774 2,288 
Couple Characteristics 
      
Couple Hourly Wage 14.24a  16.67a  
 (10.72)  (15.14)  
Ln Couple Hourly Wage 2.42a  2.53a  
 (0.75)  (0.81)  
Number of Children in Household 2.07a               1.96a 
 (0.98)               (0.86) 
One Child 0.25a               0.24a 
 (0.43)  (0.43)  
Two Children 0.31a  0.35a  
 (0.46)  (0.48)  
Three or More Children 0.23a  0.16a  
 (0.42)  (0.37)  
Residential, Biological Children 0.63a  0.67a  
 (0.48)  (0.47)  
Non-Residential, Biological Children 0.14a  0.05a  
 (0.34)  (0.21)  
Step-Children 0.06a  0.04a  
 (0.24)  (0.19)  
Spousal Characteristics 
  Husbands Wives Husbands Wives  
Person-Years 3,494 3,494 13,973 13,973  
 Hourly Wage 15.68ab 12.80ab 19.48ab 13.86ab  
 (11.41) (9.77) (16.82) (12.63)  
Age  36.73ab 35.38ab 37.49ab 35.77ab  
 (9.30) (8.93) (8.48) (7.87)  
Years of Education 13.17ab 13.67ab 13.46ab 13.92ab  
 (5.37) (4.31) (3.89) (3.81)  
Currently Employed 0.94ab 0.91ab 0.97ab 0.92ab  
 (0.24) (0.28) (0.18) (0.27)  
Weekly Hours 43.88ab 38.36ab 45.04ab 34.97ab  
 (10.21) (8.76) (10.27) (12.47)  
Annual Weeks Worked 49.23b 46.85ab 49.73b 45.57ab  
 (8.54) (11.75) (10.16) (12.62)  
a p <.05, two tailed significance test for differences across couples by race/ethnicity. 
b p < .05, two tailed significance test for differences within couples by gender. 
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Table 9. Effect of Husband Wage Advantage and Number of Children Within Married Couples by Racial Group a,b,c,d,e  
 Black White 
Couple N 774 774 774 774 2,288 2,288 2,288 2,288 
 Grossa Baselineb 
Assortative 
Partneringc 
Household 
Specializationd Grossa Baselineb 
Assortative 
Partneringc 
Household 
Specializationd 
Husband 
Advantage 0.23 ** 0.16 ** 0.16 ** 0.16 ** 0.43 ** 0.30 ** 0.30 ** 0.30 ** 
 (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Year 0.05 ** 0.05 ** 0.05 ** 0.04 ** 0.05 ** 0.05 ** 0.05 ** 0.05 ** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Number of 
Children   -0.04 ** -0.03 ** -0.03 **   -0.04 ** -0.05 ** -0.04 ** 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Husband 
Advantage *  
Number of 
Children  0.05 ** 0.05 ** 0.04 **   0.09 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 ** 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
                 
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Gross model includes dummy variable for gender and control for year of interview. b Baseline model includes dummy variable for 
gender, year of interview, number of children in the household, and an interaction term for gender * number of children. c Model includes all measures 
from the baseline model plus measures for age in years, years of education. d Model includes all measures from the human capital model plus weekly 
hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad. e See Table A11 in Appendix for variance components.
144 
 
Table 10. Effect of Husband Advantage  within Married Couples by Biological and 
Residential Status of Children and Racial Groupa,b 
Total Couple N 3062  
   
Husband Advantage 0.30 ** 
 (0.01)  
Year 0.05 ** 
 (0.00)  
Husband Advantage * Black -0.14 ** 
 (0.03)  
Residential Biological Children -0.05 ** 
 (0.01)  
Residential Biological Children * Black -0.06  
 (0.03)  
Residential Biological Children * Husband Advantage 0.13 ** 
 (0.02)  
Non-Residential Biological Children -0.10 * 
 (0.04)  
Non-Residential Biological Children * Black -0.05  
 (0.17)  
Non-Residential Biological Children* Husband Advantage 0.04  
 (0.05)  
Step-Children -0.12  
 (0.07)  
Step-Children * Black -0.05  
 (0.40)  
Step-Children * Husband Advantage 0.14  
 (0.08)  
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes all control measures from full model. bSee Table A12 in Appendix 
for variance components. 
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** p > .01, * p >.05. a Baseline model includes dummy variable for gender, year of interview, number of 
children in the household, and an interaction term for gender * number of children. b Model includes all 
measures from the baseline and human capital model plus weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each 
member of the dyad. c See Table A13 in Appendix for variance components from Table 14.
Table 11. Effect of Husband Wage Advantage and Number of Children Within 
Married Couples by Racial Groupa,b,c 
 Black White 
Couple N 774 774 2,288 2,288 
 Baseline Full Baseline Full 
Husband Advantage  0.159 ** 0.160 ** 0.298 ** 0.299 ** 
 (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.020)  (0.020)  
Year 0.048 ** 0.043 ** 0.047 ** 0.047 ** 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
One Child -0.022  -0.018  -0.013 * -0.008  
 (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.017)  (0.016)  
Two Children -0.033  -0.022  -0.065 ** -0.063 ** 
 (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.017)  (0.017)  
Three or More -0.135 ** -0.109 ** -0.159 ** -0.150 ** 
 (0.041)  (0.039)  (0.024)  (0.024)  
Husband *  One Child 0.054  0.055  0.077 ** 0.077 ** 
 (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.022)  (0.022)  
Husband * Two Children 0.096 * 0.095 * 0.212 ** 0.213 ** 
 (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.022)  (0.022)  
Husband * Three or 
More 0.150 ** 0.147 ** 0.266 ** 0.267 ** 
 (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.031)  (0.031)  
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Note: Results from full model using dummy variables for one child, two children, and three or more 
children including measures for human capital and household specialization. 
 
 
 
Note: Results from full model using dummy variables for one child, two children, and three or more 
children including measures for human capital and household specialization. 
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Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model using measure for number of children in the 
household plus measures for age in years and years of education, for each member of the dyad.  
 
 
Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model using measure for number of children in the 
household plus measures for age in years and years of education for each member of the dyad.  
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Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model using measure for number of children in the 
household plus measures for age in years, years of education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for 
each member of the dyad.  
 
Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model using measure for number of children in the 
household plus measures for age in years, years of education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for 
each member of the dyad.  
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Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model using measure for number of children in the household plus measures for weekly hours and 
annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad.  
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Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model using measure for number of children in the household plus measures for weekly hours and 
annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad.  
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Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model using measure for number of children in the household plus measures for weekly hours and 
annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad. Models estimating parental wage effects across income also include controls for age in years and 
years of education for each spouse. 
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Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model using measure for number of children in the 
household plus measures for age in years, years of education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for 
each member of the dyad.  
 
 
Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model using measure for number of children in the 
household plus measures for age in years, years of education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for 
each member of the dyad.  
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Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model plus measures for age in years, years of education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked 
for each member of the dyad.  
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Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model plus measures for age in years, years of 
education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad.  
 
Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model plus measures for age in years, years of 
education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad.
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Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model plus measures for age in years, years of 
education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad. 
 
 
Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model plus measures for age in years, years of 
education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad. 
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APPENDIX 
 
FULL RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY TESTS 
 
 
Table A1. Dyadic Data Structure   
COUPLE ID LNWAGE MALE YEAR NUMKID 
HUSBAND 
HOURS 
WIFE  
HOURS 
3 $13.73 0 93 1 0 35 
3 $21.98 1 93 1 40 0 
3 $9.87 0 104 2 0 35 
3 $26.44 1 104 2 45 0 
4 $9.62 1 93 1 42 0 
4 $5.81 0 93 1 0 40 
4 $7.00 0 98 1 0 40 
4 $16.54 1 98 1 44 0 
4 $25.00 1 100 2 44 0 
4 $9.89 0 100 2 0 30 
5 $7.81 0 98 2 46 34 
5 $19.23 1 98 2 46 34 
7 $18.03 0 93 1 0 36 
7 $15.86 1 93 1 42 0 
7 $16.82 1 94 1 42 0 
7 $9.62 0 94 1 0 37 
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Table A2. Proportions, Standard Deviations, and Sample Sizes of 
Couples by Parental Status and Work Hour Arrangements 
   Childless Parents 
Total N (Couple-Years)  6,775 23,870 
 
 Proportion  
(SD) 
 
Proportion 
 (SD) 
 
Breadwinner/Homemaker          
FT Husband/Not Emp Wife 1697 .07 0.10 
   (0.25) (0.30) 
Not Emp Husband/ FT Wife 633 0.02 0.03 
   (0.15) (0.17) 
Dual Earners      
Full-Time Dual Earners 4725 0.71 0.59 
   (0.45) (0.49) 
FT Husband/PT Wife 3067 0.18 0.31 
   (0.38) (0.46) 
PT Husband/FT Wife 657 0.04 0.03 
   (0.20) (0.17) 
Excessive Hours      
Husband > 50 Hours/FT 
Wife 
1610 
0.12 0.10 
   (0.33) (0.30) 
Husband > 50 Hours/PT 
Wife 
880 
0.03 0.06 
   (0.16) (0.24) 
Note: Couples’ work hour arrangements shift from year to year across survey wages. Therefore, 
the total number of couples in each category do not add to the total number of couples (5,769) in 
the sample. 
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** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes dummy variable for gender, control for year of interview, number of children in household and it’s interaction 
with gender, plus measures for age in years and years of education for each member of the couple/dyad. 
 
Table A3. Effect of Male Advantage and Number of Children on Couple’s Hourly Wages by Work Arrangements a 
  Breadwinner/Homemaker Dual Earners Excessive Hours 
Fixed Effects Traditional Non-Traditional 
Husband 
FT/Wife PT 
Husband PT/Wife 
FT 
Husband 
FT/Wife FT 
Husband > 50 
Hours/Wife PT 
Husband > 50 
Hours/Wife FT 
                          
Husband Advantage 0.38    ** 0.12     * 0.35 ** 0.32    ** 0.15 ** 0.28 ** 0.06  
  (0.03)   (0.05)   (0.02)   (0.07)   (0.01)   (0.07)  (0.04)  
Number of Children -0.05    ** -0.06     ** -0.02 * -0.02      -0.03 ** -0.03  -0.06 ** 
  (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.03)   (0.01)   (0.02)  (0.02)  
Number of Children * 
Husband Advantage 
0.08    ** 0.04     
 
0.07 ** 0.05    
  
0.05 ** 
0.08 ** 0.07 ** 
  (0.02)   (0.02)        (0.01)   (0.04)   (0.01)   (0.03)  (0.02)  
                          
Random Effects 
Level 2 
Husband Advantage 3.53e-13 
 
4.40e-22 
 
0.0169 ** .0525155 
  
0.0167 ** 0.0000   0.0103 ** 
 (4.47e-10)  (0.0032)  (.0169205) (0.0021)  (0.0000)  (0.0042)  
Number of Children 1.36e-16 ** 2.58e-19  0.0057 ** 2.02e-17   0.0059 ** 0.0000  ** 0.022 ** 
  (1.76e-1)  .  (0.0015)  (3.84e-17)   (0.0010)  (0.0000)   (0.0021)  
Mean Across Couples .0652282 ** .0578527  0.0862 ** .0025599   0.0909 ** 0.0000   0.0103 ** 
  (.0108643)  .  (0.0086)  (.0279323)   (0.0056)  (0.0000)   (0.0042)  
Level 1 Variance 
Within Couple Mean .1699227 ** .1490768  0.1127  ** .3621256   0.0937 ** 0.1817   0.0185  
  (.0135762)  .  (0.0083)   (.046425)   (0.0046)  (0.0243)   (0.0132)  
Residual .2733978 ** .2018393  0.2368  ** .3731797   0.1939 ** 0.3074  ** 0.2695 ** 
  (.0083599)  .  (0.0041)   (.0235748)   (0.0023)  (0.0149)   (0.0096)  
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Table A4. Effect of Male Advantage and Number of Children 
Within Couples 
Couple N 5769 
 Full 
Husband Advantage 0.26 ** 
 (0.01)  
Year 0.05 ** 
 (0.00)  
One Child -0.02  
 (0.01)  
Two Children -0.05 ** 
 (0.01)  
Three or More -0.14 ** 
 (0.02)  
Husband Advantage *  One Child 0.07 ** 
 (0.02)  
Husband Advantage * Two Children 0.18 ** 
 (0.02)  
Husband Advantage * Three or More 0.22 ** 
 (0.02)  
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes all control measures from full model.  
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Table A5. Sensitivity Test for Spouses’ Potential Experience a 
 Model A Model B Model C 
Husband Advantage 0.27 ** 0.27 ** 0.27 ** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Number of Children -0.04 ** -0.04 ** -0.04 ** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Husband Advantage * Number of 
Children  0.08 ** 0.08 ** 0.08 ** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
** p > .01, * p >.05. aModel A includes potential work experience, but not age or education. Model B 
includes potential work experience and age, but not education. Model C includes potential work 
experiences and education, but not age. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A6. Sensitivity Test for Spouses’ Relative Education and Age 
Sensitivity Testa 
 Model A Model B 
Husband Advantage 0.27 ** 0.27 ** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
Number of Children -0.04 ** -0.04 ** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  
Husband Advantage * Number of Children  0.08 ** 0.08 ** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model A are the results from the full model in Table 3. Model B are the results after 
replacing spouses’ age and education with measures for relative age and education. 
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Table A7. Variance Components From Table 6: Random Effects across Net Family Income 
Quantile  .05 .10 .25 .50 .75 .90 .95 
Husband Advantage *  Number of 
Children 0.062  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0019 ** 
             (0.0031)  
Number of Children 0.0000  0.0007  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0083 ** 
             (0.0018)  
Mean Across Couples 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 ** 
             (0.0000)  
Within-Couple Mean 0.2726  0.179  0.1432  0.1416  0.1278  0.1272  0.2590 ** 
             (0.0126)  
Residual 0.3711  0.2122  0.1817  0.1538  0.1530  0.1794  0.2464 ** 
             (0.0059)  
               
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Gross model includes dummy variable for gender and control for year of interview, number of children in the household, and an 
interaction term for gender * number of children., age in years, years of education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the 
dyad. 
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Table A8. Variance Components from Table 7: Random Effects by Educational Attainment 
 
Both < High 
School 
Husband < 
High 
School/Wife 
Higher 
Husband 
High 
School/Wife 
Lower 
Both High 
School 
Husband 
High 
School/Wife 
Higher 
Husband 
Bachelor's/Wife 
Less Both Bachelor's  
Male *  
Number of 
Children 0.0000 ** 0.0076 ** 0.0000 ** 0.0010 ** 0.0000 ** 0.0221 ** 0.0136 ** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0045)  (0.0000)  (0.0015)  (0.0000)  (0.0070)  (0.0038)  
Number of 
Children 0.0066 ** 0.0000 ** 0.0034 ** 0.0032 ** 0.0050 ** 0.0026 ** 0.0145 ** 
 (0.0028)  (0.0000)  (0.0024)  (0.0009)  (0.0015)  (0.0020)  (0.0027)  
Mean Across 
Couples 0.0491 ** 0.0234 ** 0.0000 ** 0.0343 ** 0.0314 ** 0.0504 ** 0.0522 ** 
 (0.0232)  (0.0126)  (0.0000)  (0.0070)  (0.0098)  (0.0158)  (0.0122)  
Within Couple 
Mean 0.2017 ** 0.1312 ** 0.2437 ** 0.1377 ** 0.1576 ** 0.1774 ** 0.1781 ** 
 (0.0262)  (0.0165)  (0.0220)  (0.0081)  (0.0110)  (0.0187)  (0.0135)  
Residual 0.2548 ** 0.1425 ** 0.1902 ** 0.1756 ** 0.2216 ** 0.2268 ** 0.2824 ** 
 (0.0103)  (0.0064)  (0.0087)  (0.0027)  (0.0041)  (0.0062)  (0.0048)  
               
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes dummy variable for gender and control for year of interview, number of children in the household, and its 
interaction term for gender * number of children, plus weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad.
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Table A9.  Sensitivity Test for Potential Experience Across Income Level 
 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.95 
Husband Advantage -0.09  0.22 ** 0.33 ** 0.26 ** 0.27 ** 0.30 ** 0.38 ** 
 (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.04)  
Number of Children -0.05 * -0.03 * -0.03 ** -0.04 ** -0.04 ** -0.06 ** -0.06 ** 
 (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Husband Advantage * 
Number of Children  0.07 * 0.05 * 0.06 ** 0.08 ** 0.06 ** 0.08 ** 0.08 ** 
 (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes dummy variable for gender and control for year of interview, number of children in the household, and its 
interaction term for gender * number of children, age in years, years of education, plus weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the 
dyad. 
Table A10. Sensitivity Test for Relative Education and Age Across Income Level 
 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.95 
Husband Advantage -0.09  0.22 ** 0.02 ** 0.02 ** 0.27 ** 0.30 ** 0.38 ** 
 (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.04)  
Number of Children -0.05 * -0.03 * -0.03 ** -0.04 ** -0.04 ** -0.06 ** -0.06 ** 
 (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Husband Advantage * 
Number of Children  0.07 * 0.05 * 0.06 ** 0.08 ** 0.06 ** 0.08 ** 0.08 ** 
 (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes dummy variable for gender and control for year of interview, number of children in the household, and it’s 
interaction term for gender * number of children, age in years, years of education, plus weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the 
dyad. 
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Table A11. Variance Components from Table 9: Random Effects by Racial Group 
 Black White 
Couple N 774 774 774 774 2288 2288 2288 2288 
 Gross Baseline HC Full Gross Baseline HC Full 
Level 1 Variance 
Within Couple Mean 0.145 ** 0.135 ** 0.135 ** 0.138 ** 0.177 ** 0.156 ** 0.157  0.158  
 (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  
                 
Level 2 Variance  Components 
Husband *  Number 
of Children  0.004 ** 0.004 ** 0.004 **   0.012 ** 0.011 ** 0.013 ** 
   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
Number of Children   0.008 ** 0.008 ** 0.004 **   0.010 ** 0.010 ** 0.008 ** 
   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Mean Across Couples 0.111 ** 0.097 ** 0.090 ** 0.071 ** 0.109 ** 0.105 ** 0.093 ** 0.081 ** 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  
Residual 0.205 ** 0.1994 ** 0.200 ** 0.193 ** 0.250 ** 0.241 ** 0.241 ** 0.233 ** 
 (0.004)  (0.0040)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Gross model includes dummy variable for gender and control for year of interview. b Baseline model includes dummy variable for 
gender, year of interview, number of children in the household, and an interaction term for gender * number of children . c Model includes all measures 
from the baseline model plus measures for age in years, years of education. d Model includes all measures from the human capital model plus weekly 
hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad.
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Table A12. Variance Components from Table 10: Random Effects by 
Racial Group 
 Black White 
Couple N 774 2288 
 
Level 1 Variance 
Within Dyad Mean 0.1416  0.1700  
     
Level 2 Variance Components 
     
Husband Advantage 0.0000  0.0000  
     
Residential Bio Children 0.0099  0.0230  
     
Non-Residential Bio Children 0.0000  0.0135  
     
Step-Children 0.0356  0.0346  
     
Husband Advantage * Residential Bio Children 0.0000  0.0266  
     
Husband Advantage * Non-Residential Bio 
Children 0.0000  0.0000  
     
Husband Advantage * Step-Children 0.0126  0.0000  
     
Mean Across Dyads 0.0706  0.0721  
     
Residual 0.1929  0.2369  
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes all control measures from full model.  
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Table A13. Variance Components from Table 11: Random Effects for Child 
Dummies by Racial Group 
 Black White 
Couple N 774 774 2688 2688 
 Baseline Full Baseline Full 
Level 1 Variance 
Within Dyad Mean 0.1401 ** 0.1425 ** 0.1659 ** 0.1671 ** 
 (0.0110)  (0.0110)  0.0071  0.0071  
Level 2 Variance Components 
One Child  0.0055 ** 0.0026 ** 0.0125 ** 0.0085 ** 
 (0.0090)  (0.0077)  (0.0047)  (0.0043)  
Two Children 0.0201 ** 0.0077 ** 0.0327 ** 0.0230 ** 
 (0.0093)  (0.0073)  (0.0053)  (0.0047)  
Three or More 0.0477 ** 0.0285 ** 0.0511 ** 0.0520 ** 
 (0.0154)  (0.0120)  (0.0099)  (0.0097)  
Male * One Child 0.0097 ** 0.0079 ** 0.0000 ** 0.0000 ** 
 (0.0136)  (0.0127)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Husband * Two 
Children 0.0000 ** 0.0000 ** 0.0086 ** 0.0129 ** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0073)  (0.0072)  
Husband * Three or 
More 0.0329 ** 0.0288 ** 0.0914 ** 0.1013 ** 
 (0.0212)  (0.0188)  (0.0176)  (0.0181)  
Mean Across Dyads 0.0999 ** 0.0718 ** 0.1026 ** 0.0782 ** 
 (0.0128)  (0.0113)  (0.0079)  (0.0073)  
Residual 0.1978 ** 0.1916 ** 0.2387 ** 0.2310 ** 
 (0.0040)  (0.0039)  (0.0023)  (0.0023)  
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Baseline model includes dummy variable for gender, year of interview, number of 
children in the household, and an interaction term for gender * number of children. b Full model includes all 
measures from the baseline and human capital model plus weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each 
member of the dyad.
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Table A14. Sensitivity Tests for Spouses' Potential Experience by Racial Group 
 Black White 
 Model A  Model B  Model C  Model A  Model B  Model C  
Husband 
Advantage 0.163784 ** 0.163483 ** 0.163483 ** 0.297246 ** 0.297236 ** 0.297236 ** 
 (0.031377)  (0.031372)  (0.031372)  (0.017754)  (0.01777)  (0.01777)  
Number 
of 
Children  -0.03201 ** -0.0298 ** -0.0298 ** -0.04445 ** -0.04292 ** -0.04292 ** 
 (0.010888)  (0.01091)  (0.01091)  (0.006571)  (0.006548)  (0.006548)  
Husband 
Advantage 
* # of 
Children 0.044678 ** 0.044639 ** 0.044639 ** 0.094072 ** 0.094161 ** 0.094161 ** 
 (0.014004)  (0.013998)  (0.013998)  (0.008582)  (0.008563)  (0.008563)  
** p > .01, * p >.05.  Model A includes potential work experience, but not age or education. Model B includes potential work 
experience and age, but not education. Model C includes potential work experiences and education, but not age. 
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Table A15. Sensitivity Test for Spouses’ Relative Education and Age by 
Racial Group 
 Black  White  
Husband Advantage 0.16 ** 0.30 ** 
 (0.03)  (0.02)  
Number of Children -0.03 ** -0.04 ** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
Husband Advantage * Number of Children  0.04 ** 0.09 ** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes all control measures from full model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A16. Sensitivity Test of Full Interactive Model from 
Table 9 
Husband Advantage 0.281 ** 
 (0.013)  
Husband Advantage * Black -0.104 ** 
 (0.033)  
Number of Children -0.036 ** 
 (0.005)  
Number of Children * Black 0.002  
 (0.011)  
Male Advantage * Number of Children 0.081 ** 
 (0.006)  
Black * Male Advantage * Number of Children -0.035 * 
 (0.015)  
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes all control measures from full model.  
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Table A17. Sensitivity Test of Full Model from Table 
10: Race Interactions  and Child Dummies 
    
Male Advantage  0.280 ** 
  (0.014)  
Male Advantage * Black -0.126 ** 
  (0.032)  
One Child  -0.016  
  (0.013)  
Two Children  -0.058 ** 
  (0.013)  
Three or More   -0.154 ** 
  (0.020)  
One Child * Black  -0.035  
  (0.058)  
Two Children * Black -0.033  
  (0.024)  
Three or More * Black -0.103  
  (0.096)  
One Child * Male Advantage 0.069 ** 
  (0.018)  
Two Children * Male Advantage 0.193 ** 
  (0.017)  
Three or More * Male Advantage 0.232 ** 
  (0.026)  
One Child * Black * Male Advantage -0.009  
  (0.097)  
Two Children * Black * Male 
Advantage -0.076  
  (0.092)  
Three or More * Black * Male 
Advantage 0.002  
  (0.143)  
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes all control measures from full model. 
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Table A18. Effects of Residential and Biological Status of 
Children on Couple’s Wages by Racial Group: 3-Way 
Interaction Model 
    
Male Advantage 0.295 ** 
  (0.015)  
Male Advantage * Black -0.094 * 
  (0.037)  
Intact Biological Child  -0.054 ** 
  (0.012)  
Intact Biological Child * Black -0.046  
  (0.034)  
Intact Biological Child * Male 
Advantage 0.140 ** 
  (0.016)  
Nonresidential Child -0.095 * 
  (0.044)  
Nonresidential Child * Black -0.048  
  (0.170)  
Nonresidential Child * Male 
Advantage 0.030  
  (0.060)  
Step-Child  -0.117  
  (0.070)  
Step-Child * Black -0.053  
  (0.400)  
Step-Child * Male Advantage 0.151  
  (0.098)  
Intact Biological Child * Black * 
Male Advantage -0.094  
  (0.061)  
Nonresidential Child * Black * Male 
Advantage 0.002  
  (0.223)  
Step-Child * Black * Male 
Advantage -0.041  
  (0.537)  
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes all control measures from full model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
171 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abraham, M., Auspurg, K., & Hinz, T. (2010). Migration Decisions within Dual-Earner 
Partnerships: A Test of Bargaining Theory. Journal of Marriage and Family, 
72(4), 876-892. 
 
Albiston, C. (2007). Institutional perspectives on law, work, and family. Annual Review    
of Law and Social Science, 3, 397–426. 
 
Allison, P. (2009). Fixed Effects Regression Models. Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
Amuedo-Dorantes, C. & Kimmel, J. (2005). The Motherhood Wage Gap in the United 
 States: The Importance of College and Fertility Delay. Review of Economics of 
the Household,   3(1), 17-48. 
 
Anderson, D.J., Binder, M., & Krause, K. (2002). The motherhood wage penalty: Which 
mothers pay it and why? American Economics Review, 92, 354-358. 
 
Autor, D.H., Katz, L.F., & Kearney, M.S. (2008). Trends in US Wage Inequality: 
Revising the Revisionists. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(2), 300-
323. 
 
Avellar, S., & Smock, P. (2003). Has the Price of Motherhood Declined Over Time? A 
Cross-Cohort Comparison of the Motherhood Wage Penalty. Journal of Marriage 
and Family, 65 (3), 597-607. 
 
Becker, G. (1981). A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Becker, P.E. & P. Moen. (1999). Scaling Back: Dual-Earner Couples’ Work-Family 
Strategies. Journal of Marriage and Family, 61(4), 995-1007. 
Belkin, L. (2003). The Opt-Out Revolution. New York Times, October 26. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/26/magazine/26WOMEN.html?pagewanted=all 
Bernhardt, A., Morris, M., & Handcock, M. S. (1995). Women’s Gains or Men' s Losses? 
A Closer Look at the Shrinking Gender Gap in Earnings. American Journal of 
Sociology, 101(2), 302–328. 
Bianchi, S. M., Robinson, J. P., & Milke, M. A. (2006). The changing rhythms of 
American family life. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Blau, F, Brinton, M. & Grusky, D. (Eds.) (2006). The Declining Significance of Gender? 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Blau, P. & Duncan, O. (1967). The American Occupational Structure. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc.  
172 
 
 
Blackwell. D. & Lichter, D. (2004). Homogamy among Dating, Cohabiting, and Married  
Couples. The Sociological Quarterly 45(4): 719-737. 
Blossfeld, H.-P., & Drobnič, S. (2001). Theoretical Perspectives on Couples’ Careers. In 
H.-P. Blossfeld & S. Drobnic (Eds.), Careers of Couples in Contemporary Society: 
From Male Breadwinner to Dual-Earner Families: From Male Breadwinner to 
Dual-Earner Families (pp. 16–50). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Boushey, H. (2008). “Opting out?” The effect of children on women's employment in the  
United States” Feminist Economics, 14(1), 1-36. 
 
Brown, I. & Misra, J. (2003). The Intersection of Gender and Race in the Labor Market. 
Annual Review of Sociology, 487-513. 
 
Budig, Michelle J. & England, P. (2001). The Wage Penalty for Motherhood. American 
Sociological Review, 204-225. 
 
Budig, M. J. & Hodges, M.J. (2010). Differences in Disadvantage: Variation in the 
Motherhood Penalty across White Women’s Earnings Distribution. American 
Sociological Review, 75(5), 705-728. 
 
_______. (2014). Statistical Models and Empirical Evidence for Differences in the 
Motherhood Penalty across the Earnings Distribution. American Sociological 
Review, 79(2), 358-364. 
 
Bumpass, L. & Lu, H. (2000). Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for Children’s 
Family Contexts in the United States. Population Studies, 54(1), 29-41.  
 
Carlson, M., McLanahan, S., & England, P. (2004). Union formation in fragile families.  
Demography, 41(2), 237-261. 
 
Carr, D. (2005). Mothers at work. Contexts, 4(2), 51. 
 
Cha, Y. (2010). Reinforcing Separate Spheres: The Effect of Spousal Overwork on Men 
and Women’s Employment in Dual-Earner Households. American Sociological 
Review, 75(2), 303-329.  
 
Cherlin, A. (2009). The Marriage-Go-Round: The State of Marriage and the Family in 
America Today. New York: Random House. 
 
_______. (2014). Labor’s Lost Love. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.  
 
Collins, P. H. (1998). Intersections of Race, Class, Gender and Nation: Some 
Implications for Black Family Studies. Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 
29(1), 27-36.  
173 
 
 
Cooke, L. P. (2014). Eugenics of Inequality: UK and UK Fatherhood Premia Across the 
Earnings Distribution: 1974 -2010. LIS Working Paper Series, No. 603 
 
Correll, S, Benard, S., & Paik, I. (2007). “Getting a Job: Is there a Motherhood Penalty?” 
American Journal of Sociology, 112(5), 1297-1338. 
 
David, H., & Dorn, D. (2013). The growth of low-skill service jobs and the polarization 
of the US labor market. The American Economic Review, 103(5), 1553-1597. 
 
Edin, K. & Kefalas, M. (2005). Promises I Can Keep: Why Poor Women Put Motherhood 
Before Marriage. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
England, P., Bearak, J., Budig, M., & Hodges, M. (2012). How the Motherhood Wage 
Penalty Varies by Wage, Cognitive Skill, and Race: A Reassessment. Presented at 
the Population Association of America Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA. 
 
Fortin, N. & Lemieux, T. (2000). Are Women’s Wage Gains Men’s Losses? A 
Distributional Test. The American Economic Review, 90(2), 456-460. 
 
Furstenberg. F. (1988). Good Dads, Bad Dads—Two Faces of Fatherhood. In Andrew J. 
Cherlin, (Ed.), The changing American family and public policy. (pp. 193-218). 
Washington, D.C., The Urban Institute Press. 
 
______. (1987). Race Differences in Teenage Sexuality, Pregnancy, and Adolescent 
Childbearing. The Milbank Quarterly, 381-403. 
 
Gap, O. P. (2013). Millennial Women Near Parity–For Now. Pew Research Center, 
Washington, D.C. Retrieved from http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/12/11/on-
pay-gap-millennial-women-near-parity-for-now/#overview. 
 
Glauber, R. (2007). Marriage and the Motherhood Wage Penalty among African 
Americans, Hispanics, and Whites. Journal of Marriage and Family, 69, 951-961. 
 
_______. (2008a). Race and gender in families and at work: The fatherhood premium. 
Gender & Society, 22, 8-30. 
 
_______. (2008b). Gender and race in families and at work: Fatherhood and men's labor 
market outcomes. New York University. Proquest Dissertation and Theses. 
 
Goldin, C. (2006). The quiet revolution that transformed women's employment,  
education, and Family. (No. w11953). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Gornick, J. & Meyers, M. (2005). Supporting a Dual Earner/Dual Carer Society. In Jody  
Heyman and Christopher Beem, (Eds). Unfinished Work. (pp. 371-408). New 
York: New Press. 
 
174 
 
Greenwood, J., Guner, N., Kocharkov, G., & Santos, C. (2014). Marry Your Like: 
Assortative Mating and Income Inequality. National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper, 104(5), 1-15. 
 
Grodsky, E., & Pager, D. (2001). The Structure of Disadvantage: Individual and 
Occupational Determinants of the Black-White Wage Gap. American 
Sociological Review, 66(4), 542-567. 
 
Gupta, S. (1999). The Effects of Marital Status Transitions on Men's Housework 
Performance. Journal of Marriage and Family, 61(3), 700-711. 
 
_______. (2007). Autonomy, dependence or display? The relationship between married 
women's earnings and housework. Journal of Marriage and Family, 69, 399–417. 
 
Harknett, K., & McLanahan, S. (2004). Racial and Ethnic Differences in Marriage after 
the Birth of a Child. American Sociological Review, 69(6), 790-811. 
 
Hartmann, H. (1981). The Family as the Locus of Gender, Class, and Political Struggle: 
The Example of Housework. Signs, 6(3), 366-394. 
 
Hodges, M. J. & Budig, M. J. (2010). Who Gets the Daddy Bonus? Organizational 
Hegemonic Masculinity and the Impact of Fatherhood on Earnings. Gender & 
Society, 24(6), 717-745. 
 
Huffman, M. & Cohen, P. (2004). Racial Wage Inequality: Job Segregation and 
Devaluation Across US Labor Markets. American Journal of Sociology, 109(4), 
902-936.  
 
Kalmijn, M. (1998). Intermarriage and Homogamy: Causes, Patterns, Trends. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 24, 395-421. 
 
Kamo, Y., & Cohen, E. L. (1998). Division of household work between partners: A 
comparison of Black and White couples. Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 
29, 131-145.  
 
Kennelly, I. (1999). That Single-Mother Element: Howe White Employers Typify Black 
Women. Gender & Society, 13, 168-192. 
 
Kenny, D. A., Kashy, D. A., & Cook, W. L. (2006). Dyadic Data Analysis. Guilford 
Press. 
 
Kilbourne, B., Farkas, G., Beron, K., Weir, D., & England, P. (1994). Returns to Skill, 
Compensating Differentials, and Gender Bias: Effects of Occupational 
Characteristics on the Wages of White Women and Men. American Journal of 
Sociology, 100(3), 689-719. 
 
175 
 
Killewald, A. (2013). A Reconsideration of the Fatherhood Premium: Marriage, 
Coresidence, Biology, and Father’s Wages. American Sociological Review, 78(1), 
96-116. 
 
Killewald, A. & Bearak, J. (2014). Is the Motherhood Penalty Larger for Low-Wage 
Women? A Comment on Quantile Regression. American Sociological Review, 
79(2), 350-357. 
Killewald, A. & Garcia- Manglano, J. (2013). His Gain, Her Pain? The Motherhood 
Penalty and the Fatherhood Premium within Coresidential Couples. Paper 
presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting. New York. 
Krieder, R & Ellis, R. (2011a). Living Arrangements of Children: 2009. Current 
 Population Reports (pp. 70-126). US Department of Commerce, Economics and 
Statistics Administration, US Census Bureau. 
 
_______. (2011b). Number, Timing, and Duration of Marriages and Divorces: 2009. 
Current Population Reports (pp. 1-23). US Department of Commerce, Economics 
and Statistics Administration, US Census Bureau. 
 
Lareau, A. (2003). Unequal Childhoods. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.  
 
Levy, F., & Murnane, R. J. (1992). US earnings levels and earnings inequality: A review  
of recent trends and proposed explanations. Journal of Economic Literature, 
1333-1381. 
 
Loghren, D. & Zissimopoulos, J. (2009). Why Wait? The Effect of Marriage and 
Childbearing on the Wages of Men and Women. Journal of Human Resources, 
44(2), 326-349. 
 
Lundberg, S., & Rose, E. (2000). Parenthood and the earnings of married men and 
women. Labour Economics, 7, 689-710. 
 
McCall, L. (2001). Sources of Racial Wage Inequality in Metropolitan Labor Markets: 
Racial, Ethnic, and Gender differences. American Sociological Review, 520-541. 
 
McGregor, J. (2013). Young Women are Closing the Pay Gap. The Washington Post. 
Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/on-
leadership/wp/2013/12/11/young-women-are-closing-the-pay-gap/. 
 
Misra, J., Moller, S., & Budig, M.J. (2007). Work Family Policies and Poverty for 
Partnered and Single Women in Europe and North America. Gender & Society, 
21(6), 804-827. 
 
Moen, P. (2003). It’s About Time: Couples and Work. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press.  
 
176 
 
National Women’s Law Center. (2013). Closing the Wage Gap is Crucial for Women of 
Color and Their Families. Retrieved from http://www.nwlc.org/resource/closing-
wage-gap-crucial-women-color-and-their-families. 
 
Pager, D. (2003). The Mark of a Criminal Record. American Journal of Sociology, 
108(5), 937-975. 
 
Pager, D. & Quillian, L. (2005). Walking the Talk? What Employers Say Versus What 
They Do. American Sociological Review, 70(3), 355-380. 
 
Pagnini, D. & Morgan, S. (1996). Racial Differences in Marriage and Childbearing: Oral 
History Evidence from the South in the Early Twentieth Century. American 
Journal of Sociology, 101(6), 1694-1718. 
 
Presser, H. (1994). Employment schedules among dual-earning spouses and the division 
of household labor by gender. American Sociological Review, 59, 348-364. 
 
Raudenbush, S., & Bryk, A. (2002). Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data  
Analysis Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
Ridgeway, C. & Correll, S. (2004). Motherhood as a Status Characteristic. Journal of  
 Social Issues, 60(4), 683-700. 
 
Rosenfeld. M. J. (2007). The Age of Independence: Interracial Unions, Same-Sex Unions 
and the Changing American Family. Harvard University Press. 
 
Sandberg, S. (2013). Lean In. New York: Random House. 
 
Sayer, A. G. & Klute, M. M. (2005). Analyzing Couples and Families: Multi-level 
Methods. In Begston, V., et al. (Eds.), The Sourcebook of Family Theory and 
Research (pp. 289-313). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Schwartz, C. & Mare, R. (2005). Trends in Educational Assortative Marriage from 1940 
2003. Demography, 42(4), 621-646.  
 
Shelton, B. & John, D. (1993). Does Marital Status Make a Difference? Housework 
among Married and Cohabiting Men and Women. Journal of Family Issues, 
14(3), 401-420. 
 
Shows, C. & Gerstel, N. (2008). Fathering, Class, and Gender: A Comparison of 
Physicians and Emergency Medical Technicians. Gender & Society, 23(2), 161-
187. 
 
South, S. & Spitze, G. (1994). Housework in Marital and Nonmarital Households. 
American Sociological Review, 59, 327-347. 
 
177 
 
Stone, P. (2007). Opting Out? Why Women Really Quit Careers and Head Home. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
 
Taniguchi, H. (1999). The Timing of Childbearing and Women’s Wages. Journal of 
Marriage and Family, 61(4), 1008-1019. 
 
Tomaskovic-Devey, D. (1993). The Gender and Race Composition of Jobs and the 
Male/Female, White/Black Pay Gaps. Social Forces, 72(1), 45-76. 
 
Treas, J. & DeRuijter, E. (2008). Earnings and expenditures on household services in 
married and cohabiting unions. Journal of Marriage and Family, 70, 796–805. 
 
Waldfogel, J. (1997). The effect of children on women’s wages. American Sociological 
 Review, 62, 209-217. 
 
_______. (1998). Understanding the ‘Family Gap’ in Pay for Women with Children. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(1), 137-156. 
 
Wang, W. (2012). The Rise of Intermarriage Rates, Characteristics Vary by Race and  
Gender. Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. Retrieved from 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/02/16/the-rise-of-intermarriage/2/#chapter-
1-overview 
 
West, C. & Zimmerman, D. (1987). Doing Gender. Gender & Society, 1(2), 125-151. 
 
Western, B. & McClanahan, S. (2000). Fathers behind bars: The impact of incarceration  
on family formation. Princeton University,  
 
Wilde, E. T., Batchelder, L., & Ellwood, D. T. (2010). The mommy track divides: The 
impact of childbearing on wages of women of differing skill levels (No. w16582). 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Williams, C. (1995). Still a man’s world. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Williams, J. (2000). Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do 
About It. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Williams, J. (2010). Reshaping the Work-Family Debate: Why Men and Class Matter. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Williams, J. C., & Boushey, H. (2010). The three faces of work-family conflict. San 
Francisco: Center for American Progress/WorkLife Law. Available at SSRN 
2126314. 
 
 
 
178 
 
Winkler, A. E., McBride, T. D., & Andrews, C. (2005). Wives who outearn their 
husbands: A transitory or persistent phenomenon for couples?. Demography, 
42(3), 523-535. 
 
Winslow-Bowe, S. (2009). Husbands and Wives Relative Earnings: Exploring Variation 
by Race, Human Capital, Labor Supply, and Life Stage. Journal of Family Issues, 
30(10), 1404-1432. 
 
 
 
 
 
